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Abstract 
This thesis presents an emerging concept called the interactional self to 
illustrate how, contrary to theories of "cyberspace" and "cyberselves," there tend 
not to be sharp socio-phenomenological distinctions between "virtual" and 
offline sociability within one's life-world. As such, using aspects of the 
philosophies of experience of Heidegger, Mead, Schutz, and Husserl as 
foundations, this thesis argues that social interactions online, for most, are 
extensions of and not apart from their everyday, situated life-worlds. 
After briefly introducing the path towards our contemporary "will-to- 
virtuality" and various utopian and dystopian visions of "cyberspace," an 
alternative conceptual picture of the interactional self is gradually revealed using 
the metaphor of a portrait painted on a "social-world canvas." In this painting, 
the ontology of Heidegger's Dasein supplies the first brushes for outlining the 
early sketches of the interactional self, showing that online, as in offline settings, 
we encounter the world and others from the position of beings deeply engaged 
in practical daily acts and "interpretative understandings." These brushes are 
then dipped into Mead's intertactionist colours and Schutz's socio- 
phenomenological textures, eventually filling in the portrait. Illustrated via a 
case study of blogging practices, Mead's theory of the "generalized other" 
highlights the notion that the interactional self does not concretely distinguish 
between offline and online social settings but instead, as in more traditional "off 
the network" situations, uses Internet-mediated communication for performative 
practices that afford self-expression and maintain social cohesion. Schutz's 
phenomenology of the life-world gives further perspective to the interactional 
... 
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self, showing that online sociability should not be viewed as being apart from the 
"intersubjective" intersection of life-worlds rooted in everyday life. With some 
help from Husserl's phenomenology, Schutz is subsequently relied on for 
understanding online textual embodiment, spatial extensions, community, role- 
playing, and fantasy, adding yet more socio-historical shadings to interactions 
online. 
Ultimately, the picture that emerges is framed within the following four 
concluding hypotheses: 1) The interactional self encounters social acts, online 
and off, as part of its greater life-world, practicing performative and group- 
enforcing self-management through 2) varying and interlinked dimensions of 
sociability and 3) pragmatic yet meaningful uses of the communicational tools at 
hand in 4) contextually relevant degrees of self-disclosure. 
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Introduction 
"We represent this original phenomenon of our humanity thus: we 
are what we are only through the community of mutually 
conscious understandings. There can be no man who is a man for 
himself alone, as a mere individual.. .. Truth therefore cannot be 
separated from communicability. It only appears in time as a 
reality-through-communication." 
-Karl Jaspers, 1957, Reason and Existenz, pp. 77-79 
I would like to propose in the following pages that the Internet, while 
imbued with powerful and efficient asynchronous and synchronous technologies 
for interpersonal, inter- and intra-group, and potentially mass-distributed 
communication, is mainly a collection of mediational tools used in the mundane 
course of everyday life. While the Internet does disclose new possibilities for 
human interaction, humanist-minded communication studies are also revealing 
that the sociality mitigated by the network-of-networks is deeply ensconced in 
the communicational and informational routines of everyday life. As a result, I 
would also like to propose in the following pages that a socially situated self, not 
a virtually fragmented self, helps us better understand the Internet's impact on 
sociability in these everyday contexts. Further, this socially situated self, I 
maintain, is a self that is revealed by its interactions with others mostly rooted in 
known social networks of affinity and conviviality; this is a self primarily 
embedded in the world of embodied flesh-and-blood, not splintered bits-and- 
bytes. In the spirit of social interaction theory and existential notions of worldly 
encounter, I would like to therefore call this socially situated self the interactional 
self.' In addition, because this interactional self pragmatically positions the 
Internet and its inherent technologies within meaningful use-contexts, I would 
like to term this online interaction between individuals Internet-mediated 
co~n~nunication (IMC2). 
As such, this thesis explores how technologically-mediated Internet 
sociability interplays with one's sense of self, self with others, and self and world. 
Rather than theories of cyberspace and cyberselves pitting the "virtual reality" 
(VR) of an "online world" against the "real world" (RW), I would like to efface 
this dichotomy by grounding my exploration in the too-often overlooked 
philosophies of experience and the worldly contingent self articulated in 
different circumstances by Martin Heidegger (1962/2001), George Herbert Mead 
(1934), Alfred Schutz (1962; 1970; 1973), and, because of his influence on Schutz 
and Heidegger, Edmund Husserl (1913 / 1931).3 
' This term is not originally mine. See Chapter 1 for details concderning its background. 
With the term "Internet-mediated communication" and its acronym " I M C  I am borrowing 
from and purposely modifying the acronym for "computer-mediated communication" (CMC) in 
order to differentiate Internet-mediated human interactions from other types of computer- 
mediated interactions. At the same time, I believe the term IMC still situates the 
phenomenologically-sensitive theories of human social experiences online within the greater 
body of human and social science work consisting of CMC studies, human computer interaction 
(HCI) research, and the emergent field of Internet studies. Having said this, I believe the term 
"Internet-mediated communication" is better than the more generic term "computer-mediated 
communication" when specifically attempting to look at Internet-based social interaction because 
it distinguishes the Internet as an emerging and important conglomeration of communicative 
tools that is affording new and meaningful ways for people to engage with the world. The word 
"interactional" also suggests Internet sociality should be looked at from the point-of-view of 
existential and sociological phenomenologies, pragmatism, social interaction theory, and 
symbolic interactionism. Additionally, "IMC" specifically points to an epistemic focus on the 
multifarious Internet-centred and network-supported technologies and the interactive and 
iizternctioiznl natures of socializing with others on the Internet. Lastly, the term suggests that 
Internet sociability supports transactional social exchange and collaboration facilitated by its 
constituent technologies' communicative affordances, opening up new horizons of 
communicative potential without having to appeal to overly deterministic technophobic or 
technophilic views of cyberspace. All of this will be elaborated on throughout this thesis. 
See Appendix 4 for a brief discussion concerning some of my reasons for specifically appealing 
to these four philosophers in this thesis. 
To help me along the way by providing me with further interpretive 
handles for applying these early- to mid-20th century philosophers to the 
empirical evidence I present throughout the thesis, I also appeal to several key 
ideas in Andrew Feenberg's (1999; 2002; 2003) critical philosophy of technology; 
Don Ihde's (1983; 1990) phenomenology of technologically-mediated existence; 
Maria Bakardjieva's (2000) ethnography of the Internet in everyday life; Darin 
Barney's (2000) phenomenology of networked existence; Paul Dourish's (2001) 
phenomenology of situated actions; Barry Wellman's (1999) social network 
theories of the Internet; Manuel Castells's (2001) sociology of the Internet; and 
numerous other ethnographic studies looking into Internet sociability. These 
researchers and theorists and their empirical endeavours are showing that the 
foundational works of communication study's 2oth century humanist heritage are 
still relevant for critically interpreting our late-modern "age of computerized 
networks" (Barney, 2000, p. 29) where "the words 'technology,' 'information,' 
and 'communication' constitute the holy trinity" (p. 29) of our epoch. In one way 
or another, the philosophies of Heidegger, Mead, Schutz, and Husserl all shed 
light on where we sit as "networked individualso4 (Castells, 2001, p. 128) within 
our epoch's "holy trinity" while still illuminating the meaning of human 
TO Castells (2001) and Wellman (1999), the concept of networked individualism encapsulates 
the predominant form of sociability online, based on "a social pattern" of individuals building 
their "portfolios of sociability" (Castells, 2001, p. 132) and "networks, online and offline, on the 
basis of their interests, values, affinities, and projects" (pp. 130-131). In these social settings 
afforded by "recent technological developments in communication" (p. 130), the networked 
individual is capable of sustaining "strong ties at a distance" (p. 130) while fostering weaker, 
more one dimensional ties that are nevertheless important social groupings that support interest- 
based communities requiring lower levels of commitment, "lower entry barriers, and lower 
opportunity costs" (p. 132) but that still satisfy the specific social needs of each participant. I 
assume the concept of a "networked individual" to be a fundamental condition of the 
interactional self and further interpret this from Schutz's socio-phenomenological perspective in 
Chapters 5 and 6 (also see Chapter 1). 
experiences (Husserl), the nature of "Being" (Heidegger), the social contingency 
of the self (Mead), and the intersubjective constitution of the life-world (Schutz). 
Most importantly for this thesis, the work of scholars such as Feenberg, 
Bakardjieva, Barney and others have helped convince me that Husserl, 
Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz are essential for understanding Internet sociability 
and community as new yet multi-dimensional and intimately interconnected 
parts of each users' broader and a priori socially-embedded, mundane, and 
intersubjective life-world. In other words, Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and 
Schutz help us see, I argue, that the sociability that is mediated by the Internet is 
best thought of as the world online - part of our already always and embodied 
situated world - not a separate "online world." Consequently, I hope to show 
how a socially-emergent and interactio~zal selfbuilt on Heidegger's hermeneutics 
of worldly encounter, Mead's symbolic interaction, Schutz's sociological 
phenomenology, and Husserl's phenomenology of experience, is ultimately very 
useful in helping us understand, on the whole, what happens between the screen 
and the self and other selves behind other screens. 
Within the rubric of these four foundational philosophers' 
conceptualizations of the human experiences of the existential, pragmatic, and 
socially-rooted self, this thesis will always have the following three questions as 
a backdrop: 
Does IMC create a new social reality - a virtual reality - or is it, as 
Castells (2001) and Wellman (1999) posit, situated in everyday life? 
What happens in the mediated interactions between the screen and the 
self and other selves behind other screens? 
Does IMC reveal a new way of doing new things or a new way of 
doing old things? 
In considering these questions I will first gradually paint a conceptual 
portrait of an interactional self that engages in online sociability using empirical 
evidence from an extended literature review of ethnographic and quantitative 
studies of Internet sociability. Second, I will carry out my own 
phenomenological analyses of the following IMC phenomenon: an email 
exchange (Chapter 3), embodiment in IMC (Chapter 5), and various 
phenomenologies of online communities (Chapters 5 and 6) .  Additionally, I will 
provide a brief case study of the phenomenon of blogging and a literature review 
of scholarly communication studies that look into blogging practices in Chapter 
4. This blogging case study and literature review serve to show how blogs are 
not only exemplar of the social situatedness of IMC within the lived experiences 
of "bloggers' everyday lives but also show how blogs are contemporary 
examples of how the structure of IMC technologies both afford particular social 
interactions while also being shaped by those interactions within the very use- 
contexts of IMC. In this light, all analyses in this thesis, including the case study, 
are also implicitly grounded in Feenberg's (1995~; 2003) critical and hermeneutic 
"double-aspect"%nd "worlding" theories of technology, as I lay out in Chapter 
2. 
Ultimately, the entire thesis unfolds around seven grounded postulates of 
the interactional self.6 These seven postulates, and the chapters where they 
"he "double-aspect" theory of technology stipulates "that social meanings [imbued in 
technology] and functional rationality are inextricably intertwined dimensions" (Feenberg, 1995c, 
. 12, emphasis added). 
'The seven postulates can be said to be "groundedt' because, as a phenomenological disposition 
requires, I first describe the experience or empirical evidence of a phenomenon before coming to 
the theoretical generalization of the postulates (Schwandt, 2000). Throughout the thesis I try to 
hold off on theorizing about the phenomenon in question until the last possible moment as best I 
can. This is not always completely possible, however, especially because of the need to also 
synthesize the key aspects of each of the main philosophers' respective theories of experience, 
both for myself and for the reader. This thesis, therefore, is as much an account of my own 
subsequently appear, are as follows: 
The interactional self's sedimented and socio-biographical offline 
affinities, on the whole, dictate its online activities. (Chapter 2.) 
The interactional self is the "point-zero" of all human experience and 
lives within a socio-biographically-rooted life-world where meaning is 
interpretively mediated within both the life-world's technological 
contours and the experientially-based and socio-culturally informed 
use-contexts of those technological contours. (Chapter 2). 
The interactional self is in a constant state of interpretation of itself and 
its world, practically using the things of the world, online and offline, 
as conduits for communicating with others and for self-understanding. 
(Chapter 3.) 
The interactional self emerges within a social context by projecting 
itself onto others and being projected upon through social and 
symbolic interactions. (Chapter 4.) 
The interactional self encounters others through intersubjectively 
overlapping life-worlds and within varying degrees of bodily and 
spatial extensions. (Chapter 5.) 
The interactional self practices community-building and community- 
sustaining acts that are the intersubjectively motivated contributions of 
individuals committed to participating in communicational reciprocity 
to accomplish or partake in common projects together. (Chapter 6.) 
The interactional self uses instrumental anonymity and strategic self- 
disclosure as part of the normal course of encountering its life-world, 
online or offline. (Chapter 6.) 
In laying out these seven postulates, the phenomenology of Husserl will 
be my painter's palette; the hermeneutic ontology of Heidegger will provide my 
brushes; the social philosophies of Mead and the intersubjective phenomenology 
of Schutz my paints and textures; and the embodied and sedimented world 
described by the empirical studies I review throughout my social-world easel 
and canvas. Inspired by Heidegger's call to get to the "essence of truth" by 
loolung at the world in a spirit of "aleflzeid"' an unfolding "truth revealing" 
encounters with the main propositions of the philosophers of experience I engage with as it is a 
phenomenological or social interactional investigation of Internet practices. As such, I have 
attempted to balance these explanatory needs with the descriptive requirements of a 
phenomenological standpoint. 
(Heidegger, quoted in I n ~ o o d ,  1999, p. 13)7 - the aim of this thesis is not to 
definitively show the way the world online is but, rather, to ponder possibilities 
for how the life-world and IMC might be revealed and, thus, ultimately have 
ourselves revealed in the process. In the spirit of this Heidegger-inspired 
meditative disclosure, then, the emerging theoretical image of the interactional 
self will gradually reveal a socially situated self that uses IMC pragmatically yet 
meaningfully and contextually as part of its embedded and embodied socio- 
cultural and socio-biographical world, not within a separate, uprooted, 
disembodied, and unhinged virtual world. 
A Few Words Concerning the Phenomenological and Interactional 
Focus of this Thesis 
A key point deserves clarification from me right off the top: This thesis 
does not engage in a full-on focus on aspects of power and political economy 
with regards to the social aspects of the Internet. Instead, it seeks to, from a 
phenomenological standpoint, look primarily into Internet user experiences, how 
user agency might unfold at the micro-sociological level, and how sociability 
might be mitigated via IMC. Thus, in the following pages I purposefully bracket 
out a full-blown critical analysis of Internet-mediated sociability, the institutional 
constraints of the Internet, and the power dynamics at play in our contemporary 
consumerist and technocratic society in order to more fully engage with the 
Aletlzein is Greek for "'truth; truthfulness; real, actual.. .the not hidden or forgotten"' (Heidegger, 
quoted in Inwood, 1999, p. 13). It is "that which is un-concealed, that which gets discovered or 
uncovered" (Heidegger, 196212001, p. 57). According to Heidegger, nletheia encourages us to 
approach the essence of truth from "'reflection on the ground of the possibility of correctness' 
and from 'recollection of the beginning"' (Heidegger, quoted in Inwood, 1999, p. 13) in order to 
take the things of the world out of their "'hiddeness"' (p. 13). 
sociological and phenomenological approaches I propose. This is a regrettable 
choice I had to make early on due to space constraints and my desire to 
effectively grapple with the phenomenological and interactional theories that I 
engage with. At the same time, however, I fully recognize and remain sensitive 
to the strong presence of influential technical and political power structures, the 
social inequities within our contemporary techno- and socio-political realities, 
and the normative force of the technocratic language structures that shape our 
perspective on the world and thus hold sway over us. Indeed, to face these 
issues head-on and contribute to the search for more equitable and sustainable 
ways of living within the technologically-mediated realities that define our epoch 
are the main reasons I left the corporate world for the world of academia two 
years ago! 
While not the main focus of this thesis, the political is not, however, 
ignored in the following pages. The socio-political aspects of technological 
mediation are encompassed in this thesis (if indirectly at times) in the very 
positioning of the conceptualizations of the interactional self and IMC within the 
greater rubric of the "double aspect theory" of technology (Feenberg, 1995c, p. 
12) (see Chapter 2). This is because the double aspect theory elaborates on how 
users of technology are both caught up in the instrumental rationalizations that 
dictate contemporary modes of existence as "subjects" to the technocratic 
constraints of advanced-industrial society while also acknowledging that 
technology's ambivalence affords users "margins of manoeuvre" to resist and 
appropriate technologies within the very instrumentalized realities of 
contemporary life (Feenberg, 1999). These margins of expressive and 
empowering user manoeuvrings (or "appropriations") not only open up human- 
technology relations to users' resistive potentialities but also open these relations 
to the possibilities for "democratizing" our technological decisions (Feenberg, 
1991, 1995c, 1999,2003). I illustrate the "double aspect" of IMC and assess how 
IMC technologies have empowering potential throughout this thesis and 
specifically lay out this dynamic in 1) the blog case study (Chapter 4), 2) the 
Schutz-influenced analysis of how IMC affords the phenomenological extensions 
of space for the benefit of marginalized groups (Chapter 5), and 3) in the 
overview of how Schutz's socio-phenomenological theory of the "in-group" can 
help design better user-centric online communities (Chapter 6). 
While I intend to more fully investigate the socio-political, structural, and 
power dynamics between technology creators, technocratic systems, and 
technology users' life-worlds in future work, in this thesis I have decided to 
particularly focus on phenomenological methods for assessing IMC user 
experiences and the meanings behind those experiences. A phenomenological 
attitude and methodology, I will argue in this thesis, can serve as possible 
starting points for both loolung at the dimensions of technocratic control 177td 
personal and social emancipation. As such, I believe, as do Feenberg (1996, 
1999), Ihde (1990)' and Bakardjieva (2000), that hermeneutic and 
phenomenological techniques can be used to complement critical and discursive 
methodologies in a critical Izernzelzeutics of teclz7zolo~y (Bakardjieva, 2000, p. 87; 
Feenberg, 1996). In fact, one of the main desires I had for this thesis when I 
embarked on researching and writing it was to specifically explore the 
interpretive and phenomenological dimensions of this emerging critical 
hermeneutics of technology project in order to better prepare myself for more 
explicitly critical work in my future scholarly endeavours." 
As such, this thesis assumes the "interactional selfu9 to be a socially, 
culturally, and politically contingent user construct that positions the everyday 
technology user of IMC as 1) influenced by the seen and unforeseen technical (as 
well as political, social, and cultural) structures of our contemporary, advanced 
industrial reality wlde  also bei~zg 2) a pragmatically rational individual that is able 
to make ongoing decisions concerning actions and interactions and is involved 
and engaged in personal and shared life projects in varying degrees of 
 involvement^.'^ The image of the interactional self that this thesis gradually 
unfolds, therefore, emerges within the interplay of the empirical evidence I 
present, the phenomenological analyses I carry out, and the seven subsequent 
theoretical postulates I develop. 
With the discussion thusfar in mind, the image of the interactional self 
that is eventually revealed in the subsequent chapters is a theoretical model of an 
'The type of work I have in mind for the near-future will see me blend a hermeneutics of 
technology (Bakardjieva, 2000), an existential phenomenology of "techics" and human- 
technology (Ihde, 1983,1990), and medium theory (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1988; Meyrowitz, 1985) 
with a critical theory of technology (Feenberg, 1999), theories of the empowering "potentialities" 
inherent in "nonneutral" technical objects (Marcuse, 1964; Feenberg 2003), and democratic 
interventions in technology assessment and participatory technology design (Kleinman, 2000; 
Mansell & Silverstone, 1996; Sclove, 1995). Examples of such cross-disciplinary critical projects 
for technology studies that straddle both the theoretical and the practical realms that have 
implications for a democratic reassessment of technology include Barney (2000), Bakardjieva 
(2000), and various examples in Feenberg (1999). 
I address my decision to use the term "self" - a contentious word amongst some contemporary 
theoretical schools such as postmodernism, poststructuralism, and deconstructionionism - in 
Chapter I .  
l o  In these two respects, this thesis has been primarily inspired by the work of two of my 
supervisors: Prof. Andrew Feenberg's (1999) critical and constructivist hermeneutics of 
technology and Dr. Roman Onufrijchuk's (2003) Techno-Experiential Design Assessment (TEDA) 
program. I am deeply indebted to both of them for their guidance and for their intellectual 
inspiration with regards to these two major points that, it could be said, both make u p  my thesis's 
"chasis." 
IMC user that experiences Internet sociability as tightly woven within a lattice 
consisting of three worldly eilcouizters that start from the perspective of an 
"experiencing life" (Schutz, 1962, p. 123). These three encounters are: 1) 
e~zcouizters w i th  the self, 2) eizcouizters witlz otlzers, and 3) eilcouizters w i th  coi~znzuizity." 
That is, as phenomenology and social interaction theory help us understand, the 
interactional self's socio-biographically informed life-world, whether online or 
offline, is constituted at various times and in overlapping fashion as a self-in-the- 
world, co-constructed through its worldly encounters, its shared lived 
experiences with "intended" others, and by this worldly self's deep desire to be 
in community with others (for an illustration of this intersubjective and 
interactional self of worldly encounter, see Appendix 1). Indeed, at the heart of 
this thesis's concept of the interactional self is the unabashed existential 
proposition that all humanity - online or off, presently or historically - shares an 
essential condition: the will-to-coiizi~zzrizicate. As Karl Jaspers (19571 1997) 
poetically articulates: 
To be genuinely true, truth must be communicable. We represent 
this original phenomenon of our humanity thus: we are what we 
are only through the community of mutually conscious 
understandings.. .. There can be no man who is a man for himself 
alone, as a mere individual.. .. Truth therefore cannot be separated 
from communicability.. .. Out of the consciousness of a becoming 
truth, first springs the possibility of a radical openness of the will to 
coiiziizuizicnte in actuality. (pp. 77-106, emphasis added) 
Jaspers' sentiments also lie at the heart of the human philosophies of experience I 
appeal to in this thesis and are therefore core to the theory of the interactional 
self that will be elaborated on in these pages. 
" I am again indebted to Dr. Onufrijchuk (2003) for pointing me to these aspects of human 
experience in a technologized world. 
Chapter 1: 
A Path to the Interactional Self 
"I am, this life is, I live: cogito." 
-Edmund Husserl, 1913, Ideas I, p. 143 
Before fully engaging with its implications for IMC, this chapter seeks to 
situate the concept of the interactional self within an historical perspective. I do 
this cautiously, however: This is certainly not a definitive history; to embark on 
any attempt at a definitive history of the concept of "the self" is to engage in an 
enormous task certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, whether even 
such a total history exists is questionable. The concept of the self can be seen to 
be at the heart of metaphysics and philosophy since at least Socrates' charge to 
the soul-searcher - quoting the inscription at Delphi's temple to Apollo - to 
"know thyself" (Holstein & Gubrium, 2000; Leahey, 2001). How well we can 
come to know this self, however, is another matter. As poststructuralists have 
pointed out, any self knowledge is always susceptible to the socio-cultural and 
socio- political contexts and the linguistic conventions we find ourselves in. 
Thus, while this chapter can only aspire to a thumbnail sketch of my own 
interpretation of the trajectory of notions of selfhood leading to the interactional 
self, it is nevertheless important before moving on with the main thrust of the 
analysis proposed in this thesis for me to clarify my decision to use the term "the 
self" and to attempt to place "the interactional self" within some historical 
context. This is particularly important in light of the problematization of a 
notion of "the self" by poststructuralists, postmodernists, and anti-humanist 
theorists working within the rubric of the philosophies of language, critical 
notions of power, and the "linguistic turn." 
With these precautions at hand, this chapter attempts to situate the 
interactional self within a narrative trajectory of the self and its theoretical 
evolution into the "subject," a trajectory that has preoccupied modem and 
postmodern philosophical inquiry (Docherty, 1994; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000; 
Silverman, 1994). The chapter concludes by positioning the interactional self as a 
phenomenological cousin of the "communitarian self," thus, as I will make clear 
shortly, placing the interactional self in a middle ground between the intensely 
rational, liberal humanist theories of the unitary self on the one hand and a 
complete negation of any possibility of a sense self in light of the "absent subject" 
of postructuralism on the other (Hayles, 1999; Silverman, 1994). While, as I will 
also clarify in this chapter, I do not entirely agree with the postmodern notion 
that we can no longer have any foundation or concept of selfhood in light of our 
complete immersion in a reality made up entirely of language-games, consumer 
imagery, and simulation, I do view language and narrativity as playing a crucial 
role in defining the self in conjunction with the individual's social contexts and 
biographical experiences as sustained and altered by that individual throughout 
his or her life. This "narrative of life," in agreement with the postmodernists and 
poststructuralists, is partially influenced by the language that that individual is 
immersed in. The interactional self, however, also possesses aspects of agency 
that bring with it the possibility for recreating, rewriting, and even re-evaluating 
this sense of self with others and in light of the social, cultural, and material 
world that it is immersed in. I thus view the interactional self as having much 
overlap with aspects of postmodern notions of the subject, in particular with the 
subject's narrative makeup and socio-biographical and socio-historical 
contingencies, without negating that the individual still has access to a sense of 
self, however "constructed" and "co-constructed" that sense of self might be.I2 
My argument for this "middle ground" for the interactional self will become 
clearer in this chapter. 
The Enlightenment's Concept of the Self 
At the heart of early-modern theories of liberal democracy, personal rights 
and freedoms, property rights, and rational progress is the view that we have a 
mostly stable and unified sense of self. Known as the humanist view, this notion 
of the self is rooted in the "Cartesian self": a self that is capable of rational 
thought; that can doubt and ponder on both the reality and the dubitability of the 
things of the world; and that, in its selfhood, thinks of itself as a free being 
'' While this chapter (and my thesis) can be seen as dealing mostly with Western notions of 
selfhood, I realize I do  this with the risk of seeming to intentionally efface the rich and varied 
non-Western concepts of the self. My focus on Western notions of selfhood is regrettably needed 
for the sake of space and the thesis's manageability. To have embarked on an exploration of non- 
M7estern concepts of identity and selfhood would have seen me overextend this thesis beyond the 
scope of an MA thesis. Importantly, I recognize that the notion of an "interactional self" is not 
unique to Western thought, as Tonks (n.d.) points out. (I also cannot take credit for the term.) 
Tonks quotes Lebra (1992) to explain that for the Japanese, for example, the "interactional self," 
like the Western concept of such a self, is "the awareness of self as defined, sustained, enhanced, 
or blemished through social interaction" (p. 106). It is no surprise, however, that 1 came to the 
concept via the works of Ihde, Heidegger, Schutz, Mead, and Goffman without being aware early 
on in my research that the Japanese also have a similar view of such a worldly self. Indeed, one 
of my supervisors, Prof. Andrew Feenberg, has spent many years observing and writing about 
the links between continental thought, modernity theory, and Japanese philosophy and 
confirmed to me that the notion of an "interactional" self does indeed exist in Japanese culture. 
See, for example his essay "Alternative Modernity? Playing the Japanese Game of Culture" 
(Feenberg, 1995a). 1 hope to explore these non-Western concepts of selfhood in future research. 
capable of making choices and engaging in consensus and debate (Leahey, 2001). 
Out of Descartes' "Cogito ergo suin" ("I think, therefore I am") - his "thinking 
self" - early modernity's developmentally linear framework for understanding 
the self and the world emerges. According to Underwood, "in the Cartesian self, 
the individual is mind, liberated and autonomous, capable of engaging in 
rational debates with other subjects" (Underwood, 2003, sec. 1). Ihde (1983) 
contends that "Descartes' ideal of clear and distinct ideas grounded upon 
certainty may in one sense be said to have invented both the 'subject' [the 
rational self] and the 'external world,"' or the object (p. 11, emphasis in original). 
Descartes' thinlung self is the idea that we have a stable or coherent self, set apart 
from the world and even from the body. It is also the beginning of modernity's 
stubborn focus on the primacy of scientific confirmation and deductive reasoning 
which, from a Cartesian perspective, eventually perverted into the implicit 
rejection of the Christian-Augustinian notion of self-as-soul (the opposite of 
Decartes' intentions) which has subsequently driven the liberal humanist desire 
for progress and instrumental reason throughout the past three centuries. 
Thus, the Cartesian humanist self can be seen as being at the root of one of 
Western philosophy's major views of the self: the "individualist" and liberal 
humanist self (Baldine, 1997, pp. 27-28). This individualist self is, first and 
foremost, said to have free will. This free will is, however, mitigated by what 
Hobbes and Locke termed the "state of nature": a state where the individual 
theoretically has the right to do anything he or she pleases but where that brutal 
right is moderated by the knowledge that it is ultimately in the self-interest of the 
individual to enter into social contracts and live in peaceful coexistence with 
others ("Free will," 2004). Kant took Western philosophy beyond this position in 
his critique of the relativism in the notion of the greatest good for the most 
people, replacing this utilitarian position with his affirmation that absolute moral 
laws also exist (the "categorical imperative") and that reason can be used to 
encourage and access these laws (Bowie, 2003). Takmg off from these Kantian 
notions, individualist philosophers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworlun claim 
that the self as an individual is therefore the most fundamental place from which 
to consider things like the rights of people, human dignity, and justice. In this 
view, individuality comes before ends and we are all free moral agents where 
our dignity is inextricably intertwined with our identity (Baldine, 1997; "John 
Rawls," 2004; "Ronald Dworlun," 2004). These ideas make up the foundations of 
our still-present liberal humanist heritage and are at the root of for example, the 
modem legal system, the belief that the state should not meddle too deeply into 
the lives of individuals, and the notion that the economy should be free from 
state intervention in order to maximize the rights of people to ultimately engage 
in free association, free expression, and unfettered economic exchange. 
Communitarian and Narrative Notions of the Self and the Subject 
The unified and stable framework of this liberal humanist self has been 
critiqued by various philosophical movements, in varying degrees, starting 
perhaps with Nietzsche in the late 1 9 ~ ~  century and with increasing vigour 
throughout the 2oth century. The critique of the rational, liberal humanist self 
began to be especially palpable within the broad movement that has come to be 
known as "continental philosophy" (Kearney, 1994). It also shows up early on in 
the 2oth century in writings of American pragmatists such as James, Dewey, 
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Cooley, and Mead (Ihde, 1983; Rorty, 1999, pp. 77-81). Indeed, alternatives to 
logical positivist theories of truth and knowledge and the coherent and rational 
self began to be explored late in the 1 9 ~ ~  and early in the 2 0 ~  centuries on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Examples of these alternatives to the liberal humanist self 
include Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and its effacement of the 
subject-object dichotomy (Husserl, 1970); Heidegger's articulation of Dasein, 
Being, and the existentialism he inspired (i.e., Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.), 
especially seen in existentialism's sharp critique of Descartes' reliance on a 
detached and God-like cogito (Taminiaux, 1994b); and Dewey's call to set aside 
the "'belief in the fixity and simplicity of the self"' (Dewey, quoted in Rorty, 
1999, p. 77) in light of a more "relational" notion of life (p. 77). In the middle to 
late decades of the 20th century, the liberal humanist self came under further and 
more relentless attack in the notions of the linguistically-permeated "absent 
subject" of postrstructuralism, especially in the works of Barthes, Lacan, 
Foucault, Derrida, and the postmodern theories these thinkers have inspired 
(Docherty, 1994; Silverman, 1994; Underwood, 2003). 
In this section, then, I will first touch on a few exemplary notions of the 
communitarian self of late-modernity that has been inspired by 
phenomenology's, existentialism's, and pragmatism's contestation of the liberal 
humanist self. In the subsequent sections I will elaborate on a few implications 
for notions of selfhood within more recent poststructuralist and critical 
postmodern theories, theories that have ultimately also inspired contemporary 
radical critiques of the posthuman. I will finally situate the interactional self 
within this historical trajectory, eventually placing it within a phenomenological 
paradigm. 
The Communitarian and Narrative Self 
The "communitarian," or social self, "grounds human identity in the 
community" (Baldine, 1997, sec. 11) and, in its full articulation, is a relatively 
contemporary view of the self represented by thinkers such as Husserl 
(1 91 3 / 1 93l), Mead (1934), Schutz (1 WO), MacIntyre (1984), Taylor (1989), 
Habermas (1984; 1989), and Giddens (1991). Both imbued with rational 
capabilities yet also heavily contingent on interactions with others, the 
communitarian self could, I suggest, be better known as a "communicational" 
self, influenced as it is by notions such as the will-to-communicate, as Jaspers 
informed us in this thesis's Introduction. In political theory, the communitarian 
self is an individual rooted in public life where responsibility and obligation 
comes before the individual. Thus, it is not possible for the communitarian self, 
in principle, to be detached from others (Baldine, 1997, p. 29). In social theory, 
the communitarian individual is only possible after the social; consciousness and 
self-identity is indebted to the social and to others (Mead, 1934; Sartre, 1964). 
Influenced in part by the linguistic turn in philosophy, sociology, and critical 
theory that took shape in the middle decades of the 2oth century, MacIntyre 
(1984), Giddens (1991), Taylor (1989), and Habermas (1984,1987), for example, all 
introduce theories of language, narrativity, communicative action, and speech 
acts into their own interpretations of the communitarian/ communicational self. 
MacIntyre (1984), for instance, has a "narrative concept of selfhood" (p. 
202) in mind when he argues that an individual is fundamentally a story-teller, 
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shaping his or her biography in the narratives woven with others: a "subject of a 
history that is my own" (p. 201) but that is also "embedded in the story of those 
communities from which I derive my identity" (p. 201). For MacIntyre, "the 
detached self of modern individualism [of Descartes, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, etc.] 
has no story" (Baldine, 1997, p. 4). 
For Giddens (1991), partially inspired by Mac1ntyrefs and Taylor's views, 
"self-identity.. .is not something that is just given" (p. 52) as a result of the habits 
of one's actions or a priori human nature or one's behaviour but is sustained, in 
part, by the "narrative of the self" formed by, as Charles Taylor informs him, 
one's "capacity to keep a particular narrative going" (p. 54). For Giddens, in 
"la te-moderni ty " this narrative capacity is mitigated, and in some ways 
truncated, by the erasure of space and time constraints and the personal 
fragmentations of life roles caused by our saturation in mediated life as well as 
the subsequent "transformations in self-identity and globalisation" (p. 32) that 
this over-mediation brings with it. Together, "self-identity" and "globilasation" 
both differentiate, for Giddens, our media-saturated times from any other 
historical epoch; they are the "two poles of the dialectic of the local and the 
global in conditions of high modernity" that directly implicate the self (p. 32). 
Giddens further posits that these changes to the "intimate aspects of personal 
life.. .are directly tied to the establishment of social connections of a very wide 
scope.. .[which is seeing] for the first time in human history, 'self' and 'society' 
[as] interrelated in a global milieu" (p. 32). Hence, not only are conceptions of 
the self implicated in this mediated globalization, but individuals are now also 
forced to strategize ways to reconnect with notions of rootedness and stability in 
innovative social and political ways (i.e., the popular mantra "think globally, act 
locally" comes to mind). 
In Habermas's influential two-volume work, The Theory of Communicative 
Action (1984, 1987) his critical social theory is also implicitly fused with the 
communitarian/ communicational self: For Habermas, action and interaction are 
intertwined with "symbolic exchange and speech contexts" (Mattelart & 
Mattelart, 1998, p. 116). According to Habermas, we can reclaim agency from the 
"system's" instrumental control and the "technization of the lifeworld" 
(Habermas, quoted in Feenberg, 1999, p. 101) by appealing to intersubjective 
actions and the expressive and morally guided interactions of individuals 
engaged in open discourse with each other. In these ideal communicative 
scenarios, Habermas sees opportunities for the "lifeworld" to overrule the 
"systems" of command and control that have crept into the public and private 
spaces of everyday life. For Habermas, individuals are inextricably tied to each 
other via a communicative rationality that is not about the mere acquisition of 
knowledge or the over-reliance on the instrumental logic of our contemporary 
"systems of purposive rational action" (Habermas, 1971, p. 93) that serve to 
dominate us in our contemporary neo-liberal, technocratic, and progressivist 
corporate and consumer paradigms. Instead, through the rationality made 
possible by and specifically found in the "lifeworld," "subjects who are capable 
of speech and action acquire and use knowledge" (Habermas, quoted in 
Mattelart & Mattelart, 1998, p. 117) intersubjectively for the reclamation of the 
public sphere for democratic and meaningful purposes dictated by local and 
social needs. 
The Decentering of the Self 
The communitarian self of MacIntyre, Taylor, Giddens, and Habermas, 
while influenced by the linguistic turn in 2oth century Western philosophy that 
situated this self within a narrative and linguistic emergence, still holds on to 
notions of a moral rationality explicitly dependent on an ethics of the other. As 
such the communitarian self can be seen as responding to the stark individualism 
of the liberal humanist self. But for some 20"' century philosophers, these 
responses don't go far enough. For these philosophers, the very notion of "the 
self" is to be contested as an ideological construct saturated within the power 
structures concretized in language and the "simulacra" inherent in 
contemporary, image-laden, and mediated life. The self, these poststructural and 
postmodern thinkers claim, is now to be considered completely "decentred" 
from any notion of unity or essence. 
The concept of the "decentred self," while not necessarily exclusive to 
postmodern theories, l 3  has been mainly influenced by the principle movements 
in the 2oth century's turn to the study of language as a filter of the real. This turn 
was particularly influenced by European structuralist linguistics (de Saussure), 
semiology (Barthes), linguistic anthropology (Lkvi-Strauss), poststructuralism 
(Foucault), postmodernism (Lyotard; Baudrillard), as well as Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Docherty, 1994; Silverman, 1994). Hall (1996), approaching the 
instability of the contemporary individual from the cultural studies standpoint, 
l 3  Freud, for example, also talked of the existence of such a self in his notions of sublimation and 
the tripartite theory of the individual's personality (i.e., the superego, the ego, and the id). 
gives a thorough definition of this decentered self, pitting it against more liberal 
humanist inclinations: 
We can no longer conceive of the 'individual' in terms of a whole, 
centred, stable and completed Ego or autonomous, rational 'self.' 
The 'self' is conceptualized as more fragmented and incomplete, 
composed of multiple 'selves' or identities in relation to the 
different social worlds we inhabit, something with a history, 
'produced,' in process. The 'subject' is differently placed or 
positioned by different discourses and practices. (Hall, 1996, p. 226, 
quoted in Underwood, 2003, emphasis in original) 
Thus articulated, most postmodern critiques of the self can be seen as, first and 
foremost, direct challenges to the Cartesian-influenced, humanist self that began 
with the Enlightenment project, especially the liberal humanist proclivity to see 
the individual as a unitary, whole self (Docherty, 1984; Silverman, 1984). In this 
critique, there is commonality with the communitarians. Where poststructuralist 
(and, ultimately, postmodern) theories of the decentred self begin to differ from 
the communitarian self, however, is in their focus on the linguistic and discursive 
elements that define as well as make "absent" the subject. 
Poststructural and postmodern notions of the "decentred self" have been 
especially influenced by the works of Lacan and Foucault (Silverman, 1994). 
Both, according to Silverman, lay out how "self is decentered" and how the 
"subject per se remains absent" (p. 401). In Lacan's linguistically-influenced 
"structural psychonalaysis" (Silverman, 1994, p. 399) the "subject is dispersed 
throughout language.. .[where t]he language of the self is the language of the 
chain of signifiers" rather than being rooted in the "signified" (the signified in 
this case being the self-knowing individual) (p. 401). The subject is thus, in 
Lacanian analysis, pure signification. For Foucault, the subject can also be seen 
as similarly dispersed in language but is specifically entangled in "power" 
relations which, in the "eyisteme'" of the late-20th and early-21" centuries, 
originates in the "scientific disciplines" and the "horizons" of the "social 
practices, artifacts, and power relations" these normative disciplines shape 
(Feenberg, 1999, p. 110). In Foucault's histories and "archeologies" of notions of 
"the subject" we witness an absenting of this very subject within the regimes of 
power that form around a period's "discursive practices" or, as he termed in his 
book The Order of Tlzitlgs, an epoch's "eyistenze'"-common knowledge themes 
and values that permeate a particular period and shape that period's linguistic 
conventions and power structures (Rabinow, 1984; Silverman, 1994). It is worth 
further elaborating on the implications of Lacan's and Foucault's respective 
thoughts concerning the "absent subject" as it implicates notions of the self. 
For Lacan, the unconscious is structured like language and the 
individual's psyche is ensconced in linguistic "sign systems" (Underwood, 2003). 
As with semjologists such as de Saussure's and Barthes's contentions that our 
social beings are the constructions of our language, for Lacan the unconscious 
was also a construction of language. Thus, society can be seen to "inhabit the 
individual" in the linguistic narratives the individual is immersed in 
(Underwood, 2003). As such, claims Lacan, rather than the images of ourselves 
signifying a stable centre in each of us, it is we that signify the image of ourselves 
formed initially at the "mirror stage" of early childhood where we first notice 
ourselves as an image (Silverman, 1994, pp. 399-401). That is, for Lacan, the 
subject and its subconscious are both merely images entirely framed by linguistic 
paradigms. The "self" is thus, for Lacan, a "chain of signifiers" (Silverman, 1994, 

institutionalized environments that make the power hierarchies we live in seem 
normative and even natural. 
Rooted in these writings, for postmodern sociologists and 
poststructuralist critics, we are, at most, a multitude of subjectivities intimately 
entwined in social contingencies, local narratives, and unseen yet ever-present 
power structures and institutional constraints that both prevent us from attaining 
our modernist call for emancipation whle, at the same time, offering us, as de 
Certeau (1984) posited, localized tactics for overcoming the "'strategies of 
institutionalized controls" that permeate everyday life (Feenberg, 1999, p. 112, 
emphasis in original). 
As Feenberg (1999) points out, however, all is not lost for subjugated 
individuals. Contemporary subjectivities can resist regimes of truth in ways that 
open up within the very power structures that form between these regimes and 
their subjugated knowledges. That is, withn these regimes of truth, controlled 
subjectivities experience a constant tension between their having to yield to the 
sublime ruling power structures and the related openings for resistance that 
simultaneously emerge from these very power dynamics; it is within these 
tensions that openings for resistance occur, however small these openings might 
be. 
De Certeau (1984), for example, posited that localized social groups 
practice "tactics" for overcoming the "strategies" of institutional and normalized 
controls within everyday life (Feenberg, 1999, p. 112, emphasis in original). 
Inspired by Foucault's analysis of "regimes of truth" and the openings in those 
regimes that allow "subjugated knowledges" room for resistance, these tactical 
opportunities are to be found in the very dominant codes of the institutional 
structures containing the upper hand in the socio-political power differential. 
Oppressed social groups and individuals can thus "react 'tactically"' to the 
strategies of institutionalized power even while remaining within the structure 
of the dominant strategy of control (Feenberg, 1999, p. 113). As Feenberg 
explains: "Tactics thus belong to strategies the way speech belongs to language. 
The technical code of society is the rule of an exorbitant practice, a syntax which 
is subject to unintended usages that may subvert the framework it determines" 
(p. 113). Slang might be viewed as one such tactic, for example. Later, in 
Chapter 4, I will argue that blogs and blogging practices might also afford these 
subversive aims for bloggers and blog readers. 
The Juncture of the Posthunzan 
The version of the posthuman proposed by Haraway's (1991) 
appropriated "cyborg," for example, offers another such possible opening within 
the ruling power regimes of contemporary neo-liberal technoscientific paradigms 
that resonates with Foucult's and de Certeau's potentials for locally-rooted 
liberation. The cyborg concept as envisioned by Haraway also emancipates the 
decentred and absent subject by offering a suggestive possibility for recreating 
the very notion of subjectivity in a way that divorces it from the baggages of the 
self's liberal humanist and progressivist foundations. As Haraway sees in her 
own project, "Michel Foucault's biopolitics is a flaccid premonition of cyborg 
politics, a very open fieldrf (Haraway, 2003, p. 429). Indeed, for Haraway, the 
cyborg is a powerful metaphor for the feminist constructivist program. In works 
such as her influential book Silnians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature (1991), Haraway reclaims the cyborg within a reformulated liberalizing 
narrative of "technoscience" by postulating the notion of emancipated cyborgs 
populating cyber-frontiers as the ultimate metaphor for the feminist 
constructivist program (2003). A created creature of social reality and fiction, part 
machine, part biological being, to Haraway the cyborg symbolically liberates 
women and the subjugated from millennia of paternalistic oppression that has 
made a political mine field of the female body. The cyborg is a post-gendered, 
self-created being-as-clean-sla te concept. In cyberspace, cyborg theorists 
postulate, identity and body are harnessed and moulded to the specifications 
and unshackled whims of its creator-masters, cybernetic machine-beings ready to 
be programmed by oppressed groups seelung political voice. 
Some feminist thinkers who have taken to the cyborg theories of Haraway 
have appropriated this liberalizing view of the cyborg and its promises in what 
has come to be termed "cyberfeminism" (Hawthorne & Klein, 1999). 
Cyberfeminism postulates the notion of emancipated cyborgs populating the 
cyber-frontiers of the Internet as a way through the "differences in power 
between men and women in the digital discourse" (p. 2). Cyberfeminism is 
therefore needed, claim authors such as Hawthorne & Klein and Haraway, 
because, as Haraway writes, "the boundary between the physical and non- 
physical is very imprecise for us" (Haraway, 1991, p. 153). 
Katherine Hayles (1999) offers a similar emancipative possibility for the 
future trajectory of the "posthuman." Hayles sees in the posthuman a possible 
alternative to the white-male-dominated "possessive individualism" inherent in 
the liberal humanist self, a self which is, according to Hayles and quoting C. B. 
Macpherson, "owing nothing to society" (p. 3). In her book How We Became 
Postlzuinan: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and I~lfarrnatics, Hayles directly 
connects the stand-alone, possessive humanist self to the recent neo-liberal and 
blindly technophilic drive that is ultimately forcing the human into the realms of 
the "posthuman" (p. 3). This new version of the liberal self is, for Hayles, a 
product of "market relations" (p. 3) and the normative masculinist and 
progressivist trajectory of our contemporary technocratic predisposition. The 
neo-liberal and technophilic logic of this modernist predisposition, Hayles posits, 
is leading our current scientific, cultural, and political discourses and narratives 
to conclusions that are making the concept of a yosthuman at the expense of 
embodiedness an already-decided given. Thus, Hayles argues, the posthuman is 
closely aligned with, as Feenberg (1999) puts it in another setting, "the 
technocratic ideology" (p. 101) of our times: the deterministic technological 
insistence that what is best for us now is unbridled technocratic progress and the 
unobstructed freedom of the marketplace. Indeed, claims Hayles, the liberal 
humanist penchant for placing the mind at the seat of the self has placed the 
separation of information from its materiality at the heart of the wide acceptance 
of the ideology of virtuality in our contemporary "networked society." In its 
extreme manifestation, this narrative of virtuality, Hayles argues, transforms into 
what could be termed a will-to-disembodiment: the flesh-fleeing concept of the 
ideology of the posthuman that brings it in close affinity to the Cartesian notion 
of the mind being superior to the body. In her narrative history of the 
posthuman, a history that sees its origins with the US military's cybernetics 
missile research that began immediately after WWII with Norbert Weiner and 
eventually extended into the sociology of communication via Gregory Bateson 
and the Palo Alto School, the human being has now been usurped into the 
cybernetic social-political-historical narrative. Hayles lays this narrative out in 
vivid detail, makmg the case that our current will-to-virtuality is rooted in the 
interweaving of the evolution of cybernetic systems theories with evocative 
science-fiction books and movies, a compliant neo-liberal corporate agenda, and 
the sympathetic liberal humanist tendency to rid information of its materiality. 
"Because information has lost its body," writes Hayles (1999, p. 4), "this 
construction [of the human being as informational processes] implied that 
embodiment is not essential to human being" (p. 4). Thus, metaphysically and 
practically, the posthuman can be viewed as the possibility of a self separated 
from the body. What this desire ultimately means for humanity is another 
matter. 
Critical feminist theories such as those laid out by Hayles and Haraway 
can thus be said to befor embodiment and not for the neo-liberal disconnection 
of information (mind) from materiality (body) that has been the historical 
trajectory of the "narrative" of cybernetics, a narrative that has brought us to 
contemporary - and uncritical and neo-liberal - notions of the virtual and the 
self's place in the virtual. (Phenomenologists would undoubtedly agree with this 
"pro-embodiment" slant, as I describe in the next section.) In this light, Hayles 
and Haraway are both attempting to demythologize this strong narrative 
tendency that, for the two theorists, still connects many aspects of our modernist 
and uni-linear progressivist thinking to the Enlightenment's liberal humanist 
self. In a resistive - if not de Certeau-like - tactical move, Hayles, like Haraway, 
desires to efface the reallvirtual dichotomy and the separation of information 
from its matieriality by reclaiming the posthuman from its current apocalyptic 
trajectory.15 Also like Haraway, Hayles ultimately (and ironically) sees the 
liberating possibilities in the posthuman as, in my words, a "post-self" concept 
that unshackles us from our historical roots in the "white European male" 
construct of the liberal humanist self that has, according to Hayles and Haraway, 
for too long surrendered us to an oppressive, technocratic, and capitalist 
narrative. Thus, Hayles argues, the search for a future of liberated possibilities 
within our technologically-mediated and masculinist reality could very well lie 
within a reconstituted and recontextualized cyborg - a re-writing of the next 
chapter in the continuing story of the cyborg as it were, that reclaims it in the 
name of empowerment. 
Both Hayles and Haraway believe that in literal and metaphoric ways, 
critically sensitive individuals can usurp the cyborg and posthuman narratives in 
order to reconstuct our subjectivity and, thus, our sense of self. For Hayles 
(1999), we are at the juncture of two possible futures: On the one hand we can, as 
a society and a species, fall prey to the dystopia of a posthuman hell where 
machines rule every part of our lives as articulated in films such as Bladerunner 
and The Matrix and novels such as Neuromancer. On the other hand, we can 
become active and socially conscious players in "the construction of another lund 
of account" (p. 285) where the posthuman becomes a possibility for "emergence" 
in a co-constituted "partnership" between system and lifeworld, humans and 
l5 A trajectory, I might add, that could, if left unchecked, end up in the simultaneously horrific 
and quaintly amusing "transhumanist" desire of a growing number of contemporary individuals 
(see, for example, the "Trahnshumanist Resources" webpage: http:/ /www.aleph.se/Trans/). 
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machines (p. 285). "For some people, including me," concludes Hayles (p. 285), 
"the posthuman evokes the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the 
old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about what being human 
means" (p. 285). 
While the posthuman offers both an exhilarating potential as well as a 
frightening outlook for the technological future that is inevitably at our doorstep, 
we should still not forget the implications for notions of selfhood and, indeed, for 
determining our future as a species that might lie within more traditional 
conceptions of the self put forward by phenomenologists and social 
interactionists. I turn to this next, positioning such a phenomenological and 
interactional self as possibility for a middle ground between the completely 
unitary self of the liberal humanists and the totally eradicated self of the 
poststructuralists and the posthumanists. I believe it to be a sound place from 
which to revisit the interplay between IMC and the self and self and others. 
The Phenomenological Self as a Middle Ground for Understanding 
the Place of IMC in our Everyday Lives 
At the heart of the pragmatist and experiential portraiture of the 
interactional self that I lay out in this thesis is a phenomenological theory of the 
self. This self has similar roots to the communitarian self but provides, unlike the 
theories of the self and the subject mentioned so far, an explicit theory of human 
experience situated in lived meanings and practices. This phenomenological self 
will be gradually elaborated in the rest of the thesis and forms the basecoat from 
which the phenomenologically-contoured interactional self will eventually be 
revealed. Importantly, phenomenological notions of the self are compatible in 
many ways with postmodern concepts of the subject: First, phenomenology 
addressed many of the issues that postmodernists have also critiqued concerning 
the liberal humanist self of Descartes, Hume, Locke, et al., without forgetting the 
centrality of experience, the importance of the other, and the engrained socio- 
biographic contexts in which an individual finds him or herself in. 
Phenomenology, also in partial agreement with more recent postmodernist and 
poststructuralist leanings, claims that the self is not a complete unity; the self 
does not have a core outside of the world but is instead deeply entrenched in the 
world. The phenomenological self does not seek a separation of the self from the 
world but instead looks at how the subject is deeply intertwined with the world. 
That is, for phenomenologists, the self, unlike Descartes' cogito, does not "own 
itself." Instead, it is co-possessed by the world and by the other. Additionally, 
the self is not "just experience" or "just reason" but is partially constituted by the 
world, having access to the meanings embedded in experience and reflection 
while also possessing the ability to reason and share these meanings and 
experiences with others. 
Thus, similar to more recent postmodernist and poststructuralist thought, 
phenomenologists (Heidegger, Husserl, Schutz), like pragmatists (Mead, James), 
and symbolic interactionists (Blumer, Goffman), are all opposed to a Cartesian 
dualistic self (Ihde, 1983, p. 13). Rather than the Enlightenment's ideal of the 
subject being self contained and separate from the world, phenomenology claims 
that the subject is, as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Schutz 
believed, "al~eady always situated in a world" (Ihde, 1983, p. 13) and already 
directed towards its objects via the intentionality of consciousness (Husserl, 
Schutz) or experience (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) (Moreau, 2000).16 Rather than 
Descartes' "cogito ergo sum," therefore, for phenomenologists, it is: "I am, this life 
is, I live: cogifo" (Husserl, 19131 1931, p. 143). 
Where phenomenology begins to distinguish itself from other philosophies 
and movements is in its theory of "intentionality" (Moran & Mooney, 2002). 
That is, for the phenomenological self, the phenomena and objects of the world 
are always under our conscious interpretation -whether those things are 
materially experienced, remembered, reflected upon, or imaginary - and 
positioned within the process of "the relationship between the actor and the 
objects in the world" (Rtzer, 2000, p. 412), not ensconced introspectively in the 
mind of the actor, as Descartes proposed.I7 Thus, in phenomenology, 
consciousness and experience are part of a process giving meaning to the objects 
of the world via the individual's very experiences of that world. Moreover, 
consciousness is alu~ays intentionally directed towards the things of the world 
(that is, consciousness is "intentional," or always directed towards something) 
(Ritzer, 2000, p. 412; Ihde, 1977, p. 23): Consciousness is always conscious of 
l6  Intentionality is the key Husserlian notion that consciousness is always directed toward an 
object and is central to phenomenological explanations of encountering anything in the world 
(Husserl, 1913/1931, pp. 257-260; 1970, pp. 233-244). Ihde (1977) deems intentionality "the 
central feature of experienceU(pp. 23), describing it as "a structure.. .which correlates all things 
experienced with the mode of experience to which the experience is referred" (p. 23). More 
technically, inteiztioizality is the correlation between "izoemn" - "the objective statement" of.. .the 
experience," or the uhnt of an experience -and "izoesis" - "the subjective reflection of the 
objective statement," or the how of an experience (Ehrich, 1999, sec. 2) (also see Husserl, 
19131 1931, pp. 255-281). 
l7 Although phenomenologists still speak of "subjects" and "objects," they are not to be 
considered as separate aspects of the world and, especially in the case of "objects," apart from the 
subject and left to the subject to conceive of as in an image or representation of the real object 
which is "really" situated outside of the mind (Husserl, 1913/1931, p. 136). Rather, in 
phenomenological apprehending, things experienced are always contextualized to, and thus 
experienced by, an "experiencer" (see Chapter 5 for more on this.) 
something; experience is always experience of something. Through these 
intentional and experiential interactions, meaning is thus made and interpreted. 
The phenomenological self can also be viewed as the centre of experience. 
For phenomenologists, the world is, first and foremost, made known from the 
perspective of the "experiencer." Further, the reality of the world is adumbrated 
within the perspectival "horizons" of the experiencing subject-that is, all 
perception and apperception has a "limit" and "shape" (Ihde, 1977, p. 47) made 
up of a central "core" thing experienced and its surrounding "field" extending 
out to the experience's "fringe" that forms the less-noticed backgrounds to all 
things experienced (Husserl, 1913/1931, p. 240; Ihde, 1977, p. 60; Schutz, 1970, p. 
318). Living existentially in the "natural attitude" of everyday life (the world of 
intersubjectively held common-sense), the alternating corelfieldl fringe 
"appearings" of all things experienced happen within the individual's living 
"stream of consciousness11 of the present unfolding world in the "Now and 
Here" (Schutz, 1962, p. 133).j8 Further, in the reflective phenomenological stance 
of the epoche' (the phenomenological step of the "transcendental reduction" which 
suspends, but does not negate, the existence of the objective world in the stream 
of consciousness) the meanings of the experiences of the world entrenched in 
c ~ n ~ c i o u ~ n e ~ ~  are "revealed" or "grasped" as "the pure life consciousness in 
which and through which the whole objective world exists for me, by virtue of 
the fact that I experience it, perceive it, remember itf etc." (p. 123). Hence, the 
experiencing human  being is the experiential centre of its world. This "experiencer as 
'' I explain this further in Chapter 5. 
point zero" concept Schutz (inspired by Husserl) alternatively called the theory 
of the "null point" or "zero point" of experience (Schutz, 1962, pp. 126-127).19 
For the phenomenological self, however, the world is not experienced in 
solitary existence, it is instead "intersubjectively" lived and validated. "For 
Husserl," Moustakas (1994) argues, "the world is a community of 
persons.. .[engaging in] a continuous alteration of validity.. .as people articulate 
and describe their experiences" to each other (p. 57). 20 Intersubjectively, we thus 
assume that others are also centres of their worlds like we are of ours. There is a 
"mutual interrelatedness of my existence and that of all others" (Schutz, 1962, p. 
126), evidenced by the acting and world-altering embodiedness of the other (see 
Chapter 5). In other words, I know the other exists in a similar situation as mine 
- thinking, desiring, grasping the world, etc. -because the other's bodily actions 
are similar to mine, thus suggesting that the other experiences things as I 
experience them, intersubjectively validating our mutual existences and each 
other to each other (Schutz, 1962; Husserl, 1970). Alternatively, and as 
specifically addressed by phenomenologists such as Husserl, Scheler, Levinas, 
Gurwitsch, Schutz, Sartre, Arendt, Natanson, and others, in this intersubjectivity 
the reciprocity of interactions between me and the other affirms my existence, 
that I am a self (Moran & Mooney, 2002). As Sartre (1964) has powerfully 
l9 Sawicki (2001) states that this is clearly evident in Husserl's posthumously published ldeas 11, 
where Husserl claims that "[tlhe animal body bears the zero-point of orientation for the pure ego, 
as its absolute 'here1.. .. [Tlhe animated body.. .is also the one who is zero.. .. Thus, the zero shifts 
position in relation to the other unified centres to which perceptions accrue; but as it does so, the 
series of their appearing change in a regular way" (Husserl, paraphrased in Sawiclu, 2001, sec. 
6). 
20 Husserl(1970) writes about the other thusly: "[Iln our continuously flowing world-perceiving 
we are not isolated but rather have, within it, contact with other human beings .... [I]n living with 
one another one can take part in the life of the others. Thus in general the world exists not only 
for isolated men but for the community of men.. .[in a]. . .communilization.. .[where]. . .there 
constantly occurs an alteration of validity through reciprocal correction" (p. 163). 
written: "I am possessed by the Other .... The Other holds a secret-the secret of 
who I am" (p. 475). 
From the Phenonzenological Self t o  the Interactional Self 
So, instead of the individualist and liberal humanist self - grounded in 
Descartes' notion that mind is a priori to the world as an empty vessel ready to 
be filled by the world - or the empiricist's assertion that all we know of the 
world is what our senses inform us, for the phenomenological self the world is 
already there and is implicitly constituted in the self's consciousness or 
experience as consciousness and experience are intentionally directed towards 
encountered objects and others. 
For phenomenologists, then, the world is needed to understand the self, and 
the self is needed to understand the world. As Ihde (1983) writes: 
"Phenomenologically, it isfrom the world that I come to understand myself. 
Thus, it is in interaction with the world that I come to any form of self 
understanding, contrarily, without the world I would understand nothing" (p. 
13, emphasis in original). "For interpreting self-understanding," Ihde continues, 
". ..the phenomenological self is seen to be neither self-contained nor separated 
from a context, a field, a world" (p. 14). Intentionality - how one directs oneself 
towards the world - is always "interactional in form" (p. 14, emphasis added) and 
the subject / object correlate is effaced (Halum, 2001). Phenomenologically, 
therefore (and as Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz will assert for us in 
Chapters 3 to 6), we become selves - interactional selves - fully immersed in and 
informed by our entanglements with the world. 
Looking Forward to the Interactional Self and IMC 
By mapping out the interactional self as a phenomenologically- and 
hermeneutically-sensitive interpretive handle for rethinlung Internet sociability, 
in this thesis I am, in some way (if inadvertently), attempting to accomplish a 
similar project to Hayles's: This thesis seeks to, in part, efface the virtual / real 
dichotomy that has been opportunistically hijacked in many ways by 
consumerist and marketing interests, interests that can be seen as creating an 
"eyistemk" of virtuality that are increasingly being used to meet technocratic and 
business ends at the expense of usersf desires and needs. Instead, I would like to 
use this thesis to situate the Internet within our everyday settings and everyday 
experiences in order to show how we can, like Hayles (1999) proposes, begin to 
"get out of the [quickly sedimenting] boxes" (p. 285) that are framing a similar 
uni-linear and techno-rationalistic "will-to-virtuality" for IMC, paralleling 
Hayles's observations concerning our contemporary technological existence in 
general. 
Implicit in this thesis, therefore, is a proposition that we can design better 
and more user-sensitive IMC technologies if we understand the pragmatic ways 
IMC is incorporated by users within their everyday life settings and the socio- 
phenomenological meanings that users give to these IMC tools and mediated 
interactions within their very use-contexts. I believe a fruitful way for coming to 
understand these meaningful appropriations might start with a 
phenomenological and hermeneutic analysis of IMC because, as I show in 
numerous examples and phenomenological analyses throughout this thesis, 
users constantly and creatively appropriate the Internet into the needs and 
desires of their daily lives; some communication technologies, however, tend to 
facilitate personal appropriations more than others. In Chapter 6, for example, I 
conduct a Schutz-inspired phenomenological analysis to show how some 
community applications are more conducive to these user appropriations than 
others. 
What the grounded theory of the interactional self presented in this thesis 
attempts to do, therefore, is to offer a local-level, micro-sociological and 
phenomenological model that could serve as one possible interpretive key to 
begin to better comprehend how users pragmatically approach and appropriate 
the IMC technologies in their lives. In a way we can say that the battle for the 
future of the virtual is already being waged in the very everyday uses being 
made of the Internet. While structural barriers such as access to the network and 
the price of computer technologies are still prohibitive for many, millions of 
Internet users, by their very appropriations and daily uses of the technologies the 
llnetw~rk-of-netw~rks" upports, are showing why the Internet should be left as 
an open communicative space for human interaction and why, therefore, the 
digital divide must be bridged. 
While, as I have already mentioned, this thesis does not engage in an overt 
study of power differentials or a political economic debate, it does, in spirit, 
support the work of researchers and scholars that seek to bridge the digital 
divide and reveal institutionalized power structures by shedding light on the 
subjective experiences of users engaging in digital culture as located within their 
local use-contexts. While the emancipative potential of the Internet for an 
extended public sphere is clear (see, for example, Kahn & Kellner (forthcoming)), 
what we have also seen in the past dozen years or so with the advent of the 
commercial and widely dispersed Internet is the tendency for a technocratic 
rationality to try and permeate and consolidate IMC within a market-driven 
paradigm (Feenberg, 1995,1999). This consolidation by private interests is 
partially rooted in our epoch's overtly corporate and consumerist adherence to 
the "wonders" of the virtualness of "cyberspace" that is a chapter of the same 
narrative of the posthuman presented by Hayles. In this marketing-driven thrust 
we have, for example, seen, with varying rates of success, the attempt to close off 
public access to information by subscription-driven portals, the inundation of in- 
boxes with senseless spam, the narrow claim by some that classrooms can be 
replaced rather than enhanced by "e-learning" initiatives, a continuation and in 
some cases a widening of the gulf that makes up the digital divide, and the ever- 
present risks of digital surveillance and greater and greater encroachments on 
our personal privacy. All still remain open-ended questions. In this respect, this 
thesis has a strong, social-democratic bias: it seeks to pursue Feenberg's (1999) 
quest for the "democratic rationalization" of technology from technocracy and 
looks to the democratizing possibilities inherent in the hermeneutic flexibility of 
technologies. At core, I believe that localized and rooted use-contexts can reveal 
sites of potentially successful user struggles against the technological realities 
users face on a daily basis (see Chapter 2). The concept of the interactional self 
seeks to contribute to the unraveling of these struggles from the level of the 
experiencing IMC user. What phenomenology helps us do is understand the 
meanings users give to technologically-mediated practices from deep within 
their lived experiences. I believe the interactional self, situated as it is 
somewhere between the narrative-filled communitarian self and the 
constructivist and linguistically decentred subject, is a way to understand how 
the Internet is both appropriated into the lives of its users and how its users are 
also shaped by the structures of IMC technologies. In addition to being a 
hermeneutically-sensitive, wordly, and contingent individual, this interactional 
self also possesses the agency and the capacity for ethically-informed and 
reasoned exchanges, negotiations, and planning within the intersubjective realms 
of the life-world, which I explain further in Chapters 4 to 6. 
It is with this reflexive and emancipatory spirit, and not with a desire to 
take us back to the problematic liberal humanist "self," that I embark on 
conceptualizing - or, better said, searching for the "potentialities" of - a 
phenomenological and social interactionaI self. As I show in the following pages 
and in the remaining chapters, this phenomenologically-informed self has 
already dealt with the Cartesian baggage that has saddled the liberal humanist 
self. Related closely to communitarian notions of the communicatively rational 
individual of Habermas, the narrative self of MacIntyre, and the reflexive and 
socio-biographical and intersubjective self of Giddens, the interactional self 
should be viewed as having close affinities with the socio-historical 
contingencies of the postmodern subject and the emancipating project of the 
feminist posthuman program without negating the potential for agency and 
respectful discourse in the intersubjective realm. Further, in both 
phenomenological and social interactional theories of the self I see a clear space 
for an ethics of the self in the concept of the "other." This ethics is not as strongly 
evident in postmodernist and poststructuralist notions of the decentred subject, 
in my view. I also believe that the interactional self can help us to not over- 
theorize the implications of the virtual and the "technocultural formations" of 
"cyberspace" (Turkle, 1995, p. 298) that have exagerated the implications of the 
Internet on individuals by theorists such as Sherry Turkle (1995). These over- 
extensions have had, I believe, far too much influence on the public and 
academic discourses concerning the uses of the Internet in everyday life because 
of their overgeneralizations made about "life on the screen" based on evocative 
but limited studies of a few idiosyncratic online behaviours (Barney, 2000). I 
address some of these topics specifically in the next chapter and throughout this 
thesis. 
Chapter 2: 
Social Interactions and the "World Disclosing" 
Nature of Internet-Mediated Communication 
"[The Internet is] an extension of life as it is, in all its dimensions, 
and with all its modalities." 
-Manuel Castells, 2001, The Internet Galaxy, p. 119 
Virtual Utopias and Dystopias 
As Frank Webster observers in his recent book Theories of the Information 
Society: 
Commentators have increasingly begun to talk about 'information' 
as a distinguishing feature of the modem world.. .that a new 'mode 
of information' predominates, that ours is a now an 'e-society', that 
we must come to terms with a 'weightless economy' ... a 'global 
economy.' 
Indeed, academic accounts of the "information age" have both influenced and 
been influenced by the popular press and pop culture narratives about both the 
"new economy" and the new "cyberian" dimensions of contemporary life. We 
now live, it is said, in a "new information and entertainment ecology" where 
"information technologies and entertainment media literally saturate modern 
life" (Bucy, 2004, p. 1). For some, it is further claimed, the freedom to go 
anywhere and be anyone on the digital networks is an opportunity to liberate the 
"self" from the shackles of laissez-faire neo-liberalist uniformity and the 
oppressive homogeneity of suburbia (Turkle, 1995; A.R. Stone, 1995; Poster, 
2001). For others, the information age and the over-stimulation and inundation 
of data is evidence of a potential nightmare of the posthuman run amok where 
we are losing our very humanity as we drown ourselves in a sea of unsolicited 
email, bad prose, and inhuman work expectations (Borgmann, 1999; Slouka, 
1995) - in a sense, to reword Postman (1985), for these dystopic thinkers we're 
multitasking and mechanizing ourselves to death. 
Both techno-optimists and techno-cynics tend to view our current 
digitalized iteration of the information age as spearheaded by the proliferation of 
digital communications networks into every aspect of life. Indeed, the digital 
network as reality and metaphor can be viewed as our contemporary age's new 
Prometheus (Barney, 2000). For "cybertheorists," the Internet - or, more 
dramatically, "cyberspace" - and its inherent technologies are having "profound 
consequences for our way of life and, indeed, for the ways in which we think 
about ourselves, because it alters our network of social relations" (Poster, 1990, p. 
8) by "dislocating communicative action.. .from the territorialized spatial 
relations of modernity" (Poster, 2001, p. 16). For techno-sceptics, it is these very 
"dislocating" features of the network that are bringing dystopic unease and 
personal disconnect into contemporary life. In a now famous and much debated 
study that gave much ammunition to pessimistic views of the Internet, Kraut et 
al. (1998) concluded that the Internet is a paradox: both a "social" technology but 
one that decreased quality time offline and led to reduced "psychological 
wellbeing." Nie & Erbing (2000), in a separate study with related conclusions, 
found that the more we use the Internet the less time we spend with "real 
people" (quoted in Burnett & Marshall, p. 65). And Putnam (2000), in h s  
popular book Bowliq Alone, claimed that we are turning into "suburban 
hermits" preferring to stay home with our televisions and computers rather than 
engaging in civic life. Contemporary philosophers with cautious views 
concerning our technological existence such Borgmann (1999) and Dreyfus (2001) 
view these studies as highlighting the fracturing of the individual from the more 
"authentic" connections of face-to-face life, underscoring their own views that 
"real" community and human connection cannot be sustained effectively on the 
networks. 
For more optimistic cybertheorists, the view of the Internet as possessing 
the ability to dislocate communicative actions is, in an ironic twist to the sceptics' 
findings, usually the point of departure for their claims that cyberspace brings 
with it the potential for the reinvention of the self and its liberation from the 
confines of the everyday and the mundane. Our cyber-saturated times, they 
claim, are demarcated by a radically "fractured" and "hyperreal" world - a 
postmodern world - of surface over substance, relativity over essentiality, and 
bricolage and collage over received certainties and historical stabilities, turning the 
Enlightenment project of a stable and knowable world on its head more intensely 
than ever before (Baudrillard, 1994; Jenks, 1998; Poster, 2001; A. R. Stone, 1995; 
Turkle, 1995). In this view, cybertheorists are borrowing from Jean-Franqois 
Lyotard's belief that the spirit of the postmodern condition defining our age has 
thus resulted in deep "incredulity towards metanarratives" (Lyotard, quoted in 
Barney, 2000, p. 197). To cybertheorists, cyberspace and the cyberselves 
recreated on its frontiers are yet more opportunities - or "events" - to "wage war 
on all forms of totality" (Docherty, 1994, p. 477-478). 
Theorists with these postmodernist leanings usually continue this line of 
revelation by contending that hyperlinked worlds of infinite possibilities and 
altered "networks of social relations" are in fact critical to, and proof of, a new 
kind of community which can exist apart from physical locale or traditional 
institutions like the neighbourhood and the family (Turkle, 1995; Poster, 1990, 
2001), the exact opposite of what techno-sceptics like Dreyfus and Borgmann 
advocate. Such postmodern communities are rootless yet with the potential to be 
highly inclusive and emancipating specifically because of their diversity of access 
points and asynchronously dispersed infrastructures (Barlow, 1996; Rheingold, 
1994; Tapscott & Caston, 1993). That cyberspace is an actual "placeu-albeit a 
highly pliable one-and not just a metaphor for the Internet's packet-switched 
multi-nodal network is posited as a given amongst these pundits. Some of the 
more dramatic views in this camp, inspired by William Gibson's much vaunted 
1984 novel Neuronzancer and taken up critically by Kroker & Weinstein's 1994 
dystopic counterweight Data Trash, believe that we will eventually be incited to 
upload our individual and collective consciousnesses onto the network-of- 
networks in a "will to virtuality," (Kroker & Weinstein, 1994, p. 2), ultimately 
freeing ourselves, although at times in a recalcitrant way, from the constraints of 
physical space, modernist institutional frameworks, and the mortal fate of the 
body." 
According to these cybertheorists, the self too is now free from not only 
the Enlightentment's a priori structures of the unified self, but also from the 
Kroker & Weinstein (1994) term this near-future "technotopia" (p. 2). While paralleling 
Baudrillard's implosive theories that see "individuals abandon(ing) the 'desert of the real' for the 
ecstasies of hyperreality and a new realm of computer, media, and technological experience" 
(Kellner, 1995, p. 297, paraphrasing Baudrillard), Kroker & Weinstein take on a markedly 
McLuhanesque irony that ultimately presents a critical analysis of virtuality, stating as they do 
that "technotopia is [actually] about disappearances: the vanishing of the body (into a relational 
data base), the nervous system into 'distributive processing,' and the skin into wetware" (p. 2, 
emphasis in original), transforming society within a virtually "recombinant culture" (p. 2). 
oppressive Weberian "iron cage" of rationalized and bureaucratized modernity. 
For cybertheorists, there is personal liberty to be found in the decentering of the 
self22: Cybertheorists view the experiences of MUD participants and online 
garners, for example, as instances of the freedom for personal reinvention to be 
found in "fragmented" (Turkle, 1995, p. 178), "diffracted" (A. R. Stone, 1995, p. 
36), and playfully multiple, heterogeneous, and flexible cyber-scenarios, 
transforming the self into "cyberselves" living in hypermediated simulacra with 
no "territory, referential being or substance" (Waskul & Douglass, 1997, p. 380). 
The common contention among these postmodern theories of the cyberself is 
encapsulated in psychologist and Internet researcher Sherry Turkle's influential 
book Life o n  the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet where she contends that, 
because of the Internet, we now "are moving from modernist calculation to 
postmodernist simulation, where the self is a multiple, distributed, system" 
(Turkle, 1995, p. 148). Moreover, the freedom for personal and communal 
reinvention that is being forged through our screens and keyboards and onto the 
networks is said to define the new limits of the human condition itself as we 
"develop models of psychological well-being that are in a meaningful sense 
postmodern, [encouraging us to] think of ourselves as fluid, emergent, 
decentralized, multiplititious, flexible, and ever in process" . 
It is hard to argue that theories of cyberspace do not enthral the 
imagination. The notion of new possibilities for the human in a euphoric version 
of the posthuman excites us. At the same time, the techno-sceptics leave us 
perhaps a bit too paralyzed and helpless to do anything about the ills of 
22 See Chapter 1. 
cyberspace except perhaps to turn away from it and stick to more "traditional" 
ways of living and interacting. Both, I think, rely too-heavily on the argument 
that new "technocultural formations" (Turkle, 1995, p. 298) are shaping the very 
meanings of the self and society in ways that I read as overly deterministic and 
unnecessary for malung their points. Both, I argue, over-determine the impact of 
the digital networks on our everyday lives. Indeed, in both camps' fervor to 
underscore the connections and disconnections regarding human/ Internet 
dynamics, they can both be seen as setting up an unnecessary dichotomy-the 
real world vs. the virtual world-without adequately delineating where the real 
ends and the virtual begins. It is one of my intentions in this thesis to show how 
a socio-phenomenological approach might show us a better way for coming to 
know the place of Internet sociability in our everyday lives and, in so doing, to 
suggest how a phenomenological perspective might help to look beyond this 
real /virtual dichotomy. 
The Social Interaction Position: Internet Practices and Social 
Situation 
The technological optimism that resonates with some cybertheorists' 
writings, such as Sherry Turkle's account of "life on the screen" and Howard 
Rheingold's (1994) book on virtual communities, was taken up by business 
interests and marketing imperatives in the early- to mid-1990s as a sign that a 
new dawn was approaching for reaching ever-splintering markets. For many 
corporate and consumer interests, the free-market was going to receive a shot of 
much renewed vigour in the wake of the recession of the early '90s through the 
new marketing "channels" that cyberspace was seen as opening up. The Internet 
was now going to deliver better customer resource management capabilities, 
better direct and lifestyle marketing opportunities, and better delivery and 
ordering infrastructures. Indeed, the creeds of customer empowerment and the 
new 'Net economy became two of the main mantras of the decade. On the other 
end of the spectrum, this "techno-boosterism" was counterweighted by a 
growing wave of melodramatic media reports of addicted Internet users driven 
to suicidal despair on the empty, shallow, and depraved streets of cyberspace 
where pornography and gambling were seen as potentially tearing apart 
society's long-held bonds. 
Spurred on by the obvious need for more balanced accounts of the place 
of Internet mediation in our socio-cultural settings, a growing body of 
ethnographic and survey-based research projects ultimately grounded in the 
human and social philosophies of experience are increasingly showing that 
perhaps "cyberspace" is more mundanely placed in our daily lives (Bakardjieva, 
2000; Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimmons, 2002; Herring, Scheidt, Bonus, & Wright, 
2004; Howard, Rainie, & Jones, 2002; Markham, 1998; Markman, 2003; McKenna, 
Green, & Gleeson, 2002; Nardi, Schiano, Gumbrecht, & Swartz, 2004; 
Papacharissi, 2002; Romero, 2003; Slater, 1998; Walker, 2000; Wynn & Katz, 1997). 
Rather than the arguably deterministic notion of a "multiple, distributed system" 
where "technocultural formations" shape our very notion of personhood (Turkle, 
1995, p. 298) that lead to "new configuration[s] of the construction of the subject" 
(Poster, 2001, p. 6), or the alternative view that cyberspace is creating socially and 
psychologically disconnected individuals, these ethnographic studies are 
refocusing the Internet's impact on the self and online sociability with the 
advantages that hindsight and more traditional, though no less relevant, 
scholarshp bring to bear. Manuel Castells (2001), for example, in his exhaustive 
analysis of recent research looking at Internet sociability in his book The lnternet 
Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society, disagrees with the idea that 
the Internet is that different or apart from situated life, claiming boldly that "the 
uses of the Internet are, overwhelmingly, instrumental and closely connected to 
the work, family, and everyday life of Internet users" (p. 118). Barry Wellman 
(1999), from the perspective of social network theory, supports ths: "The Net is 
only one of many ways in which the same people may interact.. .it is not a 
separate reality" (p. 169). This view is confirmed by much current scholarship 
and underscores the main theme of the studies I review in this thesis, perhaps 
best articulated by Miller & Arnold's (2002) Goffman-inspired look at gender and 
identity designed into personal home pages: "What people are doing on the Web 
is primarily what people are doing offline.. .by and large, and the things people 
do on the Web, and the selves presented there, should not be expected to be 
distinct and separated from actions and self in other areas of life" (sec. 5.3). As 
the myriad studies reviewed by Castells (2001) and Wellman (1999) show, it 
appears that Internet sociability brings with it and supports the pleasures, habits, 
baggage, needs, desires, and wants of its users' socially situated cultural lives." 
Underscoring this position and casting substantial doubt onto 
cybertheory's decentred selves and social lives in virtualness, a growing number 
of social thinkers such as Castells (2001), Barney (2000), Webster , Wellman & 
23 For a good assortment of ethnographic studies that support the thesis of the Internet as socially 
situated in the complex socio-biographies of its users, see Jones (1995; 1998). For more 
quantitatively-focused research that arrives at the same conclusions, see Wellman & 
Haythornthwaite (2002) and Howard & Jones (2004). 
Gulia (1999), Feenberg & Bakardjieva (2002), and Wynn & Katz (1997) are also 
uncomfortable with the monopoly this often deterministic and at times overtly 
technophilic research has enjoyed in popular media and marketing accounts of 
online sociability and identity play, especially with "e-enthusiasts" such as Kelly 
(1997), Tapscott (1998; 1993), Barlow (1994; 1996), and even Bill Gates once he 
became convinced that the Internet was here to stay (Gates, Myhrvold, & 
knearson, 1996). In addition, Barney (2000) claims that, paradoxically, accounts 
such as Turkle's, though insightful with respect to particular online behaviours, 
are also "less helpful if one's concern is to understand what network 
technologies do to us" (pp. 203-204) because such cybertheoretical tellings focus 
too much on "idiosyncratic" behaviours on particular online applications (role- 
playing on MUDS, in Turkle's case) "that are not representative of the range of 
ways in which most people encounter network technology" (p. 204). Illustrative 
of a more cautious position, and supporting Barney's assessment, Castells (2001) 
concludes that "role-playing and identity-building as the basis of online 
interaction are a tiny proportion of Internet-based sociability" (p. 119), forcefully 
pointing out that the over-reporting of studies that advocate a new world, a new 
economy, a new kind of human interaction, and a new multidudinous self 
emerging out of hypermediated technologies "distorted the public perception of 
the social practice of the Internet as the privileged terrain for personal fantasies" 
(p. 119). Instead, Castells emphasizes that the Internet is "an extension of life as 
it is, in all its dimensions, and with all its modalities" (p. 119). Wynn & Katz 
(1997) also point this out: Foreshadowing my discussion of Schutz's 
dimensionalized life-world in Chapters 5 and 6, their study of the practices of 
developing and sustaining personal home pages shows how instances of online 
anonymity are mostly strategic at best and do not typically deviate much from 
offline instances of anonymous interaction. While not negating the potential for 
anonymity and fantasy-play as users opportunistically appropriate the 
affordances of certain IMC technologies, Wynn & Katz instead argue that 
anonymous behaviours and role-playing are not reflective of most types of 
interactions online; role-playing and anonymous online behaviour are typically 
engaged in by a comparatively small, although growing, sub-culture of game 
players or for reasons of personal security when transacting online, the authors 
show. Even with EverQuestZ4 enthusiasts, for example, social interactions 
engaged in on its vast worlds2%re much more rooted in everyday life than 
commonly assumed, as Chee & Vieta (2004) have found and as I discuss in 
related discussions in Chapter's 5 and 6. Ultimately, online anonymity is more 
often than not dependent on and indicative of the interactional needs and 
characteristics of the social situation at hand, as Wynn & Katz and Wellman & 
Gulia claim and as I theoretically lay out later on in this thesis (see Chapter 6). 
Rather than a liberation of the mortal self from the confines of mundane space- 
bound and time-bound life (playfully referred to by some as "meat~pace"~~), 
anonymous online activity tends to parallel the multiplex and pragmatic ways 
we engage with the world and with others in everyday life, grounded as we are 
24 EverQuest is the most popular of the online role-playing games known as Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, or "MMPORGs" for short (see Chee & Vieta (2004) and 
Chapters 5 and 6 for more details). 
25 According to Chee (Chee, 2004), the EverQuest online world is not user created. Rather, the 
social interactions that emerge on it are. Norrath (the principle EverQuest world) is developed 
by Sony. 
26 For a definition of the term, see http:/ /info.astrian.net/jargon/ terms/ m/  meatspace.htm1 ("The 
Jargon Dictionary," 2000). 
in a situationally bounded and socio-historically rooted reality (Ihde, 1990). 
Indeed, a growing number of qualitative and quantitative Internet studies 
underscore Castell's, Wellman's, and Wynn & Katz's claims: For most users, 
these studies show, the Internet is a tool for communication (also see Rowland, 
1999). For instance, as UCLAfs (2003) ongoing Internet report, "Surveying the 
Digital Future" shows (see tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 2), emailing and 
increasingly instant messaging are the two most popular activities on the 
Internet. Wellman & Gulia (1999) show how these communication practices are 
also mostly rooted in known social networks of luth, kin, and professional 
networks. As the number one and two online activities respectively in 2001, 
87.6% of online users used email and instant messaging, mostly connecting with 
known recipients on a regular daily basis, up from 81.6% in 2000 ("Surveying the 
digital future," 2003) (see table 2 in Appendix 2). Also indicative of how 
mundanely-placed the Internet is in our daily lives, these communicational 
activities were followed in popularity by "Web surfing or browsing" for 
information (76.3%), "buying online" (48.9%), "finding entertainment info" 
(47.9%), and "reading news" (47.6%) (2003).27 Playing online games, a usual 
haunt of the "virtual self" according to cybertheorists (see Turkle, 1995, for 
example), was practiced by 36.6% of the population in 2000 of whom, in turn, 
only a fraction engaged in the ostensible "role-playing" endeavours ruminated 
over to such a great extent by the popular press and cybertheorists (for example, 
of the estimated 709.1 to 945 million current Internet users (Cyberatlas, 2003), 
27 Howard, Rainie, & Jones (2002), reporting on another data set gathered by the Pew Internet and 
American Life Project ("Pew Internet and American life project," 2004), conclude that "[tlhe vast 
majority of those who are online in a typical day read and send email" (p. 51). Further, this is the 
case among all ethnic, age, education, and income groups (see table 3 in Appendix 2). 
there are only an estimated 435,000 EverQuest players worldwide (Ng, n.d.)29. 
Indeed, as Chee & Vieta (2004) found, and as will be discussed further in Chapter 
6, to what degree and how often MMPORG players actually even engage in "role 
playing" activities should be re-evaluated in light of how players integrate 
EverQuest into their everyday lives (see Chapter 6). Additionally, and as table 2 
shows in Appendix 2, the online activities of more seasoned Internet users seem 
to follow the same general patterns as novice users with the communicational 
activity of emailing dominating time spent online by both expert and novice 
groups. Indeed, even more experienced users tend to not experiment with new 
types of online activities. An exception here is the increased usage of the Internet 
for work related purposes amongst more experienced users. Tellingly, and as 
table 2 in Appendix 2 further shows, more experienced users play less games, 
browse less, use chat rooms less, and even use the Internet for entertainment 
purposes less than more novice users. Instead, older users tend to use the 
Internet for more specialized, pragmatically instrumental, and mundane 
activities like banking, stock trading, for news information, and work. Perhaps 
this is evidence that even the mighty and world-altering Internet eventually loses 
its novelty. It certainly shows the mundane place it holds in the lives of the 
majority of its users. 
In light of this mounting empirical evidence, it seems that the "will-to- 
communicate," not the "will-to-virtuality," has been the driving force behind the 
2s EverQuest is, by a long shot, the most popular of the online role-playing games known as 
"MMPORGs." For some alternative readings of the social phenomenon behind these games see 
the work of Chee & Smith (2003) and Chee & Vieta (2004). Also see Chapter 6 for a re- 
theorization of the social interactions that occur on EverQuest from the perspective of Schutz's 
theory of "multiple realities." 
rapid diffusion of the Internet over the past dozen years (also see Rowland, 1999; 
Feenberg, 1995b). This communicational root at the heart of the Internet could be 
considered a continuation of the same sociological trajectory that revealed the 
social potential of the first computer networks such as ARPANET in the 1970s 
(Rowland, 1999); the French Minitel (Feenberg, 1995b) and the WELL (Rheingold, 
1994) in the mid- to late-1980s; CompuServe and Prodigy in the late-1980s and 
early 1990s (Rowland, 1999); as well as the rapid growth of the PC and the early 
success of the Apple IIe computer (1999). In the history of the anthropological 
and sociological adaptations of all of these technologies, the one striking 
similarity is that their popularity skyrocketed amongst the non-technologist and 
non-business user when their potential as communicational devices became 
evident (Rowland, 1999; Feenberg, 199513). This will-to-communicate via the 
network-of-networks has recently witnessed the rapid proliferation of chatting, 
email, accessing the Internet via cell phones using wireless application protocols 
(WAP), and text messaging (Rheingold, 2002; Weinberger, 2002). The current 
case of the blog (Bausch, Haughey, & Hourihan, 2002) (see Chapter 4) and the 
growing popularity of "wilus" (multiple-authored web sites) (Kahn & Kellner, 
forthcoming) seem to be the latest iterations of this will-to-communicate that 
drives IMC technologies. 
Simply put, ethnographic studies and survey research are increasingly 
showing that the Internet has been tightly integrated into the situated social 
practices of its users. The Internet seems to be a powerful and strategic 
communicational tool chest used to interact with known social networks of luth, 
kin, and ken and, as I show later, for more "weaker" types of interactions such as 
connecting with potential partners, for career networlung, for work-related tasks, 
support groups, and, by some, for more emancipative and even activist purposes 
(Bakardjieva, 2000; Castells, 2001; Feenberg & Bakardjieva, 2002; Herring et al., 
2004; Jones, 1998; H. Miller & Arnold, 2002; Nardi et al., 2004; Nilsson, 2003; 
Smith & Bakardjieva, 2001; Wellman, 1999; Wynn & Katz, 1997). As these recent 
social interaction studies suggest, Internet users on the whole build their social 
networks, online and off, on the basis of their socio-biographically proximate 
relations, intersubjectively sedimented social values, and embodied projects, 
mostly combining online activities with offline affinities. 
These socially-situated discoveries side with explanations that lean more 
on social interactionist, pragmatist, and phenomenological sign-posts, not on 
theories built on accounts relying solely on the fringe behaviours of experimental 
cyberselves, as the postmodernists are wont to do, nor on narrowly focused 
studies that primarily point to the socially isolating aspects of Internet behaviour, 
as the techno-pessimists tend towards. This growing evidence of more complex 
social situation begins to sketch out the first preliminary conceptual images of 
the interactional self on our social-world canvas, suggesting our first postulate 
for the interactional self in IMC: 
Postulate 1: The  interactional self's sedi~nented and socio-biographical offline 
affinities, o n  the whole, dictate i ts  online activities. 
Towards the "Worldingff Theory of IMC 
From the discussion thusfar, it is clear that defining online sociability by 
relying solely on accounts of fringe, exceptional, or marginalized behaviour is 
problematic. It is important to note here that my aim is not to discard or 
discredit postmodern theories. On the contrary, postmodern sensibilities have 
gone far in providing both critical and hopeful accounts of the varied contours of 
our contemporary existence in advanced industrial society. An influential group 
of postmodern writers, for instance, have spent considerable time warning us of 
the potential risks and failings of our contemporary speed-obsessed 
technological existence (e.g., Virilio & Der Derian, 1998) and the crisis of 
consumerist culture (Baudrillard's cutting, anti-Tocqvillean expos6 America 
(1988) comes to mind). Baudrillard (1994) and Goldman & Papson (1996) in 
particular, have warned us of the crisis of signification and, in particular, the 
signified (the referent) in our present cultural habitus as a result of media 
culture's over-reliance on signifiers at the expense of substance (symbols that 
merely reference other symbols and images that reference images) (i.e., the 
deluge of infotainment, the hyper-significations of marketing communication 
messages, the fetishism of surface over substance, etc.). Others, as I have already 
discussed, have provided vividly provocative interpretations of the state of our 
contemporary media-saturated world and of the possibilities and freeing hope 
that lies in mediated, information-driven existence (e.g., A. R. Stone, 1995; 
Turkle, 1995) or even in the democratizing potential of mass-mediated messages 
(e.g., Vattimo, 1992). 
Having said this, colourful cybertheorist accounts of multiple cyberselves living 
in autonomous and liberated cyberworlds separated from situated and embodied life 
through the screens of the Internet do not offer firm enough theoretical handles for 
both the social scientist and humanist theorist concerned with most-likely ways that 
the technical and experiential contours of IMC both influence and are influenced by 
everyday settings. They also do not tell the tale of interactions through the screen 
completely enough to effectively account for the "double aspect" (Feenberg, 1995c) 
nature of technological mediations - "that social meanings and functional rationality 
are inextricably intertwined dimensions" (p. 12, emphasis added) - especially for 
planning, designing, and implementing IMC applications and infrastructures. Instead, 
Wynn & Katz (1997) suggest that the social theorist and social researcher should turn 
to "a substantial body of theory in social interaction based on the premise of co- 
construction" (p. 297) that discusses "identity as an artifact of social context" (p. 301). 
The history of this social interaction theory, according to Wynn & Katz, includes the 
inheritance of Simmel's social action theories, Mead's symbolic interactionism, Schutz's 
intersubjective sociological phenomenology, Goffman's theories of self-performance 
management, Schegloff's theory of identity as a by-product of the group, and Berger & 
Luckrnann's notions of the social construction of reality. "All view selfhood," Wynn & 
Katz (1997, p. 301) explain, "as a product and process of social forces, whether in the 
context of everyday interaction, negotiations over meaning and manners, or struggles 
for social dominance" (p. 301). For reasons I lay out in the following pages, I would 
also add the phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl and Heidegger to this 
Nevertheless, the fact that communications studies must begin to rethmk the 
nature of the self, self and other, and social interaction in light of the new mediated 
realities disclosed by the Internet, as suggested earnestly by postmodern theorists, is 
not to be negated or undervalued. In fact, that existence amongst technology 
rearranges aspects of human life has been accepted since at least Plato's day (Scharff & 
29For a complementary list and a similar interdisciplinary approach that also includes the works 
of phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Husserl, see Ihde (1983, p. 2). 
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Dusek, 2003). More recently, "medium theorists" such as Innis, McLuhan, Ihde, 
Chandler, Meyrowitz, Ong, and Havelock, for example, have articulately and fervently 
shown, if not as provocatively as the postrnoderns, that communication media in 
various ways "give shape to experience'' (Chandler, 1996, par. 9) because of their 
"selectivity" (par. 9), "transforming the communication situation" (Ihde, 1983, p. 48) 
due to their "nonneutral" characteristic (p. 48) that can even be said to "restructure 
consciousness" (Ong, 198212002, pp. 77, 133-134).30 Medium theorists have 
particularly shown how new media have not only influenced micro-perceptual 
realities, but also historical trajectories (Innis, McLuhan), political infrastructures 
(Innis), sociological formations (Meyrowitz), and socio-cultural consciousness (Ong). 
Cultural studies (Williams, Hall, Ang, Morely, Hebdige, Silverstone, etc.) has also 
advanced much invaluable work that concerns the influences of mediated existence on 
the individual and the group but adds a socio-political slant to the mix: Cultural 
studies has demonstrated that audiences receive, appropriate, use, negotiate, and 
reinterpret mass-mediated messages within their local and domestic situations in order 
to meet their own ends, not necessarily the intended ends of the producers of 
corporatist and prepackaged mass-mediated content. In particular, cultural studies- 
influenced researchers have shown new possibilities for de Certeauian-type tactical 
and resistive (re)interpretations and decodings of mass-mediated messages and 
communications technologies by otherwise excluded and marginalized lives 
30 Chandler (1996) sums up the role of mediation as viewed by medium theorists such as 
McLuhan succinctly: "The selectivity of a medium arises from the way in which it formalizes 
phenomena within its own constraints. Any medium facilitates, emphasizes, amplifies, enhances 
or extends certain lunds of use or experience whilst inhibiting, restricting or reducing other 
kinds .... [Use of any medium] always involves a 'cost.' There are [macro- and micro- 
phenomenological] losses as well as gains" (par. 10). 
(Bakardjieva, 2000; Smith & Bakardjieva, 2001).31 
Yet other more humanistic phlosophcal perspectives such as, for instance, 
aspects of the Frankfurt School (culminating in Marcuse's "one dimensional" thesis), 
the early Habermas, the later Heidegger, the work of Ellul, and more recently, 
Borgmann and D r e y f u ~ , ~ ~  have also given similar world-altering force to the 
"technization" of modern life but from a deeply cautionary and even technophobic 
perspective Feenberg terms "the substantivist critique" of technology. In its more 
extreme form (i.e., Heidegger, Ellul) substantivism is called "es~entialism."~~ 
But the view that technology frames, moulds, changes, selects, influences, or 
determines reality is only part of the story. To base a critical perspective of 
technologically-mediated reality solely on this premise would be to risk the pitfalls of 
technological determinism and, in its worst case, essentialism. Cultural study's 
approach, for example, seems to suggest, if in~ompletely,~ the hermeneutic openness 
31 De Certeau (1984) posited that localized social groups practice "tactics" for overcoming the 
"'strategies' of institutionalized controls" that permeate everyday life (Feenberg, 1999, p. 112, 
emphasis in original). Inspired by Foucault's analysis of "regimes of t ru th  and the openings in 
those regimes that allow "subjugated knowledges" room for resistance (see Chapter I), these 
tactical opportunities are to be found in the very dominant codes of the institutional structures 
containing the upper hand in the socio-political power differential. 
32 I would also include aspects of McLuhan in this camp, see especially McLuhan & Fiore (1968). 
33 "Substantivism" gives a "substantive content to technical mediation" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 2) that 
sees technology ultimately "transform what it is to be human" (p. 2). To substantivists, 
technology is not merely instrumental or neutral but is engrained with "specific values" that 
cannot separate the means from the ends. The substantivist view is encapsulated in the phrase 
"the tools we shape in turn shape us." "Essentialism" is the more extreme form of substantivism, 
according to Feenberg (1999, pp. 2-3). Essentialists also argue that technology frames our values 
to such an extent that it "reveals" our epoch as distinguished by the fact that technology is no 
longer "mere instrumentality" but now "forms a culture of universal control" (pp. 2-3) (i.e., 
Heidegger, Ellul). Essentialists view technology as "essentially" reducing everything in its 
environs, and especially its very human users, to "functions and raw materials" (p. viii), where 
efficiency and goal-oriented tasks override human values and meaning. The effects of this are 
that users are "enframed" within technologies' very operational infrastructures (Heidegger, 
1977). 
3" Feenberg (1999) suggests that cultural study's focus on "reception theory" and the 
"domestication" and "user appropriations" of household technologies, while a useful starting 
point, does not adequately account for cases such as IMC where "users do not bring technology 
in from the outside but act though it on the public world" (p. 107). Bakardjieva (2000) has 
and multiple possibilities for user engagement in deciding the eventual applications of 
the technological things of everyday life that might not have been intended by its 
designers (e.g., the unforeseen recent phenomenon of using cell phones as pocket 
watches). The complementary critical phenomenological approaches of Feenberg 
(1999; 2003), Ihde (1990), Bakardjieva (2000), Barney (1999), and others, for example, 
offer a further dimension to cultural study's acknowledgement of user agency in that 
they attempt to articulate not only the worlungs of the tactical and imaginative 
appropriations of technical things by users within their immediate life-worlds but 
suggest that, because of the very reality of user appropriations of technology into their 
everyday life circumstances, technological implementation and design decisions 
should be considered within the socio-political, legislative, and participatory spheres, 
as well; there is simply too much at stake for our well-being not to. 
The unifying theme in Feenberg's work, for instance, is to ultimately show how 
substantivist critique informs the "deworlding" nature of the technological while at the 
same time correcting the over-determination of technology by subtantivism's more 
extreme form, essentialism. As such, Feenberg sides with technological constructivists 
and posits that technology is rather "underdetermined" and thus malleable to use- 
contexts as humans hermeneutically interpret the place of technologies within their 
everyday lives. Pinch & Bijker (1987) call this the "interpretative flexibility" (p. 40) of 
technology, immersing the historical development of the technical in the "meanings" 
social groups give to artifacts (p. 40): Thus, artifacts are said to be "socially 
constructed." As such, technology, Feenberg (1999) claims, has an "ambivalence" to it 
attempted to reconcile Feenberg's critical theory with cultural study's hermeneutics in her 
ethnographies of the Internet and everyday life. 
that compels users to hermeneutically assimilate the technical into their own life 
situations, allowing for a wider range of user applications than assumed by either 
substantivists or rational technological evolutionists (this is the case especially before a 
technology is "black boxed" - the phenomenon whereby the artifact is perceptually, 
culturally, and even politically dislocated from its social and historical contingencies 
once it becomes normalized and ~tabilized).~~ Understanding this ambivalence is 
important, according to Feenberg (1999), because it opens up technology to the realm 
of the deliberative and democratic (p. 7). 
The crisis of modernity as identified primarily by Marcuse's (1964) treatment of 
technological rationality as a sociological problem (and picked up by Feenberg (1991; 
1999; 2002)) has meant that a technocratic ideology of rational control has usurped the 
realms of the technical and the cultural, thus obscuring the ambivalence and 
malleability of technology. In modernity, technical thinking - "instrumental reason" - 
is considered the default way of thinking at the expense of more passionate and artistic 
expressions of human values within our technological existence. But this is not that 
way it has to be, claims Marcuse. As Foucault, Marcuse, Habermas, and Feenberg have 
all shown, there is nothng that naturally, or essentially, compels us to make the 
instrumental reason that predominates modernist ways of thinking the "natural" order 
of the world. Indeed, technologies and techniques have been deemed "rational" by 
human values. We have, within our modernist socio-political order, bestowed too 
much power onto the technical. All four theorists show that alternative forms of 
3"he ambivalence of technology is not to be confused with the neutrality thesis of technology 
that is advocated by strict technological rationalists (Feenberg, 2002). Ambivalence, rather, 
deeply entrenches the technological into the open-ended and political realm of human values 
while still recognizing the technical structures that give shape and functional direction to 
technology (2002). 
rationality are possible. 
Marcuse and Feenberg, in particular, show alternative ways of thinking of the 
technical sphere that can enlist it in projects focusing on beneficial and egalitarian 
social change. This possibility has led Feenberg to coin the term "subversive 
rationalization" (Feenberg, 1995)% to underscore the democratic possibilities for the 
rational and the technical. For Feenberg and Marcuse, then, technology does not 
possess an absolute, a priori ontology outside of human values. On the contrary, 
technology is saturated with human values. As such, which value predominates in the 
technical sphere will define the place of the technical in the cultural and political order 
and will dictate who controls it and who must submit to its control. "On this view," 
Feenberg (2002, p. 15) later asserts, "technology is not a destiny but a scene of 
struggle.. .. It is a social battlefield.. .a 'parliament of things"' (p. 15). 
Thus, within this "social battlefield" two principle and interlocked dynamics are 
at play: As Pinch & Bijker (1987) have convincingly shown and as Feenberg (1999), 
Ihde (1990), and Winner (2003) have concretely advanced in their related critical 
philosophes of technology, technologies both frame and are framed by the life-worlds 
of their users. This, at least theoretically, opens up the possibilities for end-user 
empowerment and the democratization of the technical realm. Recent communication 
scholarship, for instance, partially inspired by critical hermeneutic views of technology 
(Bakardjieva, 2000; Barney, 2000; Dourish, 2001; Mynatt, O'Day, Adler, & Ito, 1998; 
Smith & Bakardjieva, 2001) are showing that technology - and communication media 
in particular - indeed "afford" (Mynatt et al., 1998) and "select" (Chandler, 1996) 
36 Feenberg later amended this term to "democratic rationalization" to better account for the 
participatory possibilities in technological designs and implementations (1999). 
certain human actions, interactions, conditions, and even perceptions (Ihde, 1983; 
McLuhan, 19641 1994) over others. At the same time, critically- and hermeneutically- 
sensitive researchers such as Feenberg Ihde, and Bakardjieva, hold the view that 
technologies are given affordances by the very use-contexts, situational specificities, 
social biographies, existential needs, and life-world meanings of their users. Two 
examples of this emergent research committed to accounting for both the technological 
affordances as well as the hermeneutics of everyday use-contexts are Feenberg's 
(199513) essay on the social (re)construction of the French Minitel (a pre-Internet version 
of a packet-switched communication and information network) and Bakardjieva's 
(2000) ground-breahng study that looks at the ways Internet users "domesticate" the 
network, their computers, and their personal spaces for their own socio-cultural and 
political ends (see Chapter 5 for a detailed overview of the latter study). These new 
hermeneutic and constructivist research programs are convincingly showing that more 
socially-sensitive studies that better address user-centric experiences are needed by 
technology and society researchers in order to effectively account for the interplay 
between the technical and the social. Tellingly, they are engrained in the premise that 
technology and the rationality behind it both constructs and is constructed by social 
reality; makes and is made by social interaction; gives meaning to and is given 
meaning by users' life-worlds. 
The "World-Disclosing" Nature of Technology 
The dyadic relationship between humans and the technologies in their lives is a 
Heideggerian-inspired dynamic that Feenberg (2003) calls the "world-disclosing" 
nature of technologies (p. 95). As Feenberg writes: 
For Heidegger, worlds are realms of meaning and corresponding 
practices rather than collections of objects as in conventional usage. 
A world is 'disclosed1 according to Heidegger in the sense that the 
orientation of the subject opens up a coherent perspective on 
reality.. .. Here, interpretation is no specialized intellectual activity, 
but the very basis of our existence as human beings. (p. 93) 
In other words, Heideggerls worlds are ensconced in meaning and practices, in 
the very experiences of their inhabitants. Technological rationality is also 
completely enmeshed in the hermeneutics and pragmatics of human life. As 
such, Feenberg (1995; 1999; 2003) has attempted to reconcile the heretofore 
disparate traditions of modern dystopic theories of technology with more social 
constructivist and hermeneutic leanings, proposing a theoretical synthesis he 
calls the "intrumentalization theory" of technology (1999, pp. 201-222; 2003, pp. 
95-101). In this theory, technology both "deworlds" (i.e., technicity) and 
"reworlds" (i.e., new possibilities, social construction, etc.). It "deworlds" in "the 
functional constitution of technical objects and subjects (1999, p. 202, emphasis 
added) - what Feenberg calls "primary instrumentalization" (p. 202). It 
"reworlds" in the "complementary process of realization which qualifies 
functionalization by orienting it toward a new world containing those same 
objects and subjects" (2003, p. 97) in what he calls "secondary 
instrumentalization (1999, p. 202). In opposite ways, claims Feenberg (2003), 
both constructivist and modernity theories "fail to recognize the deworlding 
associated with technology is necessarily and simultaneously entry into another 
world" (p. 97). In this dyadic model, users are "positioned" by the functional 
contours of the technology but from a "specific locus from which technical action 
is possible: the 'drivers seat"' (p. 104, emphasis in original). Feenberg continues: 
"So located, the subject finds itself before a 'world' of affordances that invite 
initiatives of one sort or another " (p. 104, emphasis in original). But these 
"worlds" are not fundamentally separate and apart from situated life, as 
cybertheory assumes. I interpret this "reworlding" to be, instead, a new 
revelation of the many possible shadings of our own life-world. These worlds 
are like the worlds opened up by art and music (as in "Dali's world" or "Bob 
Dylan's world") or the world as known through a particular language or culture 
("the Chinese world," "the Sicilian world," or "the academic world"). They are 
new possibilities reconfigured from the concatenations of human living in 
technologically-mediated realities within our meaning-saturated cultural 
existence. There is, in other words, a world-revealing or "world-disclosing" 
duality in the ways humans relate to and appropriate technologies. Feenberg 
makes this clear when he explains that 
[o]n the one hand, the evolution of technologies depends in the 
interpretative practices of their users. On the other hand, human 
beings are essentially interpreters shaped by world disclosing 
technologies. Human beings and their technologies are involved in 
a co-construction without origin. (p. 95) 
Thus, while the medium is in many ways the message, the medium can also be 
re-appropriated by its users to forge new, user-centric messages. 
By allying my thesis's theory of the interactional self with Feenberg's 
theory of the worlding nature of technology in human-technology relations, I am 
subsequently digging into the same phenomenological and pragmatist roots that 
have also inspired Feenberg's hermeneutic theories of technological existence, 
exploring some of the possibilities for a similar phenomenological structure to 
"human-Internet" and "human-to-human through the Internet" relations. I view 
the interactional self as a disclosive concept that harbours these possibilities. 
Towards Retheorizing IMC Through the Contours of the 
Interactional Self 
I would now like to spend the rest of the thesis exploring some recent IMC- 
focused ethnographic and communication studies that begin to reveal a self that 
is mundanely situated in online social activities in light of particularly relevant 
aspects of the theories of worldly encounter proposed by Heidegger, Mead, 
Schutz, and Husserl. The following analysis will reveal an existential, social 
interactional, and phenomenological self that, online or off, is interpretatively 
ensconced in a world of things and of others. In so doing, I will continue to paint 
the portrait of the interactional self and argue, as Feenberg, Bakardjieva, Wynn & 
Katz, Castells, Wellman, and others do, that online social actions are, on the 
whole, firmly entrenched in everyday social settings and everyday social 
practices. I will attempt to further interpret this using some of the tools of 
phenomenological analysis. In the process of understanding online sociability 
through the lenses of phenomenological and social interaction theories, the 
analytically useful interactional self will eventually emerge as a self rooted in 
agency, interpretative understanding, and socio-symbolic interaction, fully 
embodied and pragmatically engaged with the things of the world as they are 
given to it via the mediations of the network and more traditional forms of 
interaction. 
In the process, not only will the detailed contours of the interactional self 
living in an effaced onlineloffline world unfold, but what will also be revealed is 
the integral role of meaning deeply entrenched in the life-world of the 
"subjective associations" (Feenberg, 1999, p. xii) that lie at the core of all human- 
appropriated uses of technology. In this light, the interactional self can be said to 
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add a specifically subjective and phenomenological "user as point-zero of 
experience" perspective to Feenberg's hermeneutic instrumentalization theory 
(Feenberg, 1999; 2003). Crucially for the interactional self, the dynamic interplay 
between human-technology relations that resonates in Feenberg's dyadic model 
is also present, in varying ways, in the theories of the phenomenological and 
interactional self of Heidegger, Mead, Schutz, and Husserl. Through the portrait 
of the interactional self, I will show that this dyadically hermeneutic human- 
technology interplay is also revealed in IMC settings. Most importantly, 
perhaps, I ultimately posit that this phemenological and hermeneutically 
inclined interactional self can be used to inform Internet technologists, software 
designers, and Internet users and communicants concerning some of the nuances 
of the interplay between "device and meaning, technical and lifeworld practice" 
from the "experiential standpoint" (Feenberg, 1999, p. xii) of Internet sociability. 
I eventually show in the following chapters of this thesis how the interactional 
self underscores the claim that, as succinctly articulated by Dourish's (2001) 
discussion of human-computer interactions, "action and meaning are inherently 
inseparable" (p. 135). Thus, the interactional self, I argue, ultimately reveals that 
the phenomenological contours of "device and meaning, technical and lifeworld 
practice" in the lived experiences of Internet social settings are made up of three 
vital encounters: the encounter with the self, the encounter with the other, and the 
encounter with community and the world at large. 
This brief introduction to the world-disclosing nature of technology for the 
interactional self living within technologically-mediated realities brings us to our 
second postulate: 
Postulate 2: The interactional self is the "point-zero" of all human experience 
and lives within a socio-biographically-rooted life-world where meaning is 
interpretively mediated within both the life-world's technological contours 
and the experientially-based and socio-culturally informed use-contexts of 
those technological contours. 
Chapter 3: 
~ e i d e g e r  and "Being-in-the-World": 
The Ontology of the Interactional Self 
and Internet-Mediated Communication 
"One is what one does.. . ." 
-Martin Heidegger, 19251 1985, History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegomena, p. 336 
"To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain 
modes of concern." 
-Martin Heidegger, 1962/2001, Being and Time, p. 102 
This chapter continues to outline the emerging sketch of the interactional 
self on the social-world canvas using the interpretivist brushes of Martin 
Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology outlined in his monumental text Being 
&3 Time (196212001). The chapter subsequently maps out the interactional self as 
a phenomenological being intimately intertwined with its world of mundane 
everyday experiences and engagements, online or off. 
According to three recent interpretations of Heidegger's phenomenology 
of worldly encounter by Barney (2000), Dourish (2001), and Feenberg (2003), 
Heidegger can help us understand the everydayness of the Internet and its place 
in our technologically-mediated existence. For Dourish (2001), writing on the 
topic of human-computer interaction (HCI), Heidegger can show us that even 
interactions through the screen are "grounded in everyday, mundane 
experience" (p. 125) and that "embodiment and phenomenology are relevant to 
tangible and social computing" (p. 116). For Barney (2000), Heidegger helps us 
understand what "more pervasive network mediations mean for what we are as 
human beings" (p. 204). And for Feenberg (2003), Heidegger helps us see that 
digital communication discloses new worlds while also deworlding us of others; 
that computational interactions disclose "realms of meaning" based on 
corresponding socio-cultural practices and inherent phenomenological gains and 
negations ultimately compensated in strategic ways by users (p. 93). Out of these 
fresh and contemporary interpretations of Heidegger for analyzing networked 
social and human-technology interactions, and from my own reading of 
Heidegger's theories of the "worldhood of the world" (Heidegger, 19621 2001, 
pp. 78-148), 1 have attempted to refocus the "virtual reality" (VR) and the "real 
world" (RW) dichotomy (paradoxically) assumed by cybertheories into one 
multi-faceted user-centred life-world. In this multi-perspectival life-world 
individuals have, on the whole, the capacity for "a coherent perspective on 
reality," claims Feenberg (2003, p. 93), while simultaneously living in a multitude 
of world-disclosing scenarios constituting both encounters of flesh-and-blood 
and bits-and-byte~.~~ 
In this light, therefore, rather than a separate "cybemorld" or "virtual 
reality," Heidegger begins to show us that the "online world" could actually be 
conceived of as the "world online" which is, as Castells and Wellman already 
pointed out, not a separate reality but a part of our everyday life. Through 
Heidegger, I argue, we can begin to say that IMC does indeed offer a relatively 
new way of encountering our multi-dimensional life-world without saying that it 
37 I further develop this in Chapter 5 with Schutz's concept of the workinglpartial self. 
is a completely different reality or a separate world removed from the contours 
of daily life. Heidegger can begin to teach us that the world online is, instead, 
integrated intimately within daily life by the uses we make of it. 
Dasein as the Interactional Self in a Life-World of Things 
Heidegger's life's work was concerned with meditating on the meaning of 
existence (Being3) as he, according to Dourish (2001), asked "[hlow does the 
world reveal itself to us through our encounters with it?" (p. 107). From t h s  
ontological beginning Heidegger starts to etch the outline of the interactional self 
as fundamentally an entity in constant and interpretative interaction with the 
world. This is Heidegger's "practical intentionality" and is wrapped up in his 
notion of Dasein, "his essence of being human" or, literally, "there where being 
dwells" (Dourish, 2001, p. 118).39 Dasein can also be viewed as a more practically 
Heidegger (1962/2001) differentiates between "Being" (Sein) and "being" (das Seiende). Das 
Seiende, or Seiendes ("beings"), are materially observable "entities" which we can count, 
categorize, measure, and otherwise account for based on their attributes by scientific observation 
(p. 91). The beings of the world as "entities" can thus be depicted, described, and accounted for 
"pre-phenomenological[ly]" and "ontical[ly]" (p. 91) in their "What-being" (Inwood, 1999, p. 27). 
Sein ("Being" with a capitalized "B" in most English translations) is the given nature of the 
existence of things, the fundamental fact that entities (things) are and that they exist (Heidegger, 
1962/2001, pp. 21-25; 91-92). It is the "How-being" and the "That-being," the "type, manner, and 
mode of [Bleing" (Inwood, 1999, p. 27), not a list of properties. All beings "are"; all beings have 
Being. "Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 62). 
"If we knew only of beings, having no understanding of [Bleing" explains Inwood (1999, p. 47), 
"we could not relate to or 'comport ourselves' to beings [das Seindes] as such" (p. 47). Heidegger 
thus called the fundamental difference between Sein and dns Seindes the "ontological difference" (r. 46). 
Inwood (1999) tells us that Dasein literally means "there-being" (p. 42). Heidegger's translators 
Macquarrie & Robinson (2001) translate it as "Being-there" (p. 27). According to Heidegger 
himself, it is "'to be there, present, available, to exist"' (Heidegger, quoted in Inwood, 1999, p. 42). 
It refers "to any and every human being" in the condition of being human while, at the same 
time, belonging solely to each individual (Inwood, 1999, p. 42). Macquarrie & Robinson (2001) 
confirm that Heidegger intends the term to specifically "stand for any person who has such 
Being" (p. 27, emphasis in original). Heidegger thus claims that Dasein is "man's Being" (p. 47). 
Dreyfus (1991) explains: "The best way to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to 
think of our term 'human being,' which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of a 
people or to a specific person" (p. 14). But, a t  its core, Dasein must be addressed by a persona1 
pronoun, explained Heidegger, because it is "in each case mineness" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 
engaged alternative to Husserl's concept of consciousness (Taminiaux, 1994a). 
As such, Dasein is constantly directed towards the world, Heidegger tells us, and 
is firmly situated in a hermeneutic encounter with the "entities" of everyday life 
as a "Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 19621 2001, pp. 78-90), a being constituted 
by its very relation to the entities and the others of the world. Expanding on 
Husserl's contention that the world is made known solely through the 
intentionality of consciousness - that consciousness is always directed towards 
material, imagined, procedural, or conceptual phenomena - Heidegger proposed 
a practical intentionality with the world; we come to know self and world 
through a living engagement with the experiences of everyday life. We don't, 
however, live everyday life in a constant awareness of "self." Instead, claimed 
Heidegger, we indirectly relate to and understand a self through the things we 
encounter in their readiness-to-hand (Taminiaux, 1994, p. 50), which I will touch 
on shortly. In this practical existence consciousness is already always in the 
world, is formed by the act of encountering the world, is co-constituted by the 
world, and is in a constant interpretive entanglement with the world. 
As a Being-in-the-world, Heidegger claimed that a hermeneutic 
disposition (Hermeneutik) towards the "facti~ity"~ of life was the principle state of 
68). In other words, I am a human being but all of us are, at the same time, also human beings. 
Further, there is an open-endedness to Dnsein: "Dasein," writes Inwood (1995, p. 176), "has no 
determinate essence; its being consists in its possibilities, in what it can make of itself be.. .. It is 
there in the world.. .[b]ut.. .is not confined to a particular place (or time); it 'transcends' and is 
'there' alongside other or past events" (p. 176). 
40 Inspired by the German sociological philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, for Heidegger "facticity" or 
"factical life" was lived experience in a pragmatically practical and inherently social world. For 
Heidegger, factical life is first for human understanding, rooted as it is in socio-historical 
experiences mitigated by the flux of time (Taminiaux, 1994a). In Heidegger's (1962/2001) own 
words, facticity is "a definite way of Being" implying that "an entity 'within-the-world' has 
Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with 
the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world" (p. 82). 
human existence in Dasein (Heidegger, 19621 2001, pp. 5-58; Heidegger, in 
Inwood, 1999, p. 87): "The ontology of life," wrote Heidegger, "is accomplished 
by way of a private Interpretation" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 75). This "private 
interpretation" means that, in Heidegger's hermeneutic existence, we come to 
know the world through our own practical acts, not through predetermined 
theories. "Comprehension (Verstehen)," explains Taminiaux (1994, p. 49), "is also 
to be conceived in terms of existentiality . In order to.. .understand the 
significance of the utensils [tools, things] it deals with in everydayness, Dasein 
has to project itself upon this or that possibility" (p. 49). As Dreyfus (1991) 
further explains, this "projection," however, is not drawn from our preconceived 
theories or ideas of what the world is or should be, but is rooted in the very 
pragmatic experiences that face Dasein daily. Dreyfus puts it as follows: 
[For Heidegger] the structure of the world is not, strictly speaking, 
a structure that can be spelled out completely and abstracted from 
all instances, so as to be understandable to a rational being who 
does not inhabit our world.. .. Thus, we cannot achieve the a priori 
knowledge concerning the world traditionally claimed for 
propositions about essential structures. The structure of the world 
is a 'priori' only in the weak sense that it is given as already 
structuring any subworld. (p. 91, emphasis in original) 
That is, we must first live in the world to be able to interpret it. But once we have 
experienced the things of the world those experiences shape our future 
interpretations of that very world; as in basic hermeneutic understanding, we 
come to know the whole by understanding the parts but we cannot understand 
the parts if we do not have some foreknowledge of the whole. We cannot 
rationally extract ourselves from the world in Cartesian-like detachment; we 
need the world to comprehend it. We have already always understandings of 
that world based on past experiences of it (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 119). As Heidegger 
himself puts it: "Whenever something is interpreted as something, the 
interpretation will be founded essentially upon for-conception. An 
interpretation is never the presuppositionless apprehending of something 
presented to us" (Heidegger, quoted in Pollio, Henley, Thompson, & Barrell, 
1997, p. 349). Further, "[elvery inquiry is a seelung. Every seeking gets guided 
beforehand by what is sought" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 24). To Heidegger, 
therefore, Being-in-the-world and its interpreting state of existence is a priori to 
theorizing it and, thus, being conscious of the world is contingent upon our 
experiences of the world: Being (existence) comes before consciousness 
(thinlung) or structures (essences). For Heidegger, therefore, "hermeneutics 
begins at home in an interpretation of the structure of everydayness in which 
Dasein dwells" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 34). 
Ontologically, then, Being-in-the-world begins to sketch the construct of 
the interactional self as a fully engaged and practical being "submerged" in a 
world of involvements. That is, the interactional self is, first and foremost, an 
entity in constant and interpretative interaction with things and others, 
contingent upon the world for coming to know itself and its place in the world. 
The Being-in-the-world living in Dasein, therefore, serves as a fruitful foundation 
from which to gauge the self in IMC from the level of the individual existing in a 
state of constant worldly engagement with the Being of others and the world's 
countless things. 
Dasein's Unsettledness 
While "Dasein unifies man in its own existence" (Inwood, 1999. p. 42), 
human beings' everyday existence proves, in practice, to be anything but unified. 
As such, there is an indeterminacy to this life of practical encounter (also see 
Heidegger, 1962/2001, pp. 67-69, 73). To dwell in Dasein is to also necessarily 
live an anxious existence because there is an open-endedness and uncertainty to 
its existence and its future. The detailed contours of existence, for Dasein, more 
often than not remain concealed in the complexities of everyday life as it lives 
expectant of a future that leads to the only ultimate certainty: death. Moreover, 
Being-in-the-world is a life that must always make decisions with unsettled 
outcomes (Heidegger, 1962/2001, pp. 68-69) leading to the one ultimate outcome 
that awaits us all (p. 281-282). In Dasein's everyday practical life, then, our 
"rootle~sness~~ and "unsettledness, " or "unheimlich" (p. 233) ("uncanniness," 
"not-being-at-home" (p. 233)) are based on the notion that, in its open-ended 
possibilities, Dasein is "thrown" into a world not completely within its control (p. 
175). As such, Dasein existentially lives in an ongoing tension between 1) the 
realities of its "thrownness" (p. 175) (that Dasein finds itself in a world of entities 
not totally within its control (pp. 329-330)), 2) its projected possibilities (human 
beings' capacity for agency and choice in a future-oriented direction), and 3) the 
situational contexts, skills, and knowledge possessed by human beings' everyday 
involvements (our talents and everyday contexts mitigate if and how we can 
implement our choices in a world that is only partially within our control). Thus, 
for Heidegger, human beings' orientation towards the world, living within the 
thrownness of Dasein, resonates with the tensions of everyday life that sees 
humans have choice but in their already always situatedness withn an 
indeterminate and fluctuating world-in other words, we live in a world of 
things and of others without a complete sense of how our decisions and 
engagements will turn out (p. 69). 
So it seems that while for Heidegger human beings have choices, Dreyfus 
(1991) also explains that Dasein's projective and unsettled makeup throws (or 
lunges, or "submerges") its very Being into a state of flux. According to Dreyfus, 
this means there is a "preontological" (an already always, or a priori) 
understanding by human beings that the self has this indeterminacy, or 
unsettledeness, about it: Human beings intuitively know that they "can never be 
at home in the world" (p. 37). Further, as Dreyfus continues to explain, while 
essentially self-interpreting, "everyday Dasein does not want to live up to its own 
interpretive activity" (p. 34) that will ultimately force it to come to terms with 
and reveal its unsettledness (unheimlich) as its fundamental condition. So, 
instead of living within this "radical rootlessness" we humans instead "plunge 
into trying to make ourselves at home and secure" (p. 37). It is within t h s  
ongoing and ultimately frustrated search for "home" (or centredness and 
rootedness) whch renders Dasein forever at the whim of its practices and 
contingencies (Coyne, 1998). In the turmoil of life, the self can be said to be in a 
constant, if ultimately futile, quest for centeredness and home. 
Heidegger (1962/2001) goes on to say that, in the "thrownness" of 
Dasein's worldly encounters and in its search for stability within the ontological 
reality of an uncertain existence, the Being-in-the-world dwelling in Dasein is 
reliant on its very acts of grappling with the entities of the world, calling tlus 
"circumspective concern" (p. 176)4' with the world. It is here, within our 
practical and engrossed engagements with the world where the world is given 
meaning and where it is "disclosed" to us. Understanding thus lies in our 
graspings, involvements, engagements and in our actual manipulations of the 
things of the world. Heidegger writes that "circumspection belongs to concern as 
a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand" (p. 159) and it is this concernful 
way of attending to the world that the world is disclosed: 
[Tlhe disclosing of thrownness and the current disclosing of Being- 
in-the-world as a whole ...[ is influenced by a concept 
that]. . .contributes above all towards a more penetrating 
understanding of the worldhood of the world. As we have said 
earlier, the world which has already been disclosed beforehand 
permits what is within-the-world to be encountered.. .. Letting 
something be encountered is primarily circumspective; it is not just 
sensing something, or staring at it. It implies circumspective 
concern.. . . (p. 176) 
Thus, while Being-in-the-world means that humans are "thrown" into a 
world of things and others not totally within their control - and thus human 
beings exist in a state of unsettledness - for Heidegger our search for rootedness, 
security, and home within this usettledness is experienced in the acts of "letting 
something be encountered" in the very practical, daily, mundane acts of 
"concern" with the things of the world. This means that it is possible for Dasein 
4' For Heidegger "concern" (Besorgen) means involvement in something in a mode of readiness- 
to-hand, to be fully engaged or engrossed with an activity, thing, thought, etc. He does not use 
the term "concern" in the sense of being anxious about something ("I am concerned about " )  
or that a certain matter is or should be of importance or particular relevance ("This lawyer has an 
interest in the concerns of the court"). Rather, "'Besorgen' stands.. .for the kind of 'concern' in 
which we 'concern ourselves' with activities which we perform or things which we procure" 
(Macquarrie & Robinson, 1962/2001, p. 83). Within Dasein's facticity, claims Heidegger, there are 
multiple ways that its Being-in-the-world can be a "Being-in" within its practical concerns: 
"having to do with something, producing something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertakmg, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining.. ..All 
these ways of being have 'concern"' (p. 83). 
to interact with and interpret everyday life in ways that are somehow "more 
penetrating" than others in circumspectful and concernful ways that more 
truthfully reveal the world for what the world is through its very encounters 
with the world. (I will show how these more penetrating, more authentic 
engagements might be found in IMC via Heidegger's notion of "equipment" (das 
Zeug) in the next section.) 
Given the importance of Heidegger's concept of Dasein within the oeuvre 
of 2oth century philosophy and how he specifically addressed the nature of 
human beings as (essentially) made up of "meaningful social practices" (Dreyfus, 
1991, p. 34), as "self-interpreting" beings, and as beings living in "unsettled" 
circumstances (p. 37), it is poignant, as Wynn & Katz (1997) point out, that 
postmodernist theories of self and cyberspace tend to favour fantastical notions 
of fragmented, decentred, and multiplititious cyberselves that are removed from 
the very unsettledness and mystery of the socio-historically informed and future- 
directed nature of everyday life so meticulously laid out by Heidegger. Rather 
than a grounding in a hermeneutics of everyday life, cybertheories of the Internet 
use the "narrow bandwidth communication" (A. R. Stone, 1995, p. 94) of the 
Internet to explain how the computational worlds of bits-and-bytes are used by 
individuals to "engage in more of the participants' interpretive faculties" (p. 94) 
as freeing opportunities to explore identity and selfhood separate from the 
confines of social location and historical contingencies. Indeed, in my researches 
I found that cybertheory mostly ignores Heidegger's discussions of the 
rootlessness and everyday engagements of D~se in ,~~  articulated almost 40 years 
prior to postmodernist theories of the ruptured self. This is perhaps not 
surprising considering the fact that Heidegger is often thrown into the 
"modernist" cauldron by many postmodernists (Barney, 2000). It is unfortunate, 
nevertheless, given the deep influence that Heidegger has had on some of the 
founders of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and constructivism such as 
Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu (Dreyfus, 1991). 
As Wynn & Katz (1997) point out, Heidegger's notion of unheimlich and 
our intrinsic resistance to this rootlessness, unsettledness, and homelessness can 
be said to be the inverse of cybertheory's claim, expounded by Turkle, A. R. 
Stone, Poster and others, that people seek "to abandon the confines of a limiting 
self" (Wynn & Katz, 1997, p. 302) within a supposed freedom found in a 
dispersed and fragmented self. Further, that there ever was a self rooted in the 
liberal humanist's "unitary phenomenon" (p. 300) that can be overcome, as 
Turkle claims is the case on the Internet in the shift from the unitary to the 
multiple and constructed self in the computational realities of the network (see 
Turkle, 1995, p. lo), has already been addressed by Heidegger's philosophy of 
Dasein, social interactional theories, and theories of the communitarian self (see 
Chapter 1): As already discussed thusfar, the Being-in-the-world in Dasein's 
everydayness is anything but unified - human beings are already always rootless 
and homeless. They do, however, aspire for and seek out centeredness and 
rootedness even though this search ends up being an eternally frustrated one. 
42 Heidegger also fundamentally rejected Cartesian dualism of mind and body, more explicitly 
and earlier probably than any 2oth century philosopher (Steiner, 1992). To Heidegger, rather than 
the mind being the centre of reason and where the world is made meaningful, the meaning of 
everyday experience happens by being inextricably entrenched in the everyday world. 
The important point that Heidegger brings to bear for the self, online or off, is 
that while there is an underlying anxiety to all human life the self nevertheless 
seeks to be (however fruitless this search eventually is) in a unified disposition 
with itself and its world. What prevents human beings from acquiring this 
ultimate unity is the fact that they are faced with countless distractions and the 
uncertainties of the world and the future (this is an aspect of human existence 
that Schutz will also have something to say about in Chapter 5). In the 
"thrownness" of existence -being in a world with parts of the world outside of 
the control of Dasein - human beings, through their disposition towards practice 
and interpretative understanding (Verstehen) of that world, are in a constant, if 
ultimately frustrated, search for unity, centredness, and rootedness, not as the 
cybertheorists claim in search of an ephemeral liberation to be found in 
decentredness, fragmentation, and multiplicity. 
Instead, Wynn & Katz (1997) turn to interactionist and humanist theories 
to understand the ways users engage with the world online. Indeed, the authors 
found much evidence of situationally-rooted self-presentation on personal home 
pages and the "socially grounded nature of interaction" in online social settings, 
observing rich examples of co-construction and consistent identity practices by 
home page owners and listserve users (p. 297). Further, Wynn & Katz show 
evidence that suggests that a Heideggerian ontology that sees us "plunge into 
trying to make ourselves at home and secure.. .[giving our lives]. . .some stable 
meaning" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 37) might be the actual case online. Indeed, both in 
the literature and their own empirical evidence, Wynn & Katz (1997) failed to 
find substantial evidence to support cybertheory's claim that for Internet users 
the online provides an "escape from the physical person" in search of a 
"decenteralized self" (p. 324). Instead, in a Heideggerian disposition of seeking 
to overcome unheimlich, they found that users strived to "pull together a cohesive 
presentation of self across eclectic social contexts in which individuals 
participate.. .[in]. . .self-description to the illustration of their Net-linkable social 
contexts" (p. 324) as users tightly intertwine their online activities with their 
offline realities. Further, the researchers found that online practices unveil users 
worlung to mitigate a sense of unsettledness in practices such as carefully 
planned self-presentations on personal web sites and clearly articulated instances 
of identifying social affiliations and geographic location in their 'Net narratives. 
This ultimately led Wynn & Katz (1997) to conclude that 
as the [interactional] literature illustrates in painstaking 
detail,. . .[online as in offline settings,] people are engaged in a 
constant effort to structure experience together and to establish 
order in conventions of discourse so that shared meanings are 
possible. (p. 302) 
As Wynn & Katz suggest, then, could Heidegger's concept of the Being-in- 
the-world of Dasein help explain how we practically encounter the world online? 
Can Dasein, for example, help explain anonymous behaviours as well as online 
practices with fully disclosed selves in IMC settings as part of the interactional 
self's general disposition for overcoming its own unsettledness and the 
ambiguity of the world online (and off)? Could Heideggerian- and interactional- 
based explanations of interpreting and unsettled individuals trying to make 
sense of the world through the binary codes of computational interactions not at 
least be as plausible as cybertheorists' accounts of fragmented and decentred 
selves navigating the wild frontiers of cyberspace? A growing number of 
theorists and researchers do indeed believe Heidegger can help decipher the 
ways humans exist within mediated realities. Originally pioneered by 
researchers working in the field of human-computer interaction (Winograd & 
Flores, 1986), more recent humanist-trained researchers such as Barney (2000), 
Coyne (1998), Feenberg (2003), Kim (2001), and others, have shown how notions 
of Being-in-the-world can be used to reinterpret interactions online. As such, 
these theorists are beginning to make fruitful advances towards explaining the 
situatedness of the world odine, the practical and pragmatic concerns of Internet 
users, and the way the self and the other is revealed through the computational 
mediations of the Internet. 
The "Gathering" Nature of Technology, Issues of Power, and IMC 
Summing up the discussion thusfar, through the interactional sketches of 
Dasein's encounters with the things (entities) and the others of the "environing" 
world, Heidegger helps us see that Dasein accomplishes its goals and comes to 
understand its world, online or offline, through the very practicality of its acts of 
encounter (Heidegger, 1962/2001, pp. 78-145). The Being-in-the-world of Dasein 
is, according to Heidegger, "that basic state of [human being] by which every 
mode of its being gets co-determined" (p. 153). Being-in-the-world is thus, for 
Heidegger, inherently a "'Being-with' Others" (Mitsein) (p. 155) and, as I will 
explain shortly, a being which encounters "Things" equipmentally assigned in 
their "serviceability, conduciveness, usability, [and] manipulability" (p. 97) as 
the totality of "entities which we encounter in concern" (p. 97). Thus, Heidegger 
claimed that Dasein pragmatically "finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, 
expects, avoids-in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is 
proximally concerned" (p. 155, emphasis in original). 
In light of this practical theory of human beings1 involvements with the 
world, in the next section I will explain one way the world online might be made 
meaningful to its users via Heidegger's existential phenomenology of 
"equipment" (das Zeug) (p. 97; also see Division 1 , s  111, et passinz), which is his 
articulation of how Daseinls practical intentionalities with the things of the world 
in their "in-order-to.. .assignment," "references," and equipmental structures (p. 
97) reveal that very world. In so doing, I take a cue from HCI researchers such as 
Winograd & Flores (1986), Dourish (2001), and Coyne (1995) and their analytical 
uses of Heidegger's theory of equipment applied in their attempts to understand 
how to design more user-centric and experientially sensitive computer interfaces 
and software applications. As these researchers do for HCI, I also argue that this 
aspect of Heidegger's philosophy is particularly crucial for understanding the 
place of IMC in users' everyday lives. 
In doing so, however, I want to clearly state that I am purposefully 
bracketing out Heidegger's essentialist predilection, especially prevalent in his 
later writings, to think of modern technology generally and mechanical and 
electronic forms of communication specifically as somehow inauthentic ways of 
engaging with the world that, at their worst, "enframe" users and the world as 
"standing reserves" of a technology's very technicity (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23).43 
43 Even as early as Being and Time (published in German in 1927) Heidegger (196212001) 
comments on how the "dictatorship of the 'they"' unfolds in the melting of the self into the 
"Being of 'the Others"' via "utilizing" technologies such as "public means of transport" and 
"information services such as the newspaper" (p. 164). That is, he rather vaguely (and, it can be 
argued, deterministically) believed these technologies caused - essentially - the "dissolving" of 
While this "anti-technology" aspect of Heidegger's thought should not be 
casually ignored, I believe there are two reasons for legitimately attempting this 
bracketing: First, in the mundaneness of IMC, and second, through Feenbergls 
(1999) useful critique of Heidegger's differentiation of traditional and modern 
technologies, the potential of modern technologies to, like more traditional 
human creations, also offer meaningful, user-centred mediations that provide a 
"gathering" of practices and rituals. I believe, as Feenberg also informs us, that 
the second point also opens up Heidegger's concept of the ready-to-hand to 
democratic possibilities that begin to redress power differentials in favour of 
users. I thnk it is appropriate to explain these two points further before moving 
on with the rest of the thesis. 
Concerning the first reason for focusing in on the early work of 
Heidegger's Dasein philosophy, I believe, as do HCI researchers, that the 
mounting evidence of the "everydayness" and the mundaneness of IMC and the 
practical ways users encounter and use IMC tools justifies a temporary 
bracketing of Heidegger's enframing "essence" of technology in the context of 
explaining how the interactional self is fully and mundanely engaged with IMC. 
As Feenberg has already shown us, technologies, whether they are ancient silver 
one's own Dasein into the "averageness" (and therefore inauthenticity) of others or "the 'they"' 
(das Man) (p. 164). In the later Heidegger's more extreme critique of the modern technological 
condition, mechanical and informational technologies essentially "enframe" users, malung them 
"standing reserves" (Heidegger, 1977) of the very technologies they use. He also critiqued, rather 
unconvincingly I think, that writing on a typewriter, for example, was less authentic than writing 
by hand because "[mlechanized writing deprives the hand of dignity in the realm of the written 
word and degrades the word to a mere means for the traffic of communication" (Heidegger, 
1992, pp. 118-119). The work of Feenberg (1999; 2003) offers a strong corrective to this obstinate 
anti-technology side to Heidegger, showing how Heideggerian-type worlds can indeed be 
authentically revealed and appropriated by technology users through the very technologies they 
use while also taking into account the Heideggerian "deworlding" nature of technicity, as I show 
below (also see Chapter 2). 
chalices or packet-switched communicational technologies or suspension 
bridges, are malleable to human interpretation based on the meanings inscribed 
in them by their very use-contexts. Technologies that facilitate computer- 
mediated communication are similarly inscribed and cannot convincingly be 
seen as necessarily enframing or dominating users any more than other 
technologies based solely on the particularities of the CMC's technical contours. 
Underscoring the point, Feenberg (1999) writes that "the ambiguities of 
computers are far from unique" (p. 193). There is nohng ,  in other words, that 
deems computers any more technocratic or any less able to "gather" meaningful 
human activities solely based on the substantive aspects of their technicity. 
Hearkening back to the work of Pinch & Bijker (1987), Feenberg further asserts 
that the malleability and interpretive flexibilities of computers are, in fact, 
"typical of most technologies, especially in the early stages of their development" 
(p. 193). I will illustrate the interpretive flexibility of IMC technologies in various 
examples using phenomenological analysis throughout the remaining pages of 
this thesis. 
Concerning the second point for bracketing out Heidegger's essentiality, 
Feenberg (1999) also shows how Heidegger fails to make a convincing case for 
the claim that traditional technologies, as "things,' possess a clearer ability for 
"gathering" meaning, rituals, and practices when compared to modern "devices" 
(pp. 194-196). As vivid examples of how the "thing" of computer-mediated 
communication also "gathers" people together in highly meaningful ways, 
Feenberg uses the cases of IMC use by marginalized patient groups, the 
development of the French Minitel, and online education settings. From these 
and other examples of similar meaningful user appropriations of IMC, Feenberg 
concludes that modern communication technologies can indeed "focus gathering 
practices that bring people together with each and with 'earth and sky,'"4 joining 
them in a world" (p. 196, emphasis in original). By rendering the "essence of 
modem technology" solely to its "Enframing" essence (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23), 
Feenberg (1999) claims that Heidegger closes off the possibility for the "two 
sided" aspect of "modern technological networks" (p. 197) (that is, as I have 
already discussed in the last chapter, that technologies have a "double aspect" to 
them). 
For Feenberg, the gathering possibility of modern technology has huge 
implications for how we can reorder our advanced technological society into 
more democratically-sensitive configurations. Borrowing from de Certeau's 
assertion that technologies are imbued with both the technocratic strategies of 
the system's manager and the potentially resistive "tactical standpoint of the 
human beings they enroll" (p. 197), Feenberg is, in other words, claiming that 
Heidegger does not adequately discern how "[the managerial strategy] 
understands itself in objectivistic terms as knowledge and power.. .[whle the 
enrolled human being] yields its secrets to a phenomenology of lived experience" 
(p. 197). That is, from the perspective of the ordinary human being (the user), 
Heidegger fails to adequately account for how modern technological networks 
44 This is in reference to Heidegger's notion of the "fourfold" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 195), where the 
"ritual structure of the thing, the human being, and the world they inhabit" come together as 
"united in ritual practice" that the later Heidegger poetically describes as "earth, sky, mortals, 
and divinities" (p. 194). For Feenberg, this is Heidegger's romantic way of philosophizing how 
"the gathering constitutes what he means by 'world,' i.e., the ordered system of connections 
between things, tools, locations, enacted and suffered by Dasein" (p. 194, emphasis in original). 
can also be "lived worlds where human beings participate via meaning-filled 
practices, rituals, experiences, and gatherings" (p. 197). 
Rather than completely discarding Heidegger's phenomenology of 
modem technicity, Feenberg (1996; 1999) finds a way to mitigate Heidegger's 
totalizing conclusions by incorporating aspects of his profound, if over-extended, 
insights into a more user-sensitive yet critical hermeneutics of technology. 
Crucially, Feenberg finds this mitigation, in part, in the link between Heidegger's 
world-disclosings and Foucault's notions of power, especially in Foucault's 
middle writings concerning "regimes of truth" and the resistive possibilities that 
necessarily emanate from these regimes' corresponding "subjugated 
knowledges" (pp. 110-1 11). Paraphrasing Foucault, Feenberg writes that 
[tlhe sources of the resistances.. .[are to be found]. . .in the structure 
of the power relationship itself; resistances are an immanent reflex 
of the exercise of power. Part of the phenomenology of the 'lived 
experience' of all technical mediation, therefore, always includes a 
relation to power and the potential for openings and cracks in the 
panoptic ordering of modern society." (p. 111, emphasis in original) 
That is, for Feenberg, Foucault's theory of power and the inherent openings 
present in power structures for subjugated knowledges to resistively act through 
links Foucault to Heidegger's notions of "~or ld ing"~~:  "A system of power 
reveals the world in something like the Heideggerian sense. It opens a certain 
angle of vision and defines a corresponding realm of objects" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 
111). Thus, because the "point of view of the dominated" as subjugated 
knowledges is located within subordinate positions in the power hierarchy, these 
subjugated knowledges also have a perspective on that hierarchy (a point-of- 
45 See Chapter 2. 
view of the "regime of truth") not afforded to the power holders. It is from this 
subordinate perspective that the possibilities of resistance open up to the victims 
of power. For Feenberg, this "counterhegemony offers the hope of radical 
change without reliance on traditional agent-based models such as the class 
struggle, which Foucault believes have outlived their usefulness" (p. 111). 
Although the power differentials between IMC technology owners, 
managers, and designers on the one hand and the users of the network on the 
other is not the main focus of this thesis, these differentials are nevertheless 
intrinsically present in my ensuing phenomenological analyses of user 
experiences of IMC. This thesis is to be viewed as a phenomenological way into 
the situated meanings of IMC as specifically experienced by users living within 
entrenched social, cultural, and political realities. Thus, implicit in this thesis is 
the vital notion that embedded within the double aspect nature of technological 
mediation is the very presence of power differentials at play and that these 
differentials both close off and open up opportunities for user resistances to 
technocratic hegemonies. One of the main aims of this thesis, then, is to look 
specifically at the socio-phenomenological ways that users might find these 
openings which are necessarily embedded in the double aspect dyad that 
underscores the relations between humans and the technical mediations of 
Being-in-the-world. The blogging case study in Chapter 4, for example, offers a 
clear illustration of how a modern communication technology can at the same 
time "focus gathering practices that bring people together" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 
196) while being rooted in a technocratic background from which the practices of 
bloggers are formed and acted upon.& This thesis, therefore, is to be considered 
an attempt to look at the issue of meaning in Internet-specific technological 
mediations and how, as Feenberg (1996) puts it, "worldviews come to be 
concretized in technology" (par. 1). It is within these user-centred worldviews 
that IMC power structures are also being contested daily. The phenomenology 
and social interaction theories of the interactional self presented in this thesis is, I 
believe, one way to come to know how these user/ technology differentials are 
simultaneously structured, contested, and appropriated. 
Summarizing the reasons for bracketing Heidegger's essentialism, I ask 
the same question of Heidegger that Feenberg (1999) does: Rather than mainly 
viewing modern technology "from above," as does Heidegger, why can we not 
also "view modern technology from within" (p. 197)? To do so is to come to 
understand how users inscribe values into modern technological systems and to 
even possibly spot the cracks in the panoptic order of technocratic structures. 
Crucially for this thesis, therefore, is the following claim: to look at IMC as 
inherently imbued with a double nature is to begin to understand how our 
"lifeworld of technology is the place of meaning in [our] modern societies" (p. 
197). In other words, to view technology from within, from the lived experiences 
of technology experiencers, so to speak, is to understand that modern 
technologies can also sustain meaningful horizons of human activities and that 
these horizons are not the monopoly of "traditional" tools and structures, as 
Heidegger claimed. It also opens up technologies to more humane and 
46 This is encapsulated in what I call the "structure and practice definition of the blog"; see the 
case study in Chapter 4. 
89 
democratically-minded designs and implementations and, ultimately, to 
empowering user appropriations in what Feenberg calls "secondary 
instrumentalizations": 
i.e., the integration of technologies to larger technical systems and 
nature, and to the symbolic orders of ethics and aesthetics, as well 
as their relation to the life and learning processes of workers and 
users, and the social organization of work and use. (p. 193) 
One way to begin to look at these user appropriations and the 
phenomenological underpinnings of the meanings of IMC in our everyday lives 
is offered by Heidegger's astute phenomenology of our worldly relations 
through the very things of the world in his concept of "equipment" (das Zeug). In 
these human-thing relations, Heidegger tells us, are embedded the enacted 
meanings of all human actions. It is also an aspect of Heidegger's philosophy 
that sees him in a non-essentializing, existentially phenomenological disposition 
where Dasein is at the centre, taking on the "practical as ontologically significant 
on its own terms" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 196). While Heidegger could have 
addressed the role of these practical "ready-to-hand" objects as objects that 
disclose meanings to the user as he did for traditional objects in some of his later 
work (such as the silver chalice in his essay "The Question Concerning 
Technology" (Heidegger, 1977)), in Being and Time Heidegger chose to instead 
focus primarily on how Dasein itself discloses meaning in its direct use of objects 
(Dreyfus, 1991). Feenberg's project attempts to, in part, bring together 
Heidegger's notion of the disclosive disposition of Dasein with the worlding role 
of the modern technical object, proposing that even modern technology reveals 
meaningful worlds and empowered uses. I attempt a similarly inspired 
phenomenology by loolung at the equipmentality of our interactions online in the 
next two sections. 
"Equipmentality": Interacting with the World via its Objects and 
Tools 
Heidegger explained that Dasein's choices regarding which objects and 
tools and which orientation to encounter the world from are all practically 
intended based on the availability of the objects and tools used to interpret the 
world with and the "equipmentality" of the tool (a tool's fit, or appropriatene~s~~) 
for the task to be done (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 97). In Dasein's practical 
intentionalities Heidegger not only claims that the things of the world are used to 
interpret the world with but that they are given to Dasein (that is, experienced by 
Dasein) in one of two ways: either in a state of being "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden) 
or "present-at-hand" (vorhanden) (pp. 96-144). 
When an object of our activity is "present-at-hand" ("'before the hands, at 
hand"' (Heidegger, quoted in Inwood, 1999, p. 128))' we are aware of the object's 
presence - its "Thingness" - and how it is mitigating our actions (Dourish, 2001, 
p. 109). This awareness prevents us from using the tool in the way it is meant to 
be used to accomplish the tasks it was designed to accomplish and reveal the 
world as it possibly could be revealed by the tool. In a present-at-hand relation 
with the tool, the tool is an object directly engaged with via an "ontic" 
understanding of it in the realm of the empirically knowable. Thus, scientific 
understanding (measuring, observing an object's attributes, etc.) is always 
47 The "equipmentality " of an "'item' of equipment" refers to that item's fit in terms of a network 
of other equipment in its "'equipmental whole"' (Heidegger, paraphrased in Dreyfus, 1991, p. 
62). 
91 
engaged in with the object under investigation as present-at-hand. When the 
object is present-at-hand we encounter it in a detached way that is, according to 
Heidegger, not a natural engagement with the object in its intended use but, 
rather, a forced encounter. Using Heideggerrs famous example of the hammer, 
we engage with the hammer in a state of presence-at-hand, for example, when 
we hit our finger in the process of driving a nail, or when we fix the hammer's 
broken handle, or consciously lift it from the toolbox to examine the thing as an 
entity called "a hammer" in a mode of detachment. In this context, the hammer 
is not being used in its intended way; it is not being utilized or apprehended in 
its utility, in its hammering possibilities, or in its "fitness" as a tool used to build 
something through its mediation. 
Conversely, the hammer - or any object used to manipulate, encounter, 
and act towards the world - is "ready-to-hand" ("'to, towards, the hands"' 
(Heidegger, quoted in Inwood, 1999, p. 129)) when it becomes an extension of 
one's activity or body and where the awareness of the tool "withdraw[s] in order 
to be ready-to-hand quite authentically," Heidegger writes, so "that with whch 
we concern ourselves primarily is the w o r k  (1962/2001, p. 99), not the tool. 
Dourish (2001) explains this further: 
[A]s we act through technology that has become ready-to-hand, the 
technology itself disappears from our immediate concerns. We are 
caught up in the performance of the work; our mode of being is one 
of 'absorbed coping.' The equipment fades into the background. 
(2001, p. 109, emphasis added) 
Moreover, as Heidegger tells us, things ready-to-hand are always encountered in 
the context of other entities -raw materials, other tools, etc. (Heidegger, 
196212001, p. 95). Things ready-to-hand are so within a network of related 
entities, within an "equipmental totality" (p. 97) that references other equipment. 
That is, equipment in the ready-to-hand mode is contextual. Heidegger explains 
the ready-to-hand mode thusly: 
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its 
readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zuriickzuziehen] in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our 
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die 
Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern 
ourselves primarily is the work-that which is to be produced at 
the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears 
with it that referential totality within which the equipment is 
encountered. (p. 99) 
Because of this contextual disposition in the way that, as Heidegger writes, "our 
everyday dealings proximally dwell" (p. 99), "[elquipment makes sense only in 
the context of other equipment," explains Dreyfus (2001, p. 92). In this 
"equipmental" context, the full potential of the hammer, for example, is made 
known only in the framework of the other tools in the tool shed in the "towards 
which" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 99), or "goal" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 92), of the task 
that will be mediated by the hammer and its related tools. Moreover, not only 
does equipment make sense in its contextual totality, but "our use of equipment 
makes sense because our activity has a point" (p. 92), a greater contextual 
purpose." This means that equipment, in addition, does not exist independently 
of other objects but necessarily uses other equipment and resides in a world of 
equipment that in their totality and meaningful use-contexts also point forward 
to a task beyond any individual For instance, "[hlammers make sense by 
This has resonances with Ihde's (1990) culturally-positioned "use-contexts" of technology (p. 
128). For Ihde, "technology is only what it is in some [cultural] use-context" (p. 128; also see p. 
31). 
49 It is, as Schutz will also inform us in Chapter 5, afirture oriented projected disposition towards the 
referring to nails, etc." (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 92). Heidegger calls this the "in-order- 
to" of equipment (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 97): the contextual relevance of 
equipment in the "reference" of tools to other tools and the fitness of tools for a 
particular task (or work) which ultimately constitutes the contextualized 
meaning of the tool within the totality of the network of tools it is used in. 
Heidegger explains it as follows: 
In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference 
of something to something.. .. Equipment-in accordance with its 
equipmentality-always is i n  terms of [aus]  its belonging to other 
equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, 
furniture, windows, doors, room.. .. Out of this the 'arrangement' 
emerges, and it is in this that any individual item of equipment 
shows itself. (pp. 97-98, emphasis in original) 
Further, when engaged in any goal-oriented activities, we discover the tools to be 
used already situated in the totality of their equipmental whole: In use "'Things' 
never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves.. .. Before [they do] 
so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered" (pp. 97-98, emphasis in 
original). Thus, in the "in-order-to," one's concern "subordinates" to the act 
being facilitated by the tool in the tools contextual and "equipmental" network. 
Indeed, "our most basic way of understanding equipment is to use it" (Dreyfus, 
1991, p. 64) and our most "primordial" way of engaging with the objects of the 
world and the world beyond the world-mediating objects is in the 
"manipulability" (the manipulating) of the tool in full use (Heidegger, 
things of the world. 
An aspect of this analysis that should not be overlooked (and that is 
picked up again by Schutz (see Chapter 5)) is the forward or future direction in 
the "in-order-to" that looks beyond the tool to the work. This forward direction 
points to a world made possible beyond the tool. Thus, as Feenberg disclosed in 
Chapter 2, tools, it can be said, "world." This is what Heidegger means when he 
writes that we do not existentially dwell in our everyday dealings in the "tools 
themselves.. .[but]. . .we concern ourselves primarily.. .[with]. . .that whch is to be 
produced.. .and this [the work] is accordingly ready-to-hand too" (p. 99). As 
Inwood (1999) explains of the in-order-to of equipment: "No tool stands on its 
own. The hammer passes the buck: it refers to nails, to wood and to the 
workshop" (p. 129), and the workshop and the equipmental totality, in turn, 
"hang together" coherently (p. 129) so as to reveal the world of the workshop 
and the possibilities of worlds beyond the workshop in the "towards which" 
("goal") and the "for the sake of which" ("final point") (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 92) of 
the work mediated via the equipment. 
Deciding in which orientation to encounter the world with - whether 
present-at- or ready-to-hand - can thus be said to be practically intended and 
always based on the "equipmentality" (fitness) with the task to be done - that is, 
with the practical intentionality of the object and the act as disclosed by the tool 
and as dictated by the task at hand (Heidegger, 1962/2001, pp. 95-98). Unless a 
tool breaks down and becomes "un-ready-to-hand" in its "obstinacy" because it 
"'stands in the way' of our concern," it is "missing," or it is "unusable" and thus 
becomes present-at-hand (p. 103), we approach tools always in their "in-order- 
to" relevance and thus in their readiness-to-hand (p. 103). Sometimes, however, 
there is no wilful choice in this matter because things also give themselves to us 
either in a state of zuhanden or vorhanden. They either are there or missing, are 
useful or useless. Therefore, this practical intentionality of use - the "in-order- 
to" - is not always instrumentally arrived at but is dependent on the level of 
"involvement" asked for by the equipment's givenness in "relevance relations" 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 92) needed for the task at hand and in their particular state of 
fitness or brokenness. 
The Equipmentality of Our Interactions Online50 
I believe Heidegger's theory of the readiness-to- or presence-at-hand 
realities of our interactions with the world can also be used to explain what 
happens in our everyday encounters mediated via IMC. For example, when we 
manipulate things using the equipmental network of IMC tools available to us - 
such as moving a cursor on our computer's desktop; moving or closing and 
opening our desktop's windows; manipulating objects in programs and files; 
surfing through websites; clicking on links; filling in CGI scripts and fields; etc - 
we rarely think of the mouse that moves the cursor that clicks on objects on the 
screen, let alone the millions of computations being calculated by our 
microprocessors and the network every moment we engage with the world via 
our PCs and the networks. Instead, we focus on the files we are manipulating as 
we move them to and from folders (so we can, practically, retrieve them later or 
work on them now); or on the acts and purposes of attaching files to an email 
50 The analysis in this section has been inspired by the interpretive acuity of Don Ihde's 
phenomenology of human-technlogy relations in his book Technology and the Lfmorld (1990) and 
Winograd & Flores's use of Heideggerian hermeneutics for human-computer interaction design 
in Understanding Computers and Cognition: A N e u ~  Foundation for Design (1987). 
we're about to send so that others may read what we have written; or we focus 
on the words or thoughts being written in the email we're cobbling together; or 
even directly on the anticipated reactions of the email's recipient. We don't think 
about how the mouse is moving the cursor that clicks on the files that then 
moves them to the destination of choice (unless the mouse remains obstinately 
frozen and unmoveable in the middle of our screen). In all of these cases we can 
see the future direction - the projection - of these acts. They also have an "in- 
order-to" nature to them (mouse pad, mouse, PC, desktop, files, windows, den, 
desk, network, etc.); a "towards which" (the goal of sending an email to Joe); and 
a "for the sake of whichrf (for the purpose of communicating such and such to 
Joe). That is, within the equipmental network of the email, for example, the user 
wants to project the act of emailing in a future direction and influence Joe, 
perhaps to remind Joe of something or to partake in an ongoing project with Joe, 
in a general desire to perhaps alter Joe's thinking (and the world) in some way. 
These are the goals and intentions of the email that require the totality of the 
email client's (i.e., the email software's) equipmental network in its readiness-to- 
hand to fulfil. That is, within the equipmentality of the IMC tool that makes the 
emailing possible (i.e., the email program, the PC, the physical Internet-based 
network and its protocols, and even the emailer's den and surrounding artifacts 
making up the email sender's wordly situation from which she locates herself 
and interacts with and impacts Joe, etc.), the email sender's immediate awareness 
is usually fixed on the future results of her activity not on the equipmental 
network itself. Her concernful awareness is, thus, on the results of the acts of 
linhng and clichng and typing, not on the actual acts of moving the cursor or on 
the mouse she's using to do the clicking; her awareness is on the recipient of her 
message, Joe, whom she intends to eventually read the email she's currently 
writing, not on the fingers she uses to type, the actual individual keys she's 
typing, or the keyboards mediating the typing. 
In addition, when we engage with others online, we usually are not aware 
of (nor do we usually care about) the code used to program the ICQ or email 
client we are using to interact with others. Instead, we are fully engaged in the 
"for-the-sake-of-which" act of the encounter with the other or with the intended 
change we want to see in the world. Thus, the "work" - again, say writing an 
email - and the sentiments being exchanged, the message being communicated, 
and the recipient(s) that we are communicating to, are the central 
"circumspectful concerns," the "core" of our awareness. The actual IMC tools 
and each piece of equipment - the physicality of the keyboards, the PC and its 
intricate wiring and chips before us, the binary code of the network, the 
network's infrastructure - that is, everything that is mediating the 
communicational act - fade from our immediate awareness and pull back to the 
fringe of our experiential horizon, like Heidegger's hammer in full ready-to-hand 
use in the tool shed. Indeed, if even one of the tools used for cobbling together 
our email enters our immediate awareness in their present-to-hand mode (say, 
because the keyboard fails or the computer starts working slowly for some 
reason) the actual communicational act of writing the email would be greatly 
hampered if not totally compromised. And so, in the readiness-to-hand of the 
equipmental network of our email (the PC, the email client, the keyboard, the 
flickering cursor, the screen, the mouse, the mouse pad, the desk my PC sits on, 
the network infrastructure, etc.) the actual tools that make up the equipmental 
network fades from our core awareness in the "in-order-to" that enables us to 
communicate with the other through the acts of writing the letter, thinlung of the 
other, and sending the letter "quite authentically" by the readiness-to-hand of 
the tools and the entire communication endeavour (the entire "equipmental 
network" referenced by the act of emailing). 
Further, in these examples of seamless and uninterrupted online 
interactions in the ready-to-hand mode, the tools used to encounter others online 
become, in essence, extensions of ones hand, ones body, ones thoughts, and, more 
importantly, ones relationship with the others we are interacting with at the 
same time that the communicational tools withdraw from our direct e~perience.~' 
In social scenarios in IMC, the tools that we tend to favour can be said to, in 
phenomenological terms, give themselves to us more appropriately than other 
communicational tools - that is, are "ready-to-hand quite authentically" 
(Heidegger, 19621 2001, p. 99) - in light of their readiness-to-hand in our 
"circumspective concern" regarding the skills we bring to the communicational 
"work" at hand, our past experiences of similar situations, our present 
situational circumstances, and the equipmental network that presents itself to us. 
In their readiness-to-hand, as the IMC technologies "withdraw" from our 
awareness and the presence of the other(s) and the practical act of interacting 
dominates our experiential horizon, the communicational tool "-in 
51 Ihde (1990) calls the withdrawal of a technology in-use from our immediate experiential 
awareness an "embodiment relation" with the technology (pp. 72-80). McLuhan (1964) also had 
similar notions of "media" being the extensions of our bodies, thoughts, and senses. A 
comparison of McLuhan's theories of media extensions in relation to Heidegger's 
phenomenology of equipmentality, however, is beyond the scope this thesis and will be dealt 
with in another setting. 
use-becomes the means, not the object, of the experience" (Ihde, 1990, p. 32, 
emphasis in original). These tools, alternatively, may become at any moment 
present-at-hand if our browser were to freeze up, or our computer were to crash 
or the network were to go down, preventing us from interacting or 
accomplishing the act of actually engaging in the exchange of a message with 
another. In moments when a specific communicational technology is present-at- 
hand, the technology's limits are, for me the user, brought into my experiential 
frame of awareness, shrinking my experiential horizon as the technology 
imposes itself onto the act. Thus, I become aware of the cursor's presence or the 
blank monitor screen in front of me. Conversely, in the ready-to-hand mode, I 
see beyond the pixels and plastic of the tool that is the computer and am, instead, 
fully engaged with the world or the other beyond it. The full network of IMC 
tools that are ready-to-hand for me extends my reach onto the world by the very 
fact that all of the individual tools making up the equipmental totality fall back 
to the fringes of my perceptual horizon. The very loss of the tools of 
communication to my immediate awareness is, at the same time, a gain for me as 
my communicative and interactional reach extends through the screen of my 
computer and into the presence of the other as I am revealed to the other and the 
other is revealed to me by the very absencing of the tool. In contrast, in the 
present-to-hand mode, if the computer were to crash or if my Internet service 
provider were experiencing difficulties, the tools malung up the equipmental 
network before me would enter my core awareness while my communicational 
acts and the other beyond would fall back to the fringe of my experience and 
immediate concern. In this case, the pixels and plastic of the PC would 
perceptually turn into what they ontically are - material entities made up of 
constituent parts that become useless with regards to my original 
communicational intentions, turning into obstinate barriers that frustrate my 
desired engagement with the other that was once brought to my presence by the 
in-order-to totality of the equipment. In the former ready-to-hand scenario, the 
engagement with the world and the relation to the tool can be said to be more 
authentic than in the obtrusiveness (and inathenticity) of the latter. 
Summarizing Heidegger's Being-in-the-World for IMC 
In summarizing this thesis's first full exploration of the interactional self 
in IMC from the perspective of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, I make the argument 
that Heidegger's notion of practical worldly encounters is a crucial first step in 
understanding fully what happens when the self engages with the things of the 
world, online or off. The application to IMC is that, rather than a new 
"cyberself" emerging from "cyberworlds," or a new virtual self being created 
from the bits-and-bytes of the computational world, online interactions are 
instead fundamentally pragmatic extensions of Beings encountering each other 
and the things of the world via the mediation of the equipmental IMC network at 
their disposal as either ready-to- or present-at-hand. As we use a hammer to 
extend our arms to drive a nail in order to ultimately build a house from wood, 
for example, disclosing the worlding nature of the hammer, the hammer's "in- 
order-to" context, and the house ultimately providing us with warmth, shelter, a 
location for familial gatherings, protection, solitude, etc., we also use email (or 
ICQ or a blog) in a worlding sense to engage with others when the practicality, 
appropriateness, and availability of the IMC tool in the context of the intended 
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social act deems the specific tool equipmentally fit for us to use. This discloses 
the email tool's worlding nature while, at the same time, "deworlding" the tool 
from our immediate awareness. On the other hand, if the email tool where to 
impose itself in a present-to-hand mode, the world of the email tool itself would 
present itself to us while deworlding us from the other and the other from us. As 
such, and as I will lay out in subsequent chapters, Internet users quickly discover 
that certain IMC tools are better than others for sustaining (worlding) certain 
types of communities, for example, or for facilitating purchasing groceries or 
books without leaving their den, or for keeping connected with far away family 
and friends, thus disclosing new worlds and new possibilities for interaction 
while limiting other worlding possibilities (deworlding; i.e., buying groceries 
online from home prevents us from touching the fruit before we buy it ). 
In sum, Heidegger's approach can be said to add phenomenological 
weight to Wellman's and Castell's sociological claims that the Internet is tightly 
interwoven within our everyday activities. As Feenberg suggests, Heidegger 
adds a "world revealing" dimension to the instrumentality of tools (also see 
Ihde, 1990, p. 34). For IMC, a Heideggerian analysis suggests that the network 
helps us interact with those we seek to interact with based on the readiness-to- 
hand of the communicational tools (access, bandwidth, computer terminal, etc.) 
and the tools' appropriateness for the intended communicational task. In 
addition, these tools are made meaningful by the very acts that they are used for; 
that is, they are practically meaningful in use-contexts. Practically, IMC tools are 
instruments that bring the other into our presence, revealing the other to us via 
the mediation and the technical limits of the tool. At the same time, we use the 
tools of IMC in meaningful ways that reveal important human interactions, 
mould and create new social settings, and disclose the possibilities for extending 
the life-world. The tools of IMC, it can be said, "world." Heidegger's subtle 
brush of Dasein, therefore, begins to fill in the sketch of the interactional self and 
we arrive at our third postulate: 
Postulate 3: The interactional selfis in a constant state of interpretation of 
itselfand its world, practically using the things of the world, online and 
offline, as conduits for communicating with others and for self-understanding. 
I next dip the brush of Dasein into the paints of social interaction theory, 
adding the social colours offered by Mead's social interactionist theories and 
Schutz's intersubjective phenomenological sociology in the next three chapters, 
filling in the social aspects of the interactional self which are under-theorized by 
Heidegger. Mead's and Schutz's views are coloured by the concepts of social 
emergence and social contingency as both sociological philosophers asked, in 
separate circumstances: "What does it mean to be social animals, to be human 
with others?" Their common themes include complementary notions of the 
intersubjective (Schutz) and socially constituted self (Mead) and can be seen as 
building on the ontological sketches of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. 
Chapter 4: 
Mead and the "Generalized Other": 
A Pragmatist Interlude for the Interactional Self 
and Internet-Mediated Communication 
"When a self does appear it always involves an experience of 
another; there could be no experience of a self simply by itself." 
-George Herbert Mead, 1934, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 195 
George Herbert Mead (1934), one of the original pragmatists, a founder of 
the Chicago School of sociology, and a pioneering philosopher of social 
psychology, was instrumental in further developing the view that individuals 
are products of society, the "self" arising out of social experience as an object of 
socially symbolic gestures and interactions. This chapter shows how Mead 
proves to be pivotal in my continuing portrait of the interactional self for an 
account of online sociability, illustrated through a sociological case study of 
blogging practices. 
Like Heidegger's practical self, Mead's self was also a self of practical and 
pragmatic intentions. Mead, for example, grounded human perception in an 
"action-nexus" (Joas, 1985, p. 148) that can be said to be alun to Heidegger's 
practically intended human actions (Joas, 1985, p. 192), engraining the individual 
in a "manipulatory phase of the act" as the fundamental "means of living" 
(Mead, 1982, p. 120). In this manipulatory sphere "the individual abides with the 
physical objects" of everyday life (Mead, 1938, p. 267).52 Unlike Heidegger's 
ontological Dasein, however, Mead also rooted the self's "perception and 
meaning" (Joas, 1985, p. 166) more deeply and sociologically in "a common 
praxis of subjects" (p. 166) found specifically in social encounters. Mead's self, in 
other words, proves to be more noticeably entwined within a sociological 
existence than Heidegger's persistent ontological account. For Heidegger, the 
story is more about the development of Being and how the world is revealed 
within a realm of things; for Mead it is about the development of the self and the 
objectivity of the world within the social realm: that "[tlhe individual mind can 
exist only in relation to other minds with shared meanings" (D. L. Miller, 1982, p. 
5). 
As such, I'd like to present Mead's theory of the socially contingent self as 
a pragmatic interlude between Heidegger's and Schutz's phenomenological 
theories of the experiencing interactional self, offering pragmatist tints and 
textures to our emergent portraiture of the interactional self. In the next two 
chapters, Schutz's sociological phenomenology of the self, with a little help from 
Husserl's foundational phenomenological palette, will then supply the final 
synthesizing perspectives to both Heidegger's existential and practical self and 
Mead's socially contingent self. 
52 Schutz (1962), inspired by Mead, also called this practical everyday grasping and engagement 
with things "the manipulatory sphere" (p. 307). In addition, Schutz opens up this sphere to 
mediated interactions; for Schutz, the manipulatory sphere is "the region open to my immediate 
interference which I can modify either directly by movements of my body or with the help of 
artificial extensions of my body, that is, by tools and instruments in the broadest sense of this 
term" (p. 307). I discuss Schutz's take on the manipulatory sphere in light of IMC in Chapter 5. 
The "I," the "Me," and the "Generalized Other" 
In synthesizing Mead's entire theory one would have to say that what he 
intended to sociologically and philosophically show was that a self removed 
from society could not exist. Indeed, without communication with others, Mead 
tells us, the self would even lack a consciousness: 
We are rather forced to conclude that consciousness is an emergent 
from [social] behaviour; that so far from being a precondition of the 
social act, the social act is the precondition of it. (Mead, 1934, p. 18) 
In fact, Mead's theory of the socially contingent self was the first full articulation 
of the shaping of the self within a societal context (Aboulafia, 1986; Joas, 1985; 
Perinbanayagam, 2000). For Mead, the "significant symbols" required for social 
interactions were communication (Mead, 1934, pp. 68-75), making up a "universe 
of discourse" from which "meaning" was negotiated and worked out in social 
"experience" (p. 89-90).53 Mead's positioning of the self within the social world 
underscores his dialectical notion that society must be understood as an 
arrangement that emerges through social acts, rooted in the mutual interactions of 
its agents that are, in turn, also intimately shaped by the very society they act 
within (Ritzer, 2000). Hence, in Mead's social interaction theory both self and 
society are intricately bound. Further, it is specifically because of t h s  constant 
interchange that the social group ensures cohesion and society continues: 
No one individual can reorganize the whole society; but one is 
continually affecting society by his own attitude because he does 
bring up the attitude of the group toward himself, responds to it, 
53 This aspect of Mead's theory of the social self also inspired Blumer's study of symbolic 
interactionism and Goffman's theories of self-performance management (Blasi, 1998). 
and through that response changes the attitude of the group. 
(Mead, 1934, pp. 179-180)5" 
Key to his theory of the social construction of the self and partly inspired 
by Hegelian dialectical thought (Ritzer, 2000a, p. 388) and Jamesian theories of 
the self (Mead, 1934, pp. 3-4), Mead divided the self into two "aspects, or phases" 
(Mead, 1934, p. 192): the "I" and the "me." The "I" is the creator or the doer of 
actions within us and dialectically reacts to the more passive "me" (Mead, 1934, 
p. 192; ktzer, 2000, p. 402). The "I" is the part of our selves that is impulsive and 
passionate, contributing to the makeup of the group and the society it resides in 
(Mead, 1934, pp. 177-180). That is, the "I" can be said to make social change 
possible. As ktzer (2000) explains, the "I" houses "our most important 
values.. .[constituting] something we all seek-the realization of the self" (p. 401). 
The "me," on the other hand, is the receiver of how others perceive us, 
internalizing the action of others. Further, the "me" is socially bound and 
passive, continuously assessing how to appropriately interact with others, 
housing the self's social attitudes (Mead, 1934, p. 175). This passive nature to the 
"me," however, is not to be confused with Heidegger's socially infused "das 
Man" ("the 'they"') of Dasein where, for Heidegger, authenticity dissolves into 
the being of "Others" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 164). While passive and 
"conformist" (Ritzer, 1992, p. 402), the "me" instead has an important social role 
that Heidegger does not bestow on the inauthenticity of the culturally-led Dasein 
living with "the they": Though it is true that, according to Mead, the "me" takes 
54 This is similar to Anthony Giddens' concept of "routinized and recursive social practices" in his 
theory of structuration where he claims that agency is not purely "voluntaristic" but actors draw 
upon socio-cultural "rules and resources" that are predictable (Giddens, quoted in Clark, 1990, p. 
25). 
107 
on "the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (Mead, 
1934, p. 175) and is, in essence, where a form of social control occurs, this socially 
influenced aspect of the "me" is, to Mead, crucially necessary for both social 
cohesion and individual reflection on the self's place in society, acting as a 
tempered counterweight to the much more impulsive "I." Foreshadowing 
Schutz's worlung / partial self (see Chapter 5), the I/ me self is, moreover, 
informed by biographical information stored in the recollection of past 
experiences by the "me." From each person's unique blend of the "I" and the 
"me" the person's social personality is forged. Synthesizing the importance of 
the "I" and the "me" for the self and for society, Mead theorizes that "[tlhe 'I' 
both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a 
personality as it appears in social experience" (Mead, 1934, p. 178). 
This idea that our individual personality reflects the norms of the social 
group through the "me'' is what Mead called the "generalized other," 
subjectively manifested in the "me." Generalizing the other through the "me" is 
the part of ourselves that emulates and puts into action what society or the group 
expects of us (pp. 152-164). Mead defines the generalized other as "[tlhe 
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of 
self" (p. 154). Further, the generalized other not only shapes the self but moulds 
the self to the image of the group: 
The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole 
community.. .and can direct our own behaviour accordingly. [•÷]It 
is in the form of the generalized other that the social process 
influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and 
carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the 
conduct of its individual members .... [At the same time, an 
individual] takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the 
attitudes toward his behavior of those other individuals with 
whom he is involved in the given social situation or act. But only 
by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, in 
one or another of these ways, can he think at all.. .. (pp. 155-156) 
In other words, we assimilate societal/ group expectations as guidelines for both 
acting with other people and for knowing ourselves. As Mead ultimately asserts: 
"[Tlo be self conscious is essentially to become an object to one's self in virtue of 
one's social relations to other individuals" (p. 172). Thus, through the processes 
of generalizing the other, individuals are constantly securing or ensuring the 
intentions of others while fashioning their own personalities. All the while the 
process helps to maintain social order and bestows social behavioural guidelines 
to group members. 
The generalized other also means that individuals are, in Heidegger's 
terms, "revealed" through others (a view advocated by many phenomenologists 
as well; see Chapter 5) but in specific intersubjective and symbolic interactions. 
Through cooperative association we communicate with others using language55 
and non-verbal cues rich in social symbols, norms, and conventions, objectively 
looking at ourselves and others and engaging in concurrent self-formation and, 
as a result, eventual self-transformation within a "conversation of gestures" (pp. 
63,167) and "significant symbols" (pp. 171-172). In daily living within these 
"gestural conversations," Coser (1977) interprets Mead to mean that 
55 In Mead's symbolic interactionism, sociological phenomenology, and the latter's successor 
ethnomethodology, language is the glue that helps the individual and the group interpret the 
world. It was also important in Heidegger's notion of Dasein: "Language belongs to the closest 
neighborhood of man's being" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 187) revealing as well as concealing worlds as 
well as aspects of Being. Indeed, language, with it's inherent symbols, signs, and socially 
constructed meanings, is one of the most central concepts of the socially constructed self, 
appearing in all of the social interactionist schools (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Jenks, 1998). 
[tlhese significant gestures that characterize most human 
intercourse.. ..and [interactants'] use of symbols always presuppose 
the ability of each participant in a communicative process to 
visualize his own performance from the standpoint of the others, to 
take the role of the others. (pp. 334-335, emphasis added) 
These "significant gestures" are thus mutual "performances" where we 
assimilate the roles and expectations of others and at the same time relay our 
own roles and expectations to others. The symbolic conventions of interpersonal 
communication, in turn, provide the interpretive keys for deciphering the 
"definitions and redefinitions, interpretations and reinterpretations" of our daily 
social interactions (Coser, 1977, p. 335). 
Symbolic Interactionism and IMC 
Similar to offline social settings, recent IMC-based research is beginning to 
show how prevalent these dialectical Meadian social dynamics and socially 
contingent self-understandings are online, especially for group cohesion and for 
self-knowledge through "becoming an object to one's self" in the textual 
performances mediated through the screen. Like more traditional offline social 
settings, Internet technologies that facilitate interactive sociability - such as 
email, chat rooms, instant messaging, blogs, customizable personal websites, and 
even online interactive games like chess, SIMs and, as I will show in Chapter 6, 
the immersive environments of EverQuest - seem to be, for users, predictable 
and projective "performative spaces and performed spaces" (Hine, 2000, p. 109) 
rather than fragmentary experiments with identity, evidencing the social 
processes of generalizing the other in IMC settings. 
For example, in Christine Hine's (2000) ethnographic look at different 
newsgroups dedicated to a similar topic in her book Virtual Ethnography, she 
found that "styles of address and interaction were distinctive to each newsgroup, 
and messages are made situationally relevant to the [specific] newsgroup" (p. 
109) by the newsgroup's members, thus suggesting Meadian-like group 
cohesiveness and practices of generalizing the other. This is done by practices 
such as "quoting parts of previous messages to maintain continuity" (p. 109); 
practicing consistent message stylings (similar types of expressions, words, tone, 
etc.); and by common rules that, for instance, "censure.. .off-topic messages" (p. 
111). Hine even found that group distinctiveness was underscored "through 
particular ways of using the technology" (p. 111) such as sanctioning cross- 
postings between newsgoups and treating off-topic messages appropriately and 
promptly so as not to clutter the software interface with irrelevant information 
(pp. 109-112). Alternatively, she also found that between different newsgroups 
"the separateness of newsgroup space is maintained by the posting practices of 
its the members.. .[and tlheir orientation towards creating situationally relevant 
messages" (pp. 111-112) that distinguishes one group from another. Thus, 
between newsgroups, Hine found that styles of addressing each other "differ 
radically" (p. 109) in the language used, member hierarchy, and other rules 
specific to the group. Rather than playful free-for-alls, Hine went on to find that 
inter- and intra-group boundaries and order were communicated and secured 
through, as Mead suggests, symbolically recognized styles of addressing each 
other which, in turn, solidified the rules of membership to a particular group. In 
dialectically Meadian terms, by the simple fact that each member generalized the 
other within the newsgroup -by assimilating the norms of the group through 
each members' "me" - the right balance between group cohesion and individual 
freedom of expression was ensured. This also foreshadows my analysis of 
Schutz's worlung/ partial self (Chapter 5) and "styles of experience" (Chapter 6) 
(which are both related to Mead's social and symbolic interactionism via the 
work of William James (Joas, 1985, p. 216)). Hine also showed that, not unlike 
the offline world, as members travelled from group to group, they would self- 
adjust their performance (their respective "1's") to match the norms of each new 
group. This is no different than in offline social interactions: Just like one would 
act and interact differently in a lecture than one would at a sports match, online 
the interactional self alternates as needed between the "I" and the "me," 
adjusting one's performance accordingly based on the particular online group's 
norms, the social setting, and the group's expectations of the individual (again 
paralleling key elements in my discussion of Schutz, particularly my analysis of 
"typifications" (Chapter 5) and "We-relations" (Chapter 6) in IMC settings). 
Cybertheorists' idea of the fragmented, multiple, and decentred self could 
be viewed as further challenged with a Mead-inspired analysis of personal web 
pages. Grounded in Goffman's self-presentation, a group of the studies I review 
in this thesis found that personal website and blog authors worked hard to 
ensure that their sites matched the expectations of their assumed offline 
audiences (Chandler, 1998; Hine, 2000; H. Miller & Arnold, 2002; H. Miller & 
Mather, 1998; Mortensen & Walker, 2002; Nardi et al., 2004; Riva & Galimberti, 
2002; Wynn & Katz, 1997). In a study of academic web authors, for example, 
Miller & Arnold (2002) reported that both male and female academics 
purposefully customized their websites to meet the expectations of their peers. 
In Wym & Katz's (1997) study of personal home pages, the authors found that 
"cases of home page self-presentation [were] mediated through socially defined 
[offline] links" (p. 1). Invoking Goffman's frame and self-presentation theories 
(Goffman, 1959,1974),56 Hine (2000) also found that different "frames of 
interaction" (p. 112) socially situated in each individual's offline reality "are 
sustained, at least in part by the physical separation of different [offline and 
online] spaces" (p. 112). While these separations, Hine found, were partially 
effaced by the virtualness of newsgroups and websites, they are not "perceptual 
boundaries but.. .performative boundaries" (p. 112) within "situational 
relevances" (p. 112). Interpreting the sociological work of Cohen (1985) and 
Meyrowitz (1985) to interpret her own Internet research, Hine explains that 
between online and offline social frames performative practices are engaged in 
that, again, maintain social cohesion and define social practices: 
56 Goffman's Mead-inspired (Ritzer, 2000) frame theory (Goffman, 1974) and his dramaturgical 
self-presentation analysis (Goffman, 1959) are also relevant for an understanding of the 
interactional self. Goffman's frame analysis holds that social acts are framed by interactional 
rules and rituals used as interpretive "schemata" for making sense of everyday interactions and 
experiences. The earlier and complementary dramaturgical model of social interaction was used 
by Goffman to powerfully articulate how these social processes worked to tacitly sustain social 
order by carefully positioning the self in ways that both sustain and define social norms. The 
dramaturgical model is part of Goffman's elaborate performative theory of human social action. 
Its central illustrative feature is the metaphor of the actor preparing for the stage: When we put 
on the metaphorical "mask," Goffman theorized, we are performing in our "front region" where 
we perform for an "audience," the object of our communicative intent. In the "back region" we 
take off the mask and take on a more casual, laid-back role where the goal is personal renewal 
and assessment of how we carried out our communicative practices. The "back region" is 
especially used in intra-group settings for group cohesion and solidarity among the "team 
members" as both the individual and the group engage in introspective reassessments and 
preparations for the next public performance (Goffman, 1959). These performances are implicitly 
understood by both the "audience" and the "actors" - the social interactants - as a model for not 
only communicating and using verbal and non-verbal means, but also as implicit social tools to 
sustain interpersonal structures, to avoid disruptions of communicative performances, and 
otherwise provide the communicative norms and rules for the functioning of social interactions 
(1959). 
The focus in constructing and evaluating messages on situational 
relevances suggests that it is not perceptual boundaries, in the 
sense of being able to see, but performative boundaries, as socially 
constructed and maintained spaces of appropriate action, that are 
crucial. (p. 112) 
Thus, as Hine found, online performances intermingled with offline 
performances in ways that afforded her research participants' a "front region" 
(the website) and a "back region" (the careful offline planning, research, and 
preparation of the site) necessary for actually managing the mediated 
presentation of the self through the website. So, for instance, in the studies just 
reviewed, participants explained how they would first carefully design a website 
to look a certain way and contain certain types of information about their 
professional careers (back region), then circulate the URL of the site to a few 
colleagues to get feedback (generalizing the other through interaction within a 
social group), and then finally launch the website (front region) for general 
consumption by a greater audience only after this entire process is completed. 
Throughout t h s  process, hit rates were constantly monitored, related email 
analyzed, and other more informal online and offline feedback channels 
considered, encouraging personal website designers to adapt and change the 
presentation of their websites strategically as the feedback was internalized and 
the "other" generalized. 
The next-generation personal website and online journal format known as 
the "weblog" or simply the "blog" provides further evidence of these Meadian 
dynamics at work online, offering a privileged example of an emerging set of 
online practices that bear further witness to carefully prepared self-performances 
where generalizing the other is integrally situated in the very practices of 
"blogging." And in these bogging practices, yet again, the social interactional 
self, not the fragmented cyberself, is the norm. I turn to this next. 
Presenting the Self and Generalizing the Other Through the Blog: 
A Case Study 
"Web logs give voice to people whom just a decade ago, you never 
would have heard from. There are war blogs, peace blogs, food 
blogs, crude blogs, humor blogs, culture blogs to occupy your day. 
Geek blogs, freak blogs, teen blogs, mean blogs, fanaticals and 
radicals who like to rant away. Worker bees and histories, punditry 
and poetry, diversity, adversity and spicy verbal play. Optimists, 
pessimists, enthusiasts and hobbyists, journalists and journal-ists 
with something big to say." 
-Jennifer Balderama, 2002, "My blog, My self," CINet 
Arguably in existence in their current form since late-1997 or early-1998 
(Rodzvilla, 2002)57 and growing in popularity after 91 11 (Bausch et al., 2002), 
blogs are mostly personal web sites that have been dynamically overhauled to 
facilitate the practices of frequently writing and subsequently archiving  post^,^ 
57 Rebecca Blood's (2002b) popular account of the history of blogs places the start of the blogging 
phenomenon circa late-1997 or early-1998. Some blog experts, however, suggest that people have 
been posting and archiving regular commentary on their websites in the style currently 
distinguishing bloggers (i.e., frequent posts, reverse chronological order of posts, multiple links 
off of the site to other parts of the web, etc.) since the dawn of the public Internet; see, for 
example, http:/ / davenet.userland.com/ 1994 (Winer, 1994). Indeed, some have suggested that 
Tim Berners-Lee, the much-lauded inventor of the world wide web and its transfer protocol, http, 
was the first blogger; his update webpage at CERN that documented all new sites as they became 
available (http:/ /info.cern.ch/) in many ways took on the shape of a blog and can be said to be 
the first blog (Winer, 2002) 
58 "PostsfJ are the most basic "chunks of content" on blogs (Bausch et al., 2002, p. 92). That is, 
posts are blogs' main content containers, making up the main focal point of blogging author's 
regular contributions to the blog. Posts can be thought of as being like entries in an encyclopedia 
or stories in a newspaper. They are usually made up of text but any form of data such as 
graphics or even sound files could be part of a post. Posts also contain what are called 
"metadata": additional supplementary information about the post such as the author's name, the 
time and date the post was created, a title for the post, the post's topic category, a permanent link 
("permalink") to a supplementary webpage on the same server that archives the page on a more 
permanent basis, links to comments by others, etc. Using the newspaper analogy, a post's 
inter-blog linlung, and commentary exchanges between "blogger" and reader .59 
In addition to their dynamic functionality, blogs have also been designed to be 
simple to set up, use, and maintain. Their simplicity, in fact, is said to be forging 
the new interactive and self-publishing practices of blogging. Further, blogs are 
viewed by users and experts as set apart from previous web tools because of: 1) 
their streamlined and functional look-and-feel (mostly text-based entries in dated 
and time-stamped posts displayed in reverse chronological order (see Appendix 
3)); 2) their ease-of-use (web-enabled forms for easy set-up, flexible hosting, 
many platforms to choose from, no programming knowledge required); and 3) 
their capabilities to facilitate blogger and reader interactions via commenting 
functionalities on actual blog entries (see figure 2, Appendix 3). These basic 
features are, it is argued, affording the following web practices: myriad 
interlinked bloging networks (Nilsson, 2003); alternative channels for grassroots 
journalism and new possibilities for the public sphere (Kahn & Kellner, 
forthcoming); and new opportunities for personal narratives and writing 
experiences easily publishable to a potentially wide-readership (Bausch et al., 
2002; Blood, 2003; Hourihan, 2002; McNeill, 2003; Paquet, 2002). 
Subsequently, blogs have seen a rapid rise in popularity from a few dozen 
such sites in 1998 to around 4.1 million registered blogs as of October 2003 
(Bausch et al., 2002; "The blogging iceberg: Of 4.12 million weblogs, most little 
seen and quickly abandoned," 2003; Blood, 2002b). While it is also the case that 
metadata can be viewed as being akin to the journalist's byline, the attribution to a news service, 
the date and perhaps the time the story was filed, and where the particular news story was filed 
from. To see a few exemplary posts as they appear in blogs see figures 2 - 4, Appendix 3. To see 
the main sections of a typical post, see figure 2 in Appendix 3. 
j9 A blog's main editor is known as a "blogger." 
most new blogs are only temporarily maintained as new but uncommitted users 
experiment with writing online by capitalizing on the blog's low entry barriers 
and easy set up (Herring et al., 2004), a core group of roughly 50,000 to 200,000 
avid bloggers ("The blogging iceberg," 2003) have gone on to become stalwart 
writers, maintaining elegant sites of personal self-expression, grassroots 
reportage, or interest-based content that often link to and from other like-minded 
blogs to forge into interlinked networks of bloggers with common interests 
(Bausch et al., 2002; Efimova, 2003; Nardi et al., 2004; Nilsson, 2003) (see figure 5 
in Appendix 3, for an example of how this "network" of running commentaries 
and links might appear on an actual blog page). Consequently, not only has the 
popular press deemed blogging a newsworthy phenomenon as of late," but 
academics have also increasingly taken to loolung at the blogging phenomenon 
from sociological, anthropological, rhetorical and genre studies, feminist studies, 
cultural studies, autobiographic studies, and political science  angle^.^' 
There has been a dramatic rise in press coverage concerning blogs since 1998. Hargittai (2003), 
for example, did a systematic search for the word "blog" or "weblog" on the LexisNexus 
database and found that popular press coverage of blogs began to expand in 2002 and 2003, with 
over 544 stories in the world's major English dailies in 2002 and almost 400 by the first quarter of 
2003 alone. 
AS of 2002, at least three years into the blogging phenoeomenon, Mortensen & Walker (2002) 
confirmed that while "there is a considerable amount of popular writing on weblogs ... there is to 
date no published research on the topic" (p. 252). This is changing, however. For this thesis I 
attempted to systematically account for all non-technical academic studies containing keywords 
such as "blogs", "blog", "weblogs", "weblog" in the most commonly used communication and 
sociology journal search engines like Ingenta, EBSCOhost, LexisNexus, and Communication 
Abstracts, but my search rendered paltry results that often repeated the same two or three 
journalistic articles on blogging. Using time, patience, and extensive searches of academically- 
minded blogrolls, and Google, I was able to identify 67 academic studies concerning blogging as 
of April 20,2003. For choosing which studies to include as "academic" I selected reports, essays, 
and publications that were written by individuals affiliated with a post secondary institution or 
that were linked to and commented about by academic scholars in other essays, blog entries, etc. 
I then preliminarily grouped these studies into four major categories: studies that looked at blogs 
as social networks and in the context of the public sphere; cultural studies-based writings on 
blogs; studies discussing the sociology of blog practices; and studies looking at blogs from a 
literary studies perspective. By this publication it is certain that this number has increased. I 
intend to publish a full list of these studies, grouped into their appropriate categories and 
Defining BZogs 
An emerging group of communication researchers and experienced blog 
experts are beginning to reach a loose consensus on what a blog is and what 
differentiates it from previous CMC technologies. This definition centres on 
what I call the structure and practice definition of the blog (Bausch et al., 2002; Blood, 
2002a; Hourihan, 2002; Nardi et al., 2004; Paquet, 2002; Siemens, 2002; Turnbull, 
2001). Paraphrasing and synthesizing the structure/ practice definition of 
blogging, I define blogs as personal and easy-to-use and manage dynamic websites 
that allow bloggers to post passages of text, graphics, links, and, increasingly, 
other multimedia filesfiequently, with the ability for others to comment on these 
entries, and with the capability to archive these files, posts, and comments so that 
they are easily retrieved by both the blog editor and blog reader (Blood, 2002b; 
Hourihan, 2002; Paquet, 2002; Siemens, 2002; B. Stone, 2002). Additionally, 
blogs' simple "look and feel" (i.e., presentation and navigation) and the reverse 
chronology of posts is what is initially noticed as arguably blogs' two most 
common features. This can be seen in the various blog screenshots in figures 2-5 
in Appendix 3. 
Elemental to most blogs are the chronological posts most often running 
down a middle column usually making up its central focal area. It is in this 
central area where the comments functionality is also usually found. All other 
more peripheral and usually more permanent links and content are located in 
sidebars or in the site's header and footer, with the name of the blogger or the 
subcategories, on my own blog in the coming months (see http:/ /arago.cprost.sfu.ca/marcelo or 
http: 1 1 www.sfu.ca/ -mavieta). 
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blog usually in the header portion of the site." Paquet (2002) neatly summarizes 
the emerging view amongst the blog-as-structure1 blog-as-practice advocates by 
observing that most blogs (and, therefore, blogging practices) tend to constitute 
the following features: 1) "personal editorshp," 2) a "hyperlinked post 
structure," 3) "frequent updates, displayed in reverse chronological order," 4) 
"free, public access to the content," and 5) "archival" capabilities (sec. 1). 
Paquet's categories are echoed in varying ways with all of the blog as 
"structure1 practice" articles I've reviewed, leading me to make a general 
observation: the blog's ease-ofuse can be vividly seen in tlzeirform and in their 
amalganzation ofprevious web technologies as blogs are, in Feenberg's (1999) terms, 
eventually "concretizing" (p. 217) into powerful yet "elegantly" (p. 217) simple 
online writing and publishing tools. b3 
62 It is important to note here that most bloggers state their name and provide an email address in 
a prominent area on the blog suggesting, as I address in the next section, that bloggers don't 
usually experiment with identity in the same ways that one might in other CMC environments 
(this also supports other social interactional CMC research findings that I report on throughout 
this thesis). Indeed, as can be seen in the blogs in Appendix 3, some bloggers even publish 
"About me" sections (see figure 2, Appendix 3) and more detailed information concerning their 
likes and dislikes, work affiliations, etc. 
63 The developmental history of the blog and its social roots show evidence similar to Simondon's 
concept of "concretization" as theorized by Feenberg (1999, pp. 216-220), "granting" the blog "a 
history in a way that [one] can recover for a constructivist concept" of the blog's "progress" (pp. 
216-217). That is, in the blog and the practices it affords we see both the "technicity" of its form 
and the "human purposes" (p. 217) behind its "usefulness" (p. 217). Blogging platforms, for 
example, are, at once, technically evolved forms of previous CMC technologies (BBS posts, 
newsgroup threads, email, archiving functionality, etc.) forged together by communities of 
programmers and hobbyist users over time and as dictated by blogging practices that have been 
cobbled together within the blog's very elegant (easy-to-use and maintain) functionality. This 
concretized iteration of previous web tools for flexible communication and personal expression 
on the blog is subsequently enabling the social practices currently being witnessed in the 
"blogosphere" (see below, this section, for a definition of the blogosphere). There is, moreover, a 
related social constructivist aspect to the blog: Not only are most blog platforms offered for free, 
but their developmental roots lie in shareware systems like Dave Winer's Frontier /Claybasket 
("Dave Winer," 2004; UserlandJFrontier, 2004) and the still-free and now Google-owned Blogger 
content management system (Blogger.com, 2004). Further, evidence of blogs' social construction 
is to be found in their purposefully designed flexible and modular architectures (Bausch et a]., 
2002) and in the already established practices of bloggers developing and designing patches and 
solutions to weaknesses in blog platforms (content management systems or CMSes) and their 
willingness to share their patches with the entire blogging community. In addition, there is even 
As such, and as Bausch et al. (2002) bluntly put it, blogs are, while 
sophisticated web tools, "simple creatures" (p. 91) from a user perspective. 
While bloggers are increasingly experimenting with sound files, images, and 
videos, resulting in genres such as "photoblogs, videoblogs, and audioblogs," 
writes Walker (2003, par. 5), she affirms that "weblogs are still primarily textual" 
(par. 5). Bausch et al. (2002) agree when they claim that "[alt their core, weblogs 
are pages consisting of several posts or distinct chunks of [textual] information 
per page" (p. 7). Simply put but with dramatic consequences for the social 
possibilities they afford, blogs are technically and presentationally nothing more 
than web sites that have, at their core, "posts" rather than web "pages" (Bausch 
et al., 2002, p. 90). That is, with blogs, the document-based paradigm of web 
pages has been transformed into the web post paradigm (Bausch et al., 2002; 
Hourihan, 2002) (for a breakdown of the most important elements of a post, see 
figure2 Appendix 3). And it is here, in the "post paradigm," where the ultimate 
sophistication of the blog lies. These structure/practice authors view the post 
paradigm as fundamentally distinguishing blogs as "an evolved form of personal 
Web pages" (Paquet, 2002, sec. 1) and an amalgamated synthesis of older CMC 
technologies (Bausch et al., 2002; Hourihan, 2002) that, at the same time, is 
reformulating what is possible on the Internet. These new "bloggy" web sites, it 
is being pointed out, are becoming a "new medium" forging a new "bloggy way 
of doing things" (Halavais, 2003, par. 11): ongoing "textual conversations" 
a willingness bydomr CMS providers to "open up" their platforms for users to modify (for this 
phenomenon, see, for example, http:/ / www.hotscripts.com, http:/ / www.drupal.org, and 
http:/ /mt-plugins.org/). Taken together, blogs can be said to be, at once, IMC technologies 
concretized into expressively flexible personal web pages and BBS-like post exchanges that also 
contain features like email, graphics posting capabilities, flexible templates, and administrative 
functionalities permitting multiple authors, all in one easy-to-use platform. 
between bloggers forming loose networks of issues- or theme-based communities 
of blog sites that sees many people publishing their thoughts to potentially many 
people. Moreover, it is particularly claimed that it is this new paradigm that 
facilitates a specific type of two-way interaction between the blogger and the 
bloggerls readers": Now, a blogger, through his or her blog website, can post a 
brief blurb of some sort and the reader is invited to respond to the post 
potentially immediately after publication. In this process, the reader, in essence, 
also becomes a joint content creator with the blog owner. Crucially, t h s  process 
is completely in the hands of the blogger and the reader, potentially avoiding 
any sort of gatekeeping and with the added possibility of attracting a mass 
readership. This phenomenon of posting and commenting can therefore be 
viewed as unique forms of conversations via online text - ongoing emerging 
dialogues between two or more people on publically accessible, searchable, and 
archivable web platforms. I discuss the implications of this for social, cultural, 
and grassroots empowerment in the next two sections. 
Blog Writers, Blog Readers, and Microcontent 
The post paradigm, the commenting features, and the archiving 
affordances of blogs prove to all be pivotal for facilitating the common blogging 
practice that sees bloggers frequently update their blogs and link to and from 
journal-like entries, sometimes several times a day. According to Hourihan 
(2002) and Paquet (2002), these simple practices not only encourage a regular 
readership to form around the best-written and most controversial blogs, but 
also see readers participating in creating blog narratives in collaboration with the 
blogging author. Facilitated by the blogls "metadata" structure, these narrative 
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practices, underwritten by the commenting functionality, serve to create reader- 
based addendums to the running thoughts of bloggers (I discuss the social 
implications of t h s  shortly). In addition, because blogs are exceptionally flexible 
and easy-to-maintain websites affording a public platform for self-expression, 
their popularity especially took off after key socio-historical moments such as 
91 11 and the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq which not only drove the desire of 
many individuals to write their thoughts on a public forum and interconnect 
with others of like-mind but, as in the case of the anti-Iraq war rallies in the 
spring of 2003, saw protesters use blogs as organizing vehicles, as well 
(AboutItAll.com, 2004; nycbloggers, 2004; Peace.Protest.Net, 2004). These 
historically galvanizing events, together with the affordances of the post 
paradigm discussed thusfar, have helped to propel blogs to prominence as many 
found solace and community comfort in the very acts of public writing, of 
commenting on others' blogs, and in the act of interlinking between each other's 
blogs (Bausch et al., 2002) 
As such, blogs are said to be introducing the "microcontent" (or 
"nanocontent") age of the Internet (Broadening the blog: Part 1, Part 2,2003; 
Paquet, 2002) where bloggers with little or no programming experience can now 
post frequent, brief, and timely commentary on their own websites, usually with 
many editorialized links pointing to information of interest throughout the 
Internet and, most notably, to other blogs (see the examplar blogs in Appendix 
3). The technological structure of blogs, their embeddedness in the everyday 
lives of bloggers, and the practices they engender are said to be transforming 
blogs into interactive hubs of connection and "distributed conversations" 
(Bausch et al., 2002, p. 60) within bloggers' everyday lives (see figure 5, 
Appendix 3). Taken together, all of these practices, underpinned by the 
functionality that affords them, are positioning blogs as potentially powerful 
tools for textual conversations on the 'Net that are opening up countless 
opportunities for interactions between bloggers and their readers and for the 
communal memories entrenched in their archives. On this latter point, it is 
becoming apparent that on the "blogosphere" - the ever-expanding collective of 
regularly updated and active blogs that make up the meta-network of smaller 
organic networks formed between blogs (Halavais, 2003; Hiler, 2002) - the 
practice of archiving posts and related reader comments is capturing for 
posterity the myriad commentaries and dialogues on emerging trends and 
events that could be viewed as personal and communal repositories of history 
from those that are actually living it, given meaning by the blog editors' and 
readers' very life-world situations. Again underscoring the structure/ practice 
definition of blogs, it is important to note here that archiving on blogs is both 
based on the teclznical capabilities of blogs and the practices of purposefully 
archiving posts and comments actively developed by bloggers and readers, 
vividly illustrating Feenberg's (2003) double aspect theory of technology 
described in Chapter 2. Amending what McLuhan in 1972 dramatically but 
pointedly said of the "Xerox," one could also say that as "Gutenberg made every 
man a reader, creating vast new publics,. . .in our time [the blog] has made every 
man a publisher" (McLuhan, 1972, par. 58). 
The Social Interaction and Socio-Political Impacts of Blogging Practices 
If we were to return to our discussion of Mead's theory of the social self in 
light of the phenomenon of the blog, blogging practices can be seen as showing 
evidence of Mead's notion of generalizing the other through the public 
performances of bloggers. These performances can be viewed as simultaneously 
extending the blogger into the realm of the public while, at the same time, 
bringing the public into the private realm of the blogger. This public/private 
effacement defines the blogger (publicly and privately) by his or her emerging 
textual narratives that are, in contradistinction to the anonymous self of 
cybertheorists, closely linked to bloggers' offline identities and offline lives. As 
Canadian blog expert Seb Paquet (2002) points out, this public/ private reality 
and the knowledge that there is a potential audience for every post published, 
together with the blogging convention that has bloggers write short posts in 
reverse serialized order, compels bloggers to post pithy and regular entries. That 
these entries have a chance of being read by peers and others also tends to 
compel bloggers to write surprisingly well-written and compelling entries. Blog 
entries, for example, will tend to be shorter and more polished than online 
personal diaries or quickly written and sent email blurbs (Broadening the blog: Part 
1, Part 2, 2003; Mortensen & Walker, 2002; Nardi et al., 2004). Often, each blog 
entry is a constituitive part of a bigger and gradually emergent argument, 
personal observation, or politically-oriented essay. Indeed, these carefully 
crafted writing practices distinguish blogs from each other and from other online 
forms of self-expression. A blog's content can therefore be viewed to be 
inherently personalized yet intrinsically public presentations and evolving 
narratives of the blogger's very identity and self-conception: a public working 
out of the self, so to speak. This is inciting readers to return time-and-time again 
to their favourite blogs in order to read the latest entry in the blogger's ongoing 
narrative concerning whatever might be of interest to the blogger and the 
reader.@ 
Moreover, the blog's "continuously running publication" format (Paquet, 
2002, sec. 1) sets up an expectation in the reader that more is to come and in the 
blogger that more should be written (also see Bausch et al., 2002; Hourihan, 
2002). Mortensen & Walker (2002), for instance, claim that "[wleblogs straddle 
the boundaries between publication and process, between writing towards 
others and writing for oneself. A weblog is always both for oneself and for one's 
readers" (p. 256). Ths  underlines Chandler's (1997) theory of personal home 
pages as he postulates that "the Internet offers those who are fortunate to have 
access to it a unique opportunity 'to write themselves' on a global stage" 
(abstract). Unlike personal home pages, however, the blog takes this self-writing 
one step further into the public realm: Readers (anybody surfing the web) can 
now actively contribute to the self-narratives of web-writers, something not 
practically possible on the more static page-paradigm of personal home pages. 
This provides the blogger more immediate feedback for not only worlung out 
ideas (Bausch et al., 2002; Mortensen & Walker, 2002), but, in Mead's terms, for 
also working out the self through the blogger's internalization of the others' (the 
@ Recent genre studies-based social research on blogs using content analysis and quantitative 
methods have found that most blogs are focused on the likes, interests, and minutiae of the 
everyday lives of its authors (Herring et al., 2004; Nilsson, 2003; Scheidt & Wright, 2004). Nilsson 
(2003), in particular, found that "[tlhe blog is the author's creative space and, as such, very 
individually centred" (p. 26). Additionally, Nilsson also found that blogs, through their links, 
also maintain strong bonds of solidarity with others of like-mind. 
readers') perceived expectations of the blogger. It can thus be said that the 
blogger "generalizes the other" through the blog. It could also be claimed that 
t h s  generalizing of the other is witnessed in the interactive blogging practices 
and emergent narratives that are directly driven by the blogger's "I." Indeed, in 
Nilsson's (2003) content and social network analysis of a set of randomly selected 
blogs the author found that "the individual person - the 'I" of a blog-is very 
strong" (p. 26). Using the BlogStreet network tracking software as a 
methodological tool of investigation (Blogstreet.com, 2004), she also points out 
that "[elach weblog is at the centre of its own network" and that an "emerging 
picture of a socially dense" and tightly rooted network of blogs is becoming the 
norm (Nilsson, 2003, p. 18). A common blogging practice thus seems to be the 
tendency to constantly reference others within each blog's narrative flow as 
bloggers, in further Meadian terms, attempt to generalize the other and relate to 
each other in their social groupings of like-minded blog networks. T h s  means 
that bloggers identify with a greater community of bloggers and readers within 
the very content and links of their blogs that point to myriad areas of the web 
and other bloggers. This interlinkmg forms into blog networks withn the 
greater blogosphere in a phenomenon that Nilsson calls "links of solidarity" (p. 
22). 
Mortensen & Walker (2002) see this social dynamic intrinsic to blogging 
practices - the "links of solidarity" - as a "tension" between the private and 
public selves of bloggers (p. 257). In bloggers' awareness of an audience, the 
authors posit, "[wleblogs straddle the boundaries between publication and 
process, between writing towards others and writing for oneself" (p. 256). In this 
public/private tension, several socio-cultural impacts come to mind that, I posit, 
can be said to expand Mead's generalizing of the other out onto the public sphere 
of the Internet in a manner heretofor unseen on the network-of-networks. 
Turning on its head cultural theory's contention that mass-media bring the 
public into the private spaces of audiences, the private thoughts and expressions 
of bloggers as media producers themselves are now also plunged in an 
unprecedented way into the public. At the same time, the public is invited to 
engage in and collaborate with the private spaces and thoughts of bloggers. 
Mortensen & Walker, in agreement with Paquet (2002), further observe that t h s  
"public but intimate space of online writing" is precisely what is attracting the 
attention of reader audiences (Mortensen & Walker, 2002, p. 285). While this 
rawer, unfiltered, more "Average Joe and Jane" content indicative of the 
blogosphere is perhaps riding on the coattails of the recent "reality TV" cultural 
phenomenon, as McNeill(2003) suggests, there seems to be something much 
more powerful and potentially emancipating at its core: On the one hand, the 
paradoxically "publicly intimate" writing practices of bloggers efface various 
aspects of the publiclprivate dichotomy as bloggers now have the potential of 
exposing intimate thoughts, images, and (perhaps inadvertently) drawing 
attention to socially risky practices (Goffman, 1959) to a potentially wide 
readership. On the other hand, these risks tend to be embraced by bloggers and 
their readers. What this public social risk-taking seems to be showing is that the 
once domesticated and marginalized voices of media consumers are now being 
unleashed via the popularized publishng ease of blogs, handing otherwise 
obscure and silenced individuals tools that also afford users, in Feenberg's 
phrase, "margins of manoeuvre" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 113) for content creation and 
mass-dissemination unanticipated by traditional media, media gatekeepers, and 
political powerbrokers. 
Kahn & Kellner (forthcmoming) view blogs, in light of their self- 
publishing capabilities and potential mass-reach, as offering new possibilities for 
extending the public sphere. Indeed, these affordances could be viewed as de 
Certeauian "tactics" of self-expression that usurp and bypass traditional media 
gatekeepers' "strategies" of control over mass-mediated content.65 These user- 
led blogging tactics of regularly writing about things that are passionate to the 
blogger and linking to others of like mind in blogging networks are actually 
showing signs of exerting cultural and political influence. For instance, the 
affordances of blogs as flexible and powerful vehcles for airing ideas and 
hosting public debates are empowering a small army of "armchair" 
commentators (anybody with a computer, an Internet connection, and a 
willingness to write about topics of concern to others). One such political 
commentator is Markos Zuniga and his now popular Daily Kos watchdog blog 
(Zuniga, 2004a). Through his well-presented blog site and frequently updated 
blog posts (sometimes updated several times in one day) which is primarily 
constructed around well researched and provocative blog posts, Zuniga has 
65 Certeau (1984) posited that localized social groups practice "tactics" for overcoming the 
"'strategies' of institutionalized controls" that permeate everyday life (Feenberg, 1999, p. 112, 
emphasis in original). Inspired by Foucault's analysis of "regimes of t r u t h  and the openings in 
those regimes that allow "subjugated knowledges" room for resistance (see Chapter I), these 
tactical opportunities are to be found in the very dominant codes of the institutional structures 
containing the upper hand in the socio-political power differential. Oppressed social groups and 
individuals can thus "react 'tactically"' to the strategies of institutionalized power even while 
remaining within the structure of the dominant strategy of control (Feenberg, 1999, p. 113). As 
Feenberg explains: "Tactics thus belong to strategies the way speech belongs to language. The 
technical code of society is the rule of an exorbitant practice, a syntax which is subject to 
unintended usages that may subvert the framework it determines" (p. 113). 
managed to transform himself from a former US soldier and tech industry 
worker to a much-linked to and followed blog pundit that is, at the time of t h s  
writing, garnering the interest of many US political heavyweights like 2004 
presidential hopeful John Kerry and the Democratic Party (Utne, 2003).& As a 
result, Zuniga has gone from a readership of virtually zero to thousands of 
dedicated readers while he logs millions of pageviews per month, all within the 
span of a year (Utne, 2003). Indeed, blog pundits like Zuniga resemble to some 
extent the political pamphleteers of 17th century England or the American 
Rev~lution.~' 
Another possibility for the extension of the public sphere via blogging 
practices could be seen in the use of blogs as organizing tools; there is growing 
evidence that blogs are also becoming effective organization tools for online and 
offline mobilization. One example of this is the "flash mobs" or "meet mobs" 
phenomenon that started in New York City in the spring and summer of 2003, 
quickly spreading throughout the world that same year. In these Situationist- 
like events, and using lists cobbled together via blogrolls" and email lists, flash 
66 A typical Daily Kos post might see between 40 and 100 comments, and sometimes many more. 
67 TWO other similar "blog-enabled" obscurity-to-fame examples will serve to further illustrate the 
de Certeauian possibilities in the blog even further: The Drudge Report (Drudge, 2004) and Talking 
Points Memo (Marshall, 2004). With Drudge and his blog-facilitated involvement in the Lewinsky 
affair, the armchair pundit turned into major journalist-albeit with a biting opinion-and almost 
brought down President Clinton via his persistent essays and sardonic commentaries 
throughtout 1998 (Drudge is still writing his regular commentaries on his blog to this day and is 
now also a syndicated radio commentator). In another more recent example, Trent Lott had to 
resign as Republican majority leader of the Senate because a relentless blogger-Joshua Marshall 
of Talking Points Metno-got wind of Lott's adulatory comments made at a private function 
regarding Strom Thurmond's 1948 segregationist campaign for the presidency. Instigated by 
Marshall's dogged coverage, a buzz quickly spread throughout the blogosphere (the ever- 
growing network of blogs and interlinked posts and comments to posts) and collectively exposed 
Lott via tenacious blogosphere-wide discussions that eventually made mainstream news outlets 
take notice. 
bs Blogrolls are lists of links to other blogs that are frequently visited by the original blogger and 
are displayed in a privileged space on the blogger's main page ("Blogrolling," 2004). See the next 
mob organizers would invite a select group of people to congregate at a pre- 
disclosed location on blog posts and mass-emailed messages. Inevitably, a 
crowd would gather within hours, go through a few covert but innocuous 
activities, loiter for a few minutes, then disperse." These "events" became 
frequent enough to get covered by the mass press (Delio, 2003; Leander, 2003), 
ultimately even getting the NYPD involved when Manhattan-area store owners 
began to protest the unwanted and unsolicited attention (Leander, 2003). While 
the reasons for these "meet ups"aren't exactly known - some call them art, others 
light social protests, and yet others the activities of the bored online masses - it is 
indisputable that these blog-organized events are demonstrating the potential 
that blogs have for being organizational tools. It does not take much to think of 
other, perhaps more politically radical uses of the blog for mobilization. 
Indeed, blogging practices might even be indicating ways of overcoming 
the overburdening technocracies of Habermas's colonizing "systems" in favour 
of the more empowering social interactions of the "lifeworld" (Habermas, 1971). 
In particular, blogs could be theorized as affording ways of extending the public 
sphere into the private life-world of Internet users and the private sphere of 
users onto the public domains of mass mediated discourse, facilitating new 
spaces for mediated social discourse and democratic deliberation. Mortensen & 
Walker (2002), for example, contend that a new Habermasian "public sphere of 
political and cultural discourse" (p. 257) is emerging from the blog's 
public/private tensions. Rather than being voyeuristic or sensationalistic, 
section for more details. 
69 For various examples of flash mobs and their related blogs, see http:/ /www.cheesebikini.com, 
http:/ / www.flashmob.com, and http:/ / www.coldforged.org. 
perhaps these public exhibitions of private thoughts-sometimes mundane 
(family blogs), sometimes moving (91 11 bloggers), sometimes inspirational (flash 
mobs)-are attempts by bloggers to re-appropriate the public sphere of the web 
for their own creative, social, and political ends (Feenberg, 1999). Could 
blogging practices exemplified by a Daily Kos or the flash mobs phenomenon be 
acts by the "publicurn" to come to "an awareness of itself" (Habermas, 1987, p. 23, 
quoted in Mortensen & Walker, 2002 p. 257) through the malleable public 
square of the Internet? 
As these examples suggest, blogs might not only be conduits for 
generalizing the other by extending social networks but might also be alternative 
channels for information dissemination, discourse, and organization. In Mead's 
terms, the "I" of bloggers seems to be able to extend its reach70 and ingratiate 
itself onto readers, bypassing corporate media gatekeepers through simplified 
and accessible mass-mediated self-presentations from bloggers' basements and 
dens. Thus, cultural study's "active reader" might be transforming into the 
"active content pr~ducer."~' Might this be perhaps vindicating McLuhanls 
prophetic claim that "the user is the content" (McLuhan, quoted in Levinson, 
1999, p. 39)? If so, not only has blogging made "every man a publisher" but 
maybe through the blog, "the user" and his or her life-world concerns is in fact 
now also "the content." 
70 I discuss the extended reach of IMC users further with regards to Schutz's theory of the life- 
world's "zones of operation" in Chapter 5. 
7' In regards to the ability for the user to now be both consumer and producer via the Internet, see 
Burnett & Marshall's (2003) "Cultural Production Thesis" (p. 3). For an example of CMC 
ethnographic research that applies the cultural production thesis theory to Internet-mediated 
practices, see Ebare's (2004) article "Digital Music and Subculture: Sharing Files, Sharing Styles." 
Blogs and Working O u t  the Selfin Public 
Whde McLuhanls prophecy might be weighed down by kus "technological 
determinist" label, the emerging scholarly literature focused on blogging 
practices seems to agree with Mortensen & Walker's (2002) less provocative but 
similarly inspired claim that "[the blogger] can seduce, attack, manipulate, rant 
or expose herself -but most of the time what you find in a weblog is an attempt 
to say something about what concerns the writer" (p. 258). As blog studies and 
the actual comments of avid bloggers are revealing (see below), it seems that 
blogs are firmly situated in bloggers' meaningful and greater life-worlds. 
Through bloggers' carefully articulated posts, frequent entries, and well crafted 
self-presentations, Mortensen & Walker assert that bloggers place not only their 
daily experiences into a wider public context afforded by the asynchronous, mass 
potential of IMC, but, in the process, also place their own running commentary 
of their sense of self onto the public arena in what could also be considered a 
publicized worlung out of the "me." Mortensen & Walker call this the "thnlung 
by writing" affordance of the blog, theorizing that "weblogs are more than 
simple tools.. . [because]. . .the way we write in a blog reveals somethng about 
how we think (p. 253). As long-time blogger Derek Powlek (2002) evocatively 
writes: 
I love weblogs because they're yet another way for people to 
express themselves online. Sure they're full of links. They're also 
full of lives. Look at the way Meg uploads her train of thought on a 
daily basis, or Tom tells us about his love life, or Jack tells his 
stories. These are real people putting their lives online. (p. 6) 
Another avid blogger, Steve Goldberg (2004), describes similar feelings: 
For me, I blog for myself. It helps touch and experiment with my 
long dormant (and barely existent) creativity. It is an outlet for my 
angst and for my exuberance. It is a safe place for me to be self 
expressive. (Jan. 28,2004) 
In addition to blogs being online opportunities for workmg out the self, in 
the tension between the public and the private and in their acts of self-writing 
bloggers not only understand intimately that a reader may be on the other end of 
their blogging narratives but are also aware that their narratives might have a 
broader impact in the lives of their readers, and this also affects the way bloggers 
write on their blogs (Bausch et al., 2002; McNeill, 2003; Paquet, 2002). Goldberg 
(2004) offers an insightful comment regarding the link between the blogger and 
his or her audience: "Occasionally,. . .what I write touches somebody. 
Sometimes positively, sometimes negatively, but it caused a reaction in 
somebody else" (Jan. 28,2004). Notice the tangibly visceral feel to Goldberg's 
comment. The audience, though anonymous most of the time, is very real to 
him. He writes, in part, to "touch" them and to speak directly to them. 
Commonbeauty (2004)72 writes similarly but more specifically about the personal 
experience of this assumed audience when blogging: 
The first member of the audience for which I write is myself. But 
the.. .host of readers that makes up the rest.. .are also important 
because, without them, I might not challenge myself as much as I 
do .... Some of my readers are masters of the English language, 
others are remarkable thinlung beings, and yet others are sensate to 
a remarkable degree. Many are all of the above and in writing to 
them, I feel like I am writing for an audience that deserves a record 
of my experience. (Jan. 29,2004) 
72 "C~mm~nbeauty"  is this particular blogger's blogging alias. 
The effects of this assumed - or phenomenologically "intended" - audience as 
articulated by Goldberg and commonbeauty is that, as witnessed in the extreme 
case of Zuniga and as previously mentioned, the writing on blogs tends to be 
particularly well-crafted when compared to quickly dashed off emails or chat 
posts, and the presentations (grammar, narrative flow, look and feel of the site) 
are often heavily personalized and deftly executed. Further, as in Hine's (2000), 
Miller & Arnold's (2002), and Wynn & Katz's (1997) examples related to 
homepage practices (and in yet another reversal of cybertheorists' contentions 
that self-presentations online are rooted in anonymity and decentredness), 
bloggers usually always show strong tendencies to, in Goffmanian terms, 
meticulously manage their self-presentations and to engage in narrative 
engagements with known and assumed audiences of readers. 
Compared to the effusive and raw conversations of online chat rooms, 
where chatters engage in anonymous self-presentations and often choppy and 
hectically abbreviated textual dialogues (Romero, 2003; Turkle, 1995), a blog's 
textual presentations and the "conversations" that happen between bloggers and 
their readers via the comments to posts functionality are more carefully, if not 
more thoughtfully, presented. One reason for this is that posts and their 
subsequent archives are more permanent than fleeting chat dialogues or one-off 
email messages (Bausch et al. 2002; Paquet, 2002). (For an example of these well- 
crafted posts and comments to posts, see figure 5, Appendix 3). Generally, these 
blog dialogues consist of supportive additional commentary to an original post, 
readers' contextual asides to the post, additions to a key point, extensions of 
ongoing debates, or perhaps even corrections to the original post. Consequently, 
textual conversations in the blogosphere are more like communal essays or 
emerging drafts of a group writing project, as witnessed on Stephen VanDyke's 
(2004) blog and the subsequent running commentaries stemming from his March 
8,2004 post (see figure 5, Appendix 3), clearly illustrating the emergent discourse 
stimulated by VanDykefs original post. These evolutionary textual conversations 
also resemble in many ways the practices of self-presentation and 
communication via the "written world" of stable online textual environments in 
more traditional CMC technologies such as computer conferencing (Feenberg, 
1989). As with Feenberg's conferencing interactions, the "other" can be said to 
be intended and generalized in the textual conversations of blogs via the 
"retrievable forms of discourse" (p. 25) embedded in the "retrievable text" (p. 25) 
of blogs' archives; in the "social memories ...[ as] ... mediated memories" (p. 24) that 
archiving functionalities afford; and in the community-like formations (p. 25) 
that are forged in the networks of interlinked blogs and reader/ blogger 
interactions that help create Nilsson's (2003) "links of solidarity." 
Another interesting and related social practice that is unique to blogging 
and further underscores Mead-like social interactions and situated selves is the 
custom of "blogrolling" (see figure 3, Appendix 3). BIogrolls are lists of links to 
other blogs that are frequently visited by the original blogger and are displayed 
in a privileged space on the blogger's main page ("Blogrolling," 2004). 
Blogrolling is uniquely different from other types of IMC practices in that the 
blogger identifies with a wider community of bloggers as "tattooed," if you will, 
or embedded right on the blogger's own blog, rather than from a central 
community portal or list or even a webring. Whle preferred web links lists or 
"frequently visited sites" sections have been common on personal websites for 
some time now (and blogrolls can even be said to be descendents of these lists), 
blogrolls are different than these earlier links lists in that they tend to be more 
dynamic and ever-expanding, usually centrally designed into the central 
navigation of the main blogging page (see figure 3, Appendix 3), and directly 
associated with a community of like-minded or related bloggers. Thus, as 
Nilsson (2003) points out, blogrolls are the physical gateways into a blogls 
related network hubs, linlung the blog to other blogs that are, in turn, their own 
network hubs. The blogosphere can thus also be called a network-of-social- 
networks within the greater network-of-networks that is the Internet. Using a 
Meadian lens, blogrolls are also ways for bloggers to identify with, in Nilssonls 
terms, their "solidarity" networks. As such, blogrolls are also a sign of belonging 
and acceptance as much as convenient tables of content to link off of from a 
source blog. They are like badges of group acceptance and membership: To have 
an extensive blogroll is a sign that the blogger is well read, that he or she has 
discerning reading tastes, and that the blogger belongs to a select group of fellow 
bloggers (Paquet, 2003). Inversely, to be on another's blogroll is much more than 
a simple web marketing tool, it is also a sign that a linked-to blogger has been 
deemed worthy of belonging on such a privileged list, legitimating him or her as, 
not only a "good read," but also an exclusive community member together with 
the others on the blogroll list (2003). 
In the practice of blogrolling, we again notice that the cybertheorist's 
inclination to hail the web as a new world for decentred identity play as well as 
the essentialist's claim that "true" community is not possible via IMC are both 
challenged. First, blogroll practices require a blogroll member to have proven 
him or herself as having the same interests, be engaging in the same social or 
intellectua1 behaviours, and often to be pursuing the same goals as the blogroll 
owner and the other members on the list. Second, the blogroll editor usually 
needs to be assured of the beliefs, values, and identities of the blogroll member in 
order to ensure the integrity and consistency of the list.73 Indeed, some bloggers 
go so far as to heavily restrict the list to the most proven of blogging comrades, 
such as Zuniga's strict blogroll policies (Zuniga, 2004b).74 
Bloggers as Social Selves 
In sum, blogs can be seen as tightly integrated self-performance venues 
where personal identities are tightly integrated, albeit in an "edited" way, into 
the blogger's non-computational world of flesh-and-blood. While it is true that, 
as Feenberg points out in regards to online conferencing interactions, blogs also 
witness the loss of some "ordinary conventions and rituals of small group [face- 
to-face] communication" due to the reduction of "tacit cues and coded objects" 
(p. 35) in the asynchronicity of blogging conversations, flesh-and-blood identities 
are, nevertheless, often explicitly referenced and assumed within the blog's very 
73 These two points also can be seen as affording the blogroll a community-building functionality 
that can be linked to my discussion of online communities in light of Schutz's theory of the "in- 
poup'' in Chapter 6. 
'The following is an excerpt from Zuniga's (2004b) blogoll and links policy: "As you can no 
doubt tell, I am extremely stingy on links.. .. [•÷]So how does a site get listed? Be noticed. Make a 
stir. Don't regurgitate the contents of a news story, but provide perspective or additional insight. 
Be clever, funny, original. Get away from the default templates. Get away from Blogspot. Create 
your own identity. Your own domain. Have attitude. Be self-confident. Participate in the 
comment boards at dKos or MyDD or Atrios or any number of other sites (a great way to 
demonstrate your writing acumen). Participate in group weblogs like Stand Down or the Political 
State Report. Don't be obnoxious or feel entitled to a link. Given my site's readership, have a 
heavy focus on elections and the political process. And while I appreciate any traffic you send my 
way, I don't care whether you link to me or not. Or how much traffic you send. Like I said 
already, I don't use my blogroll as a marketing tool" (pars. 1 and 4). 
look and feel and emergent narratives. Thus, much can be gleaned concerning 
the blogger's likes and dislikes, values and mores, group affilitations, and 
situated identity and personality. As can be seen in all of the sample blogs in 
Appendix 3, most blogs, for instance, openly document the likes and dislikes and 
the various roles of the blogger via: 1) the blog's multiple links to other parts of 
the web within actual posts; 2) in the reading preferences and group affiliations 
listed on blogrolls; 3) in the running life narratives of the blogger; 4) in the "about 
me" page; 5) and even through the growing practice of adding personal pictures 
to posts or to more permanent areas of the blog, as witnessed in the recent 
practice of   face roll^"^^ (see figure 2, Appendix 3). Further, the reader 
commenting on blogs often identifies him or herself by the practice of a link back 
to his or her own blog or by including an email address in the actual metadata of 
the blog post. In addition, if one were to spend an afternoon perusing the 
myriad cross-linked networks of conversations in the blogosphere one would 
quickly see lively (and fully documented) conversations with their inherently 
Meadian gestures, significant symbols, and paralinguistic cues. As in offline 
settings, these online textual conversations between bloggers are also dynamic, 
emergent, recursive, and ever in flux, in many ways similar to how emergent and 
asynchronous conversations might proceed when writing a string of letters back 
and forth, with the exception that blogging conversations are always public, 
archivable, and thus retrievable by both bloggers and readers. 
75 Facerolls are similar to blogrolls but, rather than text links, facerolls are hyperlinked graphics of 
actual associated bloggers' mug shots. See Joi Ito's faceroll, for example in Appendix 3, figure 2. 
For an example of how bloggers display a photo of themselves on their blogs as a personal 
signature of ownership, see Seb Paquet's blog Seb's Open Research (2004), Joshua Marshall's 
Talking Points Memo (2004), and Elizabeth Lawley's mamamusings (2004). 
Summarizing Mead's Generalized Other for IMC 
Mead's theory of the generalized other, supported by recent social 
interactionist and ethnographic studies and as illustrated in the case of the blog 
just presented, helps to position aspects of online behaviour as socially situated, 
performative, and communicative actions that, unlike both cybertheoretic 
assessments and essentialist critiques, "moves away from positing unidirectional 
technological influence on online social formations" (Hine, 2000, p. 115). Where 
cybertheorist thinkers have posited that online self presentations are in many 
ways categorically different than offline ones, and where essentialists have 
suggested that community formations are compromised online, under the light 
of Mead's symbolic interactionist theories and the empirical studies reviewed in 
this thesis thusfar, I instead propose that online sociability is intricately 
interrelated with offline social behaviour vis-a-vis group dynamics, careful 
practices of self-presentations and self-management, inter- and intra-group 
boundaries, social cohesion, and instances of Goffman's personal "backstage" 
preparation and careful self-presentation management. In other words, as 
Correll(1995), Wynn & Katz (1997), Ward (1999), Baym (2000), Hine (2000), 
Mortensen & Walker (2002), Nardi (2004), Herring et al. (2004), Nilsson (2003), 
and others have discovered, it seems that these predictable online social practices 
are more often than not deeply entrenched in offline settings. Rather than the 
postrnodern image of the decentred, fragmented, and constantly shifting subject, 
the socio-hstorically-contextualized and projective interactional seIf of Mead 
that generalizes the other and self-presents in ways also laid out by Goffman, I 
argue, also offers further evidence of Feenberg's technological "double aspect" 
where the limits of the tools of IMC are appropriated and mitigated by the use- 
context of the communicational technologies in our everyday lives. Moreover, 
the case study of the blog vividly illustrated that, in the practices of blogging, 
others are fully "intended" and "generalized;" the self tends to be in full 
emergent display in the very self-narratives woven into blogs; and bloggers and 
readers interact in socially relevant and communicative acts of textual 
conversations. Further, and as Schutz, Husserl, and Feenberg will further inform 
in the next chapter, the bloggerls "I" (its proactive, world-influencing sense of 
self) is able to extend its reach out onto the new possibilities for the public sphere 
forged by the ever-growing network of blogs and interlinked posts and 
comments to posts known as the "blogosphere." This is provoking 
communication researchers like Kahn & Kellner (forthcoming) and Mortensen & 
Walker (2002) to wonder if the blog could not only be reinvigorating Habermas's 
(1987) vision for the public sphere, but also breaking valuable ground for 
Habermas's notions of "interactional" and "communicative actions" into the 
sphere of intersubjectivity he termed the "lifeworld." Could blogs, for example, 
be helping to overcome the overarching tendencies of the sphere of the "system" 
of "steering media" (Habermas, 1989)? That is, in the social and textual 
interactions being witnessed on the blogosphere, blogging practices could be 
seen as offering a possible way through the oppressive monopolization and the 
Marcusean sublimation of the cultural, political, and public spheres by the ruling 
technical systems that command and control us (Habermas, 1971)? These are 
questions that have yet to be fully explored amongst blog scholars. 7b 
76 Having asked this, Habermas has apparently never suggested that such possibilities exist for 
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If we return to our social-world canvas, Mead's social interaction theory of 
the generalized other can begin to fill in our metaphorical portrait with social 
interactional contours, suggesting the fourth postulate of the interactional self: 
Postulate 4: The interactional selfemerges within a social context b y  
projecting itself onto others and also being projected upon through social and 
symbolic interactions. 
In our emerging look at the interactional self, I next turn to Schutz's 
sociological adaptation of Husserl's phenomenological world-view, encountering 
an intersubjectively constituted being that can be viewed as dimensionalizing 
Mead's generalized other and adding further colours and contours to 
Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world" for the interactional self, revealing fresh 
theoretical possibilities for re-interpreting online intersubjectivity and 
community. 
the Internet as a potential new space for communicative interactions or as a new public sphere 
(Kellner, n.d.). (Indeed, according to comments in the Habermas listserv, he apparently doesn't 
even use email (Perzynslu, n.d.)!). As Brake (2003) reported in his blog in the spring 2003, 
Habermas told Brake in a brief conversation that Brake had with the professor that he 
(Habermas) "hadn't written anything specifically about the new media and that he felt its 
impacts were ambiguous. He expressed concern about the possible fragmentation of the public 
sphere that comes when the Internet brings interest groups together" (Jan. 28, 2003). Needless to 
say, I disagree with Habermas on this point. Scholars such as Feenberg (1999) and Kellner (n.d.; 
Kahn & Kellner, forthcoming) point out that not only has Habermas undertheorized new media 
technologies, but he has also mostly missed that new possibilities for the public sphere via the 
Internet do indeed exist, as my countless examples in this thesis show. 
Chapter 5: 
Schutz's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the Self: 
The Roots of a Social Phenomenology 
for Internet-Mediated Communication 
"In this universe of the experiencing life.. .I find my entire.. .life- 
world which surrounds me, a life-world to which also belong my 
life with others and its pertinent community-forming processes, 
which actively and passively shape this life-world into a social 
world." 
-Alfred Schutz, 1962, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," in 
Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, p. 123 
According to Dourish (2001), Alfred Schutz's greatest contribution to 
social science was "to extend phenomenology beyond the individual to 
encompass the social world" (p. 110) as he looked at "the way actors create social 
reality" within the constraints of "socially determined action patterns" (Ritzer, 
2000, p. 412). Schutz's is a sociological phenomenology that goes outward from 
Husserl's "transcendental ego" (lbtzer, 2000) to look at how social actors live 
intersubjectively within the "life-world" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 3). 
Specifically, Schutz's phenomenological sociology is centred on the 
question of how individuals interpret social actions as meaningful in the life- 
world and how this everyday, common-sense, and intersubjective world is 
constituted (Ritzer, 2000a; Schutz & Luckmann, 1973). For Schutz, the struclres 
of the life-world were made up of a rich tapestry of sociological and 
phenomenological human actions, interactions, motivations, and experiences 
that disclosed what it fundamentally means to be a human being with other 
human beings. Because of ths, I argue that Schutz's socio-phenomenological 
contours, complementing Mead's generalized other, are very relevant to IMC 
research; his theories can be seen as adding a rich dimensional nature to Mead's 
symbolically interactant self and Heidegger's hermeneutic Dasein. 77 
In order to get a more complete sense of how Schutz's social theory adds 
deep contours and shading to the conceptual portrait of the interactional self for 
IMC, in this chapter I first turn to a few key foundational points in his social 
phenomenological theories of the life-world. I then show how Schutzian 
sociability might be evidenced in IMC settings via social network theory's 
concept of "strength in weak ties," informing the theory of community presented 
in Chapter 6. In the remainder of this chapter I spend time addressing in some 
detail a few of the phenomenological concepts underlying the experiences of the 
self and "other" in IMC vis-A-vis the notions of apperception, time consciousness, 
extended bodies and extended spaces, all serving as a phenomenological 
backgrounder for the next chapter and for my concluding remarks concerning 
the completed portrait of the interactional self at the end of the thesis. 
The Life-World 
Whle Husserl(1970) conceived of the "life-world" (Lebenswelt) as the 
"pregiven" world of the "natural attitude" (Husserl, 1970, pp. 103-189), it was 
not until Schutz's "constitutive" sociological phenomenology that the life-world 
77 Surprisingly, with the exception of Bakardjieva (2000) and Smith & Bakardjieva (2001), Schutz's 
rich theory of the intersubjective life-world remains underutilized in social science and 
communications research loolung into IMC. Hine (1999) also makes use of Schutz in her book 
Virtual Ethnography but in a cursory manner, while Wynn & Katz (1997) also briefly suggest the 
possibilities for IMC research in Schutz's work. 
was articulated sociologically (Wagner, 1970) as the realm of everyday actions, 
orientations, and projections where our "common, communicative, surrounding 
world is constituted" intersubjectively (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 3). For 
Schutz, it is in the common social action that takes place between individuals' 
life-worlds where all direct experiences of other humans occur (Wagner, 1970, p. 
14) (see figure 1, Appendix 1). The life-world is thus the "fundamental and 
paramount reality" (Schutz & Luckman, 1973, p. 3) and the sphere of the 
experiencing subject living with other experiencing subjects that gives "common- 
sense" meaning to our actions, practices, and encounters as interpreted using 
meaningful signs, symbols, and language in a "universe of signification" (Schutz, 
1970, p. 133). Fundamentally, the life-world is contextually experienced in 
accordance with one's socio-biographical circumstances and "reach of action in 
[particular] situation[s]" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 133). Moreover, in the 
life-world, both the interpretation and carrying out of these "actions" are 
informed by an emerging set of "typifications" and situational "recipes" that 
help the experiencing self make sense of others and the world. These 
typifications and recipes for action are, in turn, stored by the experiencing 
individual as an ever expanding "stock of knowledge" (Schutz, 1962, p. 226). 
Situated as the life-world is within the natural attitude, we also assume witlun 
this natural attitude that what is common-sense to us in our life-world is 
common-sense to our "fellow men" in theirs (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 4). 
We thus, in everyday life, suspend doubt of the common-sense assumptions 
within our own and each other's life-worlds, our life-world thus "remaining 
unproblematic until further notice" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 4). 
Everyday life is therefore lived directly in the life-world, is interpreted by 
our accumulated stocks of knowledge, and is experienced through the life- 
world's mitigation. While it might appear from a cursory reading of Schutz that 
there is only one life-world, this is not the case; each individual has his or her 
own life-world with its own spatial and temporal horizons of experience. 
However, each life-world also overlaps with other life-worlds to form the realm 
of social life in a world of life-worlds, so to speak (see figure 1, Appendix 1). Ritzer 
(2000) interprets Schutz to mean here that "others belong to our life-world and 
we belong to the life-worlds of others" (p. 419), each individual life-world, in 
turn, anchored culturally and historically to each experiencing subjects' socio- 
biographies which, when melded together, give unique personalities to the 
various groups individuals form (Schutz, 1970, p. 84).78 Collectively, these 
infinitely interlinked life-worlds make up our common social and cultural world 
that is connected to a past of "predecessors" and shapes the present within the 
realm of our "contemporaries" and "consociates," which will, in turn, shape the 
future world of our "successors" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, pp. 61-92). I have 
made an attempt to illustrate t h s  world of overlapping life-worlds in figure 1 in 
Appendix 1 and will be referring to it throughout the ensuing analysis. 
While to Schutz the world was intersubjectively constituted, the life-world 
is, first and foremost, experienced from a personal perspective as we individually 
gain understanding of our own life-worlds through our private, socio- 
biographically attained "stock of knowledge" (Schutz & Luckman, 1973, p. 
78 I.e., see my discussion of the in-group in Chapter 6. 
79 The "situation-relatedness of the stock of knowledge" is its "biographical character" (Schutz & 
Luckmann, 1973, p. 111). Schutz further theorizes that "[elvery present situation is, in addition, 
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The stock of knowledge is the sum total of the accumulated experiences acquired 
throughout one's life, supplying the life-world with meaning and order and 
subsequently providing us with the "'reference schema' necessary for our 
explanation of the world" (p. 7). Further, the stock of knowledge is enhanced 
intersubjectively before, during, and after every encounter as we add to "the 
sequence of situations during the course of life" (p. 111). In turn, the objects and 
events that confront us in the life-world are placed into a set of situational 
"recipes" and "typifications" that subdivide our reference schema into workable 
sets of generalizations we can work off of in interactions with others (Schutz & 
Luckman, 1973, pp. 229-235), similar to (although functionally different than) the 
socializing role of Mead's concept of the "generalized other." Language, for 
example, is for Schutz a method of typifying that gives us "linguistic types" 
(Ritzer, 2000, p. 418); through language, we continue to socio-culturally acquire a 
"store of typifications" throughout our lives (p. 418). Consequently, by 
interpreting one's own past experiences rooted in social interactions and saved 
within one's typified reference schema through, for example, linguistic types, 
individuals define their situation and choose how to act towards objects or 
others. And so, through each encounter with others - in varying degrees of 
engagement for every encounter - the stock of knowledge grows and the life- 
world continuously, concomitantly, and contingently changes, adding to our 
"common experiences1' (common sense) and the interactional self's interpretive 
and intersubjectively acquired schemas. 
biographically articulated within its 'known' limits.. .. In this sense," concludes Schutz, " the 
biographical character of the present situation forms an element of my stock of knowledge" (p. 
111; also see pp. 90-131 and Wagner, 1983, p. 289). 
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For Schutz, the acting self- the Being-in-the-world that changes and 
moulds its world - is inherently social. Further, the acts of apprehending the 
things of the world, anticipating a future, and experiencing others within the 
sedimented reality of everyday life see the interactional self, as with Mead, 
projecting onto others as others and things project upon it. To Mead's 
generalized other, Schutz can be seen to add a more complete theory of the 
intersubjectivity of the life-world. As just mentioned, for Schutz interactant 
reciprocity occurs in shared, intersubjectively attenuated and overlapping life- 
worlds in a world of life-worlds (see Appendix 1). These interacting, 
intersubjective selves are thus also spatially, biographically, and historically 
interconnected. As Moustakas (1994) describes it, the intersubjectively 
entrenched self interacts with the social world "in a process in whch I present 
myself to you and you present yourself to me.. .in an interchange of perceptions, 
feelings, ideas, and judgments regarding the nature of reality" (p. 57). That is, 
for Schutz, social interactions occur within "degrees of intimacy and anonymity" 
(Schutz, 1962, p. 134, emphasis in original) that he also termed "gradations of 
immediacy" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 65, emphasis added)." In Schutz's own 
words: "I experience men . . .according to various levels of proximity, depth, and 
anonymity in lived experience" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 69). In other 
words and as social network theory also suggests, all human interactions can be 
said to happen within dimensions of sociability that begin from each individual's 
"subjective, spontaneously flowing stream of experience in whch the individual 
so These "gradations of immediacy" are mitigated by the "intentionality to act" (Schutz & 
Luckmann, 1973, p. 59). Rtzer (2000) rephrases this social spectrum as "degree[s] of immediacy" 
(p. 422). 
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lives and which.. .carries with it spontaneous linkages, memory traces, etc., of 
other, prior, experiences" (Schutz, 1970, p. 318, emphasis in ~riginal).~' As I show 
in upcoming sections and in the next chapter, these concepts prove to be fruitful 
for rethinking the socially contingent place of the interactional self in IMC 
settings and for helping to theorize how and why "strength in weak ties" and 
"media multiplexity" occur in IMC. 
Media Multiplexity, Intersubjectivity, and IMC 
I believe that Schutz's notion of the life-world helps us further envision 
the varied hues and textures of the interactional self, helping us understand that 
IMC is not a separate virtual reality but part of our multi-dimensional and 
situated social world of everyday life. Indeed, Bakardjieva's (2000) work on the 
Internet and everyday life shows how well Schutz's theory of a multi- 
dimensional, intersubjective life-world transfers to the analysis of online social 
interaction, adding socio-phenomenological force to the position that interactions 
online are socially entrenched deep in our interconnected life-worlds 
(Bakardjieva, 2000; Smith & Bakardjieva, 2001). Schutzian theories of the 
intersubjective life-world especially make sense in IMC when, as Wellman & 
Gulia (1999) remind us in their well-known paper "Net-Surfers Don't Ride 
Alone: Virtual Communities as Communities": 
[Pleople do not neatly divide their worlds into two discrete sets: 
people seen in-person and people contacted online. Rather, many 
community ties connect offline as well as online. It is the 
relationship that is the important thing, and not the communication 
81 Schutz's references to the experiencing ego's "stream of experience" is heavily indebted to 
Husserl (see, for example, Husserl1913/1931, p. 143). 
medium.. . . [TI he development of multiplexity can involve the 
conversation of relationships that only operate online to ones that 
include in-person and telephonic encounters. Just as community 
ties that began in-person can be sustained through email, online 
ties can be reinforced and broadened though in-person meetings. 
(p. 349) 
As such, Wellman's (1999) social network theory can be used to illustrate a 
Schutzian view of online sociability that sees users living in worlds of 
overlapping life-worlds within dimensions - or gradations - of sociability, online 
or off, and, as I will touch on shortly, using media "multiplexly" in a plethora of 
configurations and concatenations withn these overlapping life-world 
situations. 
While Wellman uses a more positivist approach in h s  methods than that 
envisioned by Schutz, I believe Wellman's research findings nevertheless 
validate Schutz's concept of the "degrees of intimacy" found within overlapping 
life-worlds (see Chapter 6); both theorists have compatible conclusions: 
Wellman & Gulia (1999), for example, state that "evidence available suggests that 
the ties people develop and maintain in cyberspace are much like most of their 
'real-life' community ties: intermittent, specialized, and varying in strength" (p. 
353). If we look at Wellman's online social network theory with a Schutzian eye, 
online interaction can be said to support interactions situated within a spectrum 
of sociability (that is, of interconnecting life-worlds) somewhere between narrow, 
special interest relations containing low entry barriers, much anonymity, and low 
"degrees of intimacy" (such as the sociability found on FAQ sites, expert forums, 
online purchases, some online live chats, interactive games, etc.) and broad, 
multiplex relations having high entry barriers and deeply intertwined degrees of 
intimacy needing fully divulged identities (such as family websites and blogs; 
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emailing or ICQing family oversees (Bakardjieva, 2000), and online support 
groups (Correll, 1995; Ward, 1999)). Wellman (1999) designates the former types 
of social networks primarily special interest and "narrow" affinity-based 
relations usually characterized by specialized, focused, and interest-based 
interactions requiring low barriers for entry and weaker emotional investment, 
thus also also called the "weak ties" theory of interaction by social network 
theorists (Granovetter, 1982). The latter types of interpersonal networks are 
made up of more broadly multiplexs2 and close-krut relationshps requiring a 
deep investment of time and stronger emotional bonds that have high barriers 
for entry, inversely called "strong ties." While Wellman & Gulia (1999) suggest 
that IMC supports both types of social networks (p. 346), they go on to explain 
that solely IMC-based relations that express themselves online on the whole are 
proving to be mostly the former type of weaker relationship, albeit with certain 
levels of intimacy that the authors term "intimate secondary relationshps: 
informal, frequent, and supportive community ties that nevertheless operate 
only in one specialized domain" (p. 347). The researchers ultimately show that 
the structures of IMC are particularly well-suited for these types of weaker but 
still "intimate secondary relationships," a phenomenon also known amongst 
social network theorists as "the strength of weak ties" (Granovetter, 1982; 
Haythornthwaite, 2003; Wellman, 1999). 
Explaining the concept of "the strength of weak ties" for online social 
82 According to social network theory, strongly "multiplex" relationships are made up of multiple 
layers and dimensions of social bonds that carry deep emotional commitments and parlay long- 
term socio-psychological support for an individual and group, meeting a multiplicity of deeply 
invested psychological needs (Wellman, 1999). Weaker relationships, in turn, are less multiplex 
and more uni-dimensional in nature. 
settings using Granovetter's (1982) seminal social network theory paper, "The 
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," Ito (2003) offers some 
powerful examples of these narrower types of social ties online using h s  
personal and professional experiences with blogs and complementary IMC 
technologies. In his blogging and professional online work experiences Ito is 
finding that weaker secondary ties are the norm for him. 83 Ito especially finds 
that his interactions with other bloggers with focused common interests, his 
career connections, and h s  collaborative online projects are all well supported 
through the blogging and supplemental IMC technologies he uses. This is the 
case, Ito argues, because "social software" technologies that enable online 
asynchronous interactions and conversations help to also disclose key aspects of 
interactants' backgrounds, identities, and personalities that, used in unison, 
facilitate accomplishing the common goals and projects of all participants (for 
similar conclusions, see Feenberg, 1989; concerning social software, see Wershler- 
Henry, 2004). Such social software could include conferencing systems, blog 
postings, and email. These social software technologies are especially well suited 
for affording and sustaining the varying degrees of interaction that individuals 
experience in everyday life, especially when combined with more synchronous 
technologies such as IRC ("internet relay chat," also known as "instant 
messaging" (IM)), and even the telephone (and now online IP-based telephony 
such as Skype ("Skype.com," 2004)). As Ito explains, combinatorial uses of IMC 
n3 As of the June 2004, Joichi Ito was one of the world's most linked to and interviewed bloggers, 
considered amongst the "A-List" in the blogging community and attracting a wide readership 
due to his insightful and accessible writing on the social impacts of communication technology. 
He is currently CEO of www.neotany.com and has a leadership role with the blog tracking 
service www.technorati.com. 
technologies allow networks of weak ties to transcend the constraints of deeply- 
invested relations (which take time) and geographic boundaries (which are 
confined by space) while offering each interactant enough information of the 
other for all participants to feel confident that everyone is who they claim to be 
based on the required personal backgrounds needed for the communicational 
task at hand in order for the interchange can take place with legitimacy, 
accuracy, and the proper level of mutual support. 
Ito, for instance, has capitalized on the affordances of blogs for idea 
exchanges (e.g., Ito, 2004b; Pearson, 2003), distributed publishing (e.g.: Ito, 
2004a), and even for hiring employees (Ito, 2003). Writing about his recent kuring 
experiences using IRC and blogging in a brief essay on his personal blog, Ito 
evocatively illustrates this "strength in weak ties" dynamic via his own 
communicational experiences with potential hires. In the essay he elaborates on 
how his hiring process was facilitated by the IMC technologies both he and his 
potential employees saw as being most fitting (or, "equipmentally fit," in 
Heideggerian terms) for the hiring task at hand. I will let Ito explain this 
dynamic in h s  own words: 
What I would like to assert is that social software can help people 
with their self-esteem and can also help you find others who can 
find your assets and interests more valuable and place people in 
jobs where one can have "character". . .. 
What I can see emerging [in blogs and social software] is a way to 
amplify the strength of weak ties. (I knew this before, but it's 
becoming more crisp to me now.) IRC allows me to see the style 
and personality of many of the people online. Blogs help me see 
what their interests are and focus is. LinkedIn [an online 
professional networking tool] provides a professional context for 
referrals. I think that supporting the process of developing your 
assets and character and finding a job that best suits you will be one 
of the single most important benefits of social software .... [I 
have]. . .realized that social software may be most important in 
addressing.. .finding the job that brings home the bacon.. .. 
I recently hired two people who were IRC regulars. I felt very 
comfortable after "getting to know them" over the last few months 
on IRC. Of course face to face meetings and interviews were 
essential, but the time spent with them on IRC really added to my 
ability to judge their character. I realize now that I am actively 
recruiting from my network of weak ties on the Net and also using 
the Net to meet interesting people to connect with others who 
might be good collaborators for those interesting people. The Net 
has always been a big part of my arsenal of networking tools, but I 
think it's reaching a whole new level. (Aug. 16, 2003) 
It is revealing to see that Ito does not just use one technology but rather 
applies a combination of technologies to carry out the communicational task at 
hand which, in this case, was to hire employees. This is called "media- 
multiplexity" by social network theorists (Haythornthwaite, 2003; Wellman & 
Haythornthwaite, 2002) and is the notion that "[flrequent contact via one 
[communication tool] is associated with frequent contact via other means" 
(Wellman et al., 2003, sec. 8). In support of Ito's experiences, Wellman et al. 
(2003) are finding that Internet sociability in particular shows strong tendencies 
towards this media-multiplexity phenomenon, or what they also call the theory 
of "the more the more" (sec. 8). The Internet, the authors found, extends the 
number of social contacts in the networks of Internet users, online and off. As 
such, "[hleavy Internet users have a greater overall volume of contact with 
community members because Internet use supplements telephone and face-to- 
face contact. It does not displace it" (sec. 8). Further, and in a partial tip of the 
hat to Poster's 2001 claim that the Internet brings with it new dimensions to 
social realities (though not as totally as Poster and other cybertheorists suggest), 
Wellman et al. contend that "the more the more" reality of Internet sociability 
must therefore also be seen to extend our social possibilities: "It is probable 
[therefore]," the authors conclude, "that people not only have more relationships 
than in pre-Internet times, they are in more frequent contact with community 
members" (sec. 8). There is a caveat to this conclusion, however: For Wellman et 
al., the new extensions of our social circles afforded by the Internet do not 
necessarily create a new communicational and social paradigm, as the 
cybertheorists claim, but are instead mostly new extensions of our old social 
structures-that is, they are new ways of doing old things. On the whole, we 
communicate online with those that we've always been communicating with: 
known social networks of kith and kin in addition to more instrumental weaker 
relations. This is, additionally, also in direct contradiction to Dreyfus's (2001), 
Borgmann's (1999), and other essentialists' fears that "real" community is not 
possible on "less authentic," "less risky" online interfaces (see Chapter 6). On the 
contrary, media-multiplexity studies such as Wellman et al.'s are suggesting that 
those that use the Internet frequently to connect and communicate are also likely 
to talk face-to-face and to generally support already established community 
formations (Haythornthwaite, 2003; Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2002). 
Both essentialists and cybertheorists often overlook the fact that the online 
is not engaged with independently of the offline. On the contrary, as Hogan 
(2003) and Matei & Ball-Rokeach (2003) have recently reported, and in support of 
Wellman's pioneering work in Internet social network studies, higher levels of 
interaction in offline communities correlate with higher levels of interaction in 
online ones and vice-versa. Hogan (2003), for instance, found that heavy users of 
IMC technologies tend to "talk more in person and by telephone" (sec. 1) while 
Matei & Ball-Rokeach (2003) concluded that "strong anchoring to offline social 
and cultural groups links cyberspace to people's local communities" (p. 552). 
When looked at more broadly from a point-of-view that attempts to factor 
in the complex nuances of everyday life, social network researchers are showing 
that social scientists cannot isolate IMC-based sociability from the greater context 
of users' life-worlds. Ito's description of how his media-muliplexity includes 
face-to-face interactions when the situation deems it appropriate, together with 
emerging media-multiplexity research, supports one of my thesis's main 
proposals: that online and offline social settings and media uses are intimately 
intertwined. Indeed, media-multiplexity research also hints at Heidegger's 
theory of equipmentality, where tools are chosen according to their "in-order-to" 
fitness (see Chapter 3). Moreover, social network theory's related "strength in 
weak ties" hypothesis and Ito's hiring scenario also underscore a major anchor 
point in my thesis that connects it with Feenberg's (1999; 2003) dyadic 
"instrumentalization" model for human use-technology relations that I described 
in Chapter 2: Like Feenberg theorized for human-technology relations as a 
whole, IMC technologies are both shaped by and shape users. On the one hand, 
IMC is shaping online and offline social networks by extending users' social and 
geographic reach while selectively framing the particular performative 
interactions mediated through the IMC tools used, compelling users to adapt to 
the affordances of the IMC technologies at hand. On the other hand (and at the 
same time), users are "creatively appropriating," changing, and constantly 
redefining the IMC applications of choice by their very life-world realities and 
use-contexts, also bringing the affordances of the technologies into account to 
meet user's own social ends. 
Schutz's "Working" and "Partial" Self and IMC 
Schutz's intersubjective self has not only direct lineage to Husserl, but also 
to Mead's and James's dialectical conceptualizations of the socially contingent 
"I" and "me" (Schutz, 1962, p. 216). With Schutz, similar to Mead's and James's 
Ilme framework, the self emerges explicitly as a dialectic between the "working 
seij" and the "partial self' (Schutz, 1962, p. 216, emphasis added). The "working 
seij" "experiences itself as the originator of.. .ongoing actions.. .as an undivided 
self" (p. 216) which, similar to Mead's and James's "I," acts out onto the outer 
world. What Schutz adds to the JamesianIMeadian "I" is an explicit action 
theory encapsulated in the notion of a future-oriented "project" (Schutz, 1962, p. 
24) that is characterized, as Barber (2002) explains, "by the intention to bring 
about.. .[a]. . .projected state of affairs" (sec. 2). At the same time, the self has a 
more passive, socially determined aspect to it: "the partial se2f' (Schutz, 1962, p. 
216, emphasis added). Like James's and Mead's "me," the partial self is the 
reflective "taker of a role" accessed through circumspection and reflection 
(Schutz, 1962, p. 216). The partial self is the passive part of the self, recollecting 
"performed past acts" from its stock of knowledge by referring "to a system of 
correlated acts to which it belongs" (p. 216). Barber (2002) explains that Schutz 
associates the partial self with "because-motives," an existential concept that 
contrasts with "in-order-to-motives." "Because-motives" are where, "after 
completing one's actions, one correlates, as an observer of oneself, the choice of 
the project with its historical determinates" (sec. 2). 
Schutz's self is therefore a self rooted simultaneously in agency and action 
(the worlung self) and reflection and recollection (the partial self). Moreover, as 
with Heidegger's practical encounters and Mead's "manipulatory phase," to 
Schutz the world is one of "well circumscribed objects" (Schutz, 1962, p. 208) 
encountered through "eminently practical interest" (p. 208). We "gear into" the 
world (p. 209) and both change and are changed by it. This world, like 
Heidegger's practical encounters, is overseen by a "pragmatic motive that 
governs our natural attitude toward the world of daily life" (p. 209). But there is 
a tension in the way we encounter the world: While we transform the objects in it 
- thus giving agency to our plans, purposes, and actions - these transformations 
are always mitigated by the actual world we live within as it resists our efforts to 
change it. As Schutz explains: 
Our bodily movements ...g ear, so to speak, into the world, 
modifying or changing its objects and their mutual relationships. 
On the other hand, these objects offer resistance to our acts which 
we have either to overcome or to which we have to yield.. .. World, 
in this sense, is something that we have to modify by our actions or 
that modifies our actions. (p. 209) 
Critically for Schutz, this involvement with the world is not solitary. 
Unlike Heidegger's Dasein, Schutz explicitly adds intersubjectivity to this 
worldly encounter: "The world is from the outset not a private world but an 
intersubjective world, common to all of us" (p. 208). We live with others. We are 
social creatures. We actively pursue worldly transformation "with our fellow 
men " (p. 209). We cannot avoid this. Thus, as the world changes us and we it, 
the "I" and "me" must become, as Sartre suggested in a different occasion, "us" 
and " ~ e . " ~  For Schutz, this is to be found in his concept of "work." This 
instersubjective world of everyday life is "the scene" (p. 209) where working, 
actions, and interactions happen. It is where we engage in our purposeful 
pursuits with others. But what exactly did he mean by "work and how does it 
tie into the interactional self and our experiences of the other? 
Schutz's "work and "worlung acts" are at the core of how the world can 
be engaged with and changed in "the here and now" and how the self is realized 
as a "total self": "the worlung self" (p. 216). Further, it is in working acts that the 
self communicates with others. Work is "purposive action" which Schutz also 
calls "performances" (p. 211). A performance has roots in planning, in projecting 
a future state; it is based on a "preconceived project" (p. 211) and is rooted in 
Husserl's "pretensions" and "anticipations" (p. 216).85 Moreover, our actions 
and performances are able to be experienced by another via our "bodily 
movements" (p. 212). We engage in work, change and are changed by work in 
the world, and share this work with others. To Schutz, then, work 
is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterized 
by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by 
bodily movements. Among all the described forms of spontaneity 
that of working is the most important one for the constitution of the 
reality of the world of daily life ... the wide awake self integrates in 
its worlung an by its working its present, past and future into a 
specific dimension of time; it realizes itself as a totality in its 
working acts; it communicates with Others through worlung acts; it 
organizes the different spatial perspectives of the world of daily life 
through worlung acts. (p. 212) 
See in particular Sartre, 1964, pp. 535-537. 
Husserl's "pretensions" and "anticipations" are part of his theory of time. For the links 
between Schutz's concepts of "working acts" with Husserl's notion of "phenomenological time," 
which is, in turn, related to Bergson's concept of durte, see Schutz, 1962, pp. 215-216. Also see this 
chapter's next section. 
Schutz, therefore, informs us that the interactional self always operates within 
life-worlds consisting of alternating modes of "gearing into the world": We work 
into and are worked over by the world. Online, I argue, this is no different. 
Feenberg (1989; 1995b), Bakardjieva (2000), Hine (2000), and Baym (2000), 
for example, have all shown how the offline social situation and socio- 
biographies of Internet users are closely tied to online behaviours in alternating 
states of active and reactive interplay with others as situated within the 
complexities of everyday life and revealed "worlds" that are "geared into" 
online. In this same spirit, Chee & Vieta (2004), for example, assert that similar 
online/ offline effacements, "working" actions, and social interactions occur 
within the gaming world of EverQuest, finding that the "fantasy" game worlds 
of players were actually worlds that in many ways formed a part of the gamer's 
greater life-world in complexly interconnected ways.% On various EverQuest 
"realms" (online worlds), for example, EverQuest gamers perform, work, and 
develop future-oriented projects with each other via online and offline 
communities discussing various aspects of EverQuest life, sharing player-written 
stories, interacting in chat rooms, exchanging player bios, and even co-creating 
game-inspired art (Chee & Vieta, 2004, p. 4). Shared projects, therapeutic 
ss EverQuest is the most popular of the online role-playing games known as Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, or "MMPORGs" for short (see Chee & Vieta (2004) for 
more details). Chee & Vieta (2004) report on primary ethnographic fieldwork carried out by one 
of the authors, Florence Chee, from "inside" the EverQuest community. On a primary level, the 
work consists of participant observation of gaming avatars from within the EverQuest world 
where Chee used her EverQuest avatar to engage with other gamers and the online gaming 
environment of EverQuest. The authors also report on in-depth interviews of three avid 
EverQuest gamers concerning their experiences of becoming members of the EverQuest 
community and online role-playing gaming in general. The authors then theorize their findings 
using the sociological phenomenology of Alfred Schutz (1962; 1970; 1973). A related paper based 
on this study is slated to become a chapter in a reader on online games tentatively title Gaming 
Cultures Reader and scheduled to be published sometime in 2005 (Chee, Smith, & Vieta, 
forthcoming). 
 involvement^,^^ and offline interactions as inspired by online ones in EverQuest 
are all witnessed in Chee & Vieta's ethnographic and long interview-based look 
at the online and offline lives of various EverQuest players. Not only do 
EverQuesters need to forge social bonds and networks (referred to as "joining a 
guild" and "grouping" with others) within the game's world for ultimate success 
(the acquisition of social and material wealth), but long-lasting social bonds often 
subsequently form directly in the gaming environment and between EverQuest- 
related social networks offline (2004). 
Chee & Vieta's empirical evidence, therefore, shows that the EverQuest 
world is a Schutzian world of work; just like the world of flesh-and-blood 
engages the self with the other and the things of the world by each interactant's 
"gearing into" the world, so too do EverQuesters engage with others and "gear 
into" the things of the world on EverQuest and its communally-created realities. 
In support of Chee & Vieta, Castronova (2001) also found worlds of work on 
multiplayer games like EverQuest: "Avatars in virtual worlds must work to do 
anything interesting at all" (p. 16), Castronova writes. Chee & Vieta encountered 
similar worlung selves and "worked over" worlds on EverQuest, reporting that 
garners' avatars were witnessed running errands, worlung collaboratively, 
building their surrounding life-world structures, and even engaging in "free 
market" exchanges of EverQuestian goods and services (Chee & Vieta, 2004). 
Drawing from the writings of Schutz and Goffman and expanding on Argyle, 
Furnham, & Graham's (1981) symbolic interactional work, Hine (2000) suggests 
'' Le., some players claim that interactions on EverQuest help resolve personal issues and 
stresses. 
that online social groupings such as EverQuest's communities can also be 
thought of as groups of individuals engaged in active "performances oriented 
towards practical understandings of behaviour appropriate to particular social 
spaces" (p. 109). As Argyle et al. (1981) assert in discussing symbolic interactions 
in everyday social situations: "situations are not passively there; they are actively 
perceived and negotiated" (paraphrased in Hine, 2000, p. 109). Hine found 
similar active performances in the newsgroups she investigated (also see Chapter 
4). The "social spaces" of EverQuest, for example, happen to be a combination of 
the player's offline situation and players' "work on the EverQuestian 
computational worlds (Chee & Vieta, 2004). On EverQuest, social performances 
are indeed situationally bound within the constraints of the EverQuest realm. 
But the social networks engaged in, each member's "working" self, and the 
boundaries and structures of players' non-computational spaces also inform 
players' social performances. As Hine argues generally for most online settings, 
Chee & Vieta (2004) also show that the same types of socio-phenomenological 
structures, worlung and partial selves, performances, and social cues, hold in 
EverQuest, as well." I discuss these performative dimensions of EverQuest 
further in Chapter 6. 
I believe that Schutz's dialectical theory of the working self and partial self 
continues to fill in the details of the interactional self on our social world canvas 
" When the social formations of EverQuest are analyzed using Schutz's interaction theory of 
community (see Chapter 6)' Chee & Vieta (2004) learned that the social performances they 
witnessed within the land of Norrath (an EverQuest "world"), for example, contained social 
groupings of gamer's avatars existing in the same locality and following codes of conduct which 
can be implicit or explicit. According to my definition of community in Chapter 6, the people 
associated with sustaining these avatar relationships would definitely qualify as a valid 
community (see Chee & Vieta, 2004), especially because the garners, when interviewed, did not 
outwardly differentiate their non-computational embodied self from the computational self of the 
avatar-on the whole they spoke of both in the first person. 
for the self online. Not only do Schutz's theories of action-oriented performances 
through working selves situate online activities within the working interstices of 
everyday life, it can also be said that online communicative environments are full 
of evidence of embodied selves leaving traces of their actions on the world, 
pointing to the possibility of the types of "bodily movements" integral to "the 
intention to bring about the projected state of affairs" of worlung selves that 
Schutz introduced this section with. Next, I discuss these phenomenological 
embodiments and extensions in regards to IMC practices as yet more evidence 
that, online as in off, the interactional self is situated in everyday spaces as lived 
in everyday life. 
Phenomenological Extensions, Embodiment, and IMC 
Before embarlung on a full discussion of how we are already always 
embodied online and how, at the same time, IMC technologies 
phenomenologically extend our spheres of reach, I need to lay out briefly the 
phenomenological theory of extensions and embodiment grounded in the 
pioneering work of Edmund Husserl. In particular, we need to understand 
phenomenological concepts of time, the role of "retrospection" in our 
engagements with the world, and Husserl's notions of "apperception" and 
"appresentations ." These are pivotal concepts for rethinlung the interpretative 
disposition of the interactional self in online social settings. 
Setting the Phenomenological Stage 
Borrowing from Husserl's notion of "time consciousness" (Husserl, 
19131 1932, pp. 234-244), Schutz (1962) theorizes that working actions are 
experienced "in simultaneity ... as a series of events in outer and in inner time, 
unifying both dimensions into a single flux which shall be called the vivid 
present ... an intersection of durde and cosmic time" (p. 216, emphasis in original). 
That is, the working self engages with and changes the world in the "vivid 
present" - in the experiential "here and how" - but  as informed by past 
recollections and future expectations. On the one hand, events that happen in 
space and time and that can be objectively measured by things like chronometers 
and clocks and can be experienced by a group of people at once - outer time - 
Schutz (1962) also calls "spatial time" (p. 215), which is concordant with 
Husserl's (19131 1931) "cosmic time" (p. 234). On the other hand, "inner time" 
(called "durte" by Bergson (quoted in Schutz, 1962, p. 215) and 
"phenomenological time" by Husserl(1913/ 1931, p. 234)), is experienced from 
our "stream of consciousness," which is the inner world of our thoughts 
constantly fluctuating between the meaning-bestowing and interpreted past, our 
anticipations of the future, and our present engagements in the "here and now" 
(the vivid present).89 It is in the inner time, or durde, of our stream of 
consciousness where experiences are linked "with the past in recollections and 
retentions and with the future by protensions and anticipations" (Schutz, 1962, pp. 
215-216, emphasis added). To Schutz, the performances of our embodied actions 
on the world evidence the movement from durte to spatial time (p. 216). And, as 
Husserl also believed, these existential actions in and upon the world are 
informed by the meanings present in the phenomenological recollections of our 
89 Schutz's "stream of consciousness" is identical to Husserl's (19131 1931) "stream of experience" 
(p. 140) 
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past experiences: Acts are meaningful in retrospection as "well circumscribed 
experiences" within a reflective attitude (Schutz, 1962, p. 210). " [Alction," Schu tz 
further explains, "is always based upon a preconceived project, and it is this 
reference to the preceding project that makes both the acting and the act 
meaningful" (p. 214). This adds a hermeneutic dimension to Schutz's present 
and future-oriented actions. As hermeneutists know, we interpret what we 
experience in the present and the direction of our future actions and goals based 
on experiences of the past (Schwandt, 2000) and, as Schutz would add, by 
drawing on our "stocks of knowledge." That is, both the performing (present 
tense) and, in Heideggerian terms, the "towards-which" and "for-the-sake-of- 
which" of future-directed activites (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 116), are 
meaningfully-rooted in already experienced and performed (past tense) 
activities. As was the case for Heidegger's Dasein, actions (or for Heidegger, our 
"comportment" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 94)) are always directed towards a future 
projected state of affairs. According to Schutz, then: "In projecting, I look at my 
act in the Future Perfect Tense" (Schutz, 1962, p. 215).% 
Thus, it can be said that the worki7zg selfchanges, moulds, and acts in the 
present, while the passive selfreflects and recreates experiences of the past 
retrospectively to inform and give meaning to future projects that guide our 
90 Heidegger's "comportment" is less "intentionalistic" in his concept of the "toward-which 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 94) than Schutz's intentional future-oriented projects in the sense that, for 
Heidegger, the future direction in our concernful ways of engaging with the world are not 
necessarily immediately goal-oriented but more simply the way we engage with things in their 
readiness-to-hand and as part of "skillful coping" (p. 93) within their equipmental complex. 
There are, nevertheless, similar existential echoes in Schutz's notion of the project. As Dreyfus 
writes of Heidegger's notion of comportment, so, I believe, is it the case for Schutz: "We make 
sense of our own comportment or the comportment of others," Dreyfus (1991, p. 94) paraphrases 
Heidegger, "in terms of such directedness towards long-range and proximal ends" (p. 94). I 
believe Schutz to be saying a similar thing here. 
present actions. In the vivid present the working self acts on and changes the 
world and is always an undivided and total self in a world of open anticipations. 
Reminding us of Heidegger's unsettled Dasein, however, and as it is for the 
pragmatist self of Mead, James, and Dewey (Schutz, 1962, p. 214), the worlung 
self cannot act perpetually in the vivid present. Often, it is forced to break from 
the unity of the vivid present to enter into a contemplative engagement with the 
partial memories of the past in order to bring meaning to bear on our actions 
and, thus, in order to appropriately fulfil our projected intentions. In doing so, 
the working self "turns back  reflectively in order to interpret the meaning of the 
act, bringing our actions, the actions of others, and our world "into view" (p. 
214). Cybertheorists' views of the decentred self online might miss this if they 
were to critique phenomenology as yet another modernist explanation of the 
world. While postmodern views of the decentred subject is influenced by a past 
(a social biography) (see Chapter I), the fragmented and decentred subject of 
cybertheorists as put forward by Turkle (1995) and A. R. Stone (1995) ruptures 
itself from the past in its focus on the will to the virtual, thus effectively negating 
a past for the self to refer to. To an uprooted self removed from a past and free to 
reinvent itself in the computations of cyberspace, as with Turkle's cyberselves, 
historical rootedness is necessarily torn asunder and the self is thus left to free- 
float in the ephemeral ambiance of the present moment (and the "ons" and "offs" 
of the network). In the reflective attitude of the phenomenological self, however, 
the past gives meaning to the present and the future while, at the same time, 
acknowledging the uncertainties and contingencies of the present and the future 
and the social situatedeness of the "here and now" of the stream-of-experience. 
That is, in Schutz's terms, as the self dips into its stocks of knowledge, 
typifications, and recipes for action, the self's "unity" in the here and now "goes 
to pieces" (p. 216) - in effect fracturing itself. As it turns out, the 
phenomenological self isn't a completely unitary, total, and centred self (the self 
of Descartes). It too is, like the postmodern self and as Heidegger tells us, 
"unsettled." However, rather than possessing the freed and untethered 
fragmentation of the postmodern self, the phenomenological self is the inverse: it 
is only a sense of a unified self in the present acts of Heideggerian coping and 
concern (see Chapter 3) and in the natural attitude of Schutz's notion of work 
which, subsequently for Schutz, becomes a "partial" self in the reflective 
moments of "rnodo praeterito" meaning seelung and role talung (Schutz, 1962, p. 
But, as Husserl also informed Schutz (see Schutz, 1962, pp. 207-259), it is 
precisely in the partial self's mode of reflection that the entire unity of the 
experience can begin to be reclaimed, where the actual incompleteness of 
phenomenological appearings in lived experience is brought to the awareness of 
the experiencing person, and where that individual can reconstruct these lived 
experiences into the possibility of meaningful unities. In Husserl's words: 
[A]n experience is not ...p erceived in its completeness, it cannot be 
grasped adequately in its full unity. It is essentially something that 
flows, and starting from the present moment we can swim after it, 
our gaze reflectively turned towards it, whilst the stretches we 
leave in our wake are lost to our perception. Only in the form of 
retention or in the form of retrospective remembrance have we any 
consciousness of what has immediately flowed past us. And in the 
last resort the whole stream of my experience is a unity of 
experience, of which it is in principle impossible 'swimming with 
it' to obtain a complete perceptual grasp. (Husserl, 19131 1931, p. 
140) 
For Husserl and all subsequent phenomenologies including Schutz's sociological 
version, then, things are understood to be "apprehended" in degrees of 
ambiguity and clearness: "Apprehension of the essence," Husserl(1913/ 1931, p. 
194) also wrote, "has accordingly its own grades of clearness" (194). This 
spectrum of clarity ranges from the "zero limit" of a newly given thng as 
immediately apprehended, which "is obscurity," on up to the "full clearness" 
which is the "unity-limit" of something grasped in reflective intuition (p. 194). 
But to get to the full meaning of the experience of a thing or an act or even an 
"other" - to its "unity-limit" in reflection - the working self must become a 
partial self to "reconstruct," so to speak, or reconstitute the fragmentary "modes 
of appearing" (Husserl, 19131 1931, p. 137) of that thing or act experienced. And 
that phenomenological reconstruction is necessarily done in recollection. 91 It is in 
91 While Husserl (l9l3/ 1931) claimed that properly carrying out this reflection was difficult and 
needed much practice (p. 181), Schutz seems to allow for a more accessible reflective disposition 
for phenomenology. Husserl believed that proper reflection that gets at the "pure 
transcendence" of the experiences of phenomena is to be done in the rarified and philosophical 
stance of the phenomenological epoch& where the "natural standpoint" and common-sense 
attitudes are to be suspended or bracketed out (Husserl, 191311931, pp. 107-111). To get there, he 
prescribed various steps that have come to be known as his "phenomenological reductions" (pp. 
171-184). Bringing Husserl's philosophy back down to ground level, Schutz's phenomenology of 
the natural attitude (the major part of Schutz's socio-phenomenological interests (see Ihde, 1977, 
pp. 143-147)) seems to suggest that the workinglpartial self practices this projectivelreflective 
dyad constantly as a normal state of existential life, if in an ad hoc manner. That is, for Schutz, 
loolung back at our "stock of knowledge" in order to inform present actions and future projects is 
the natural disposition of being human and core to all meaningful human experience. 
Nevertheless, whether as in Husserl's "new science. ..of phenomena" (Husserl, 191311931, p. 41) 
or Schutz's more "everyman" version, phenomenological theory assumes that all appearances, 
whether mediated or not, are always imperfect and never an instance of the complete thing as it 
"immanently" is (pp. 139, 179). A thing is only immanent to its own thingness, claimed Husserl, 
which, in its immanence, always remains outside the experiencing subject's complete reach (p. 
139). Only aspects, or perspectives, of the experienced things "thingness" are experientially 
reachable at any given moment. Additionally, while accumulated past experiences of things 
build on each other to form more complete and commulative ideas of the thing, its totality as a 
thing is never experienced at once, especially existentially, only in states of reflection and in the 
fleeting retensions and protensions of "the stream of consciousness" of the here and now 
(Husserl19131 1931, p. 140; Schutz, 1962, pp. 208-259). The transcendent aspects of the thing 
this reflective attitude - also called the "phenomenological attitude" - where the 
worlung self fragments, in a sense, into the multivariable recollections of the past 
in the partial self's attempt to reconstitute the unity of the experience. 
So, indeed, there is fragmentation in the phenomenological self as well, 
but not in the same implosive sense that postrnodernists believe. The 
phenomenologically fragmentary self is rather more like the Heideggerian 
inverse discussed in Chapter 3, affected by the unity-searching but forever 
unsettled Dasein living in its thrownness; the limitations imposed on Dasein by 
the world; and the situational contexts, slulls, and the socio-biographical 
knowledge possessed by the human being in its everyday realities. Like 
Heidegger's Dasein, Schutz's worlunglpartial self faces the reality of a world that 
also resists and pushes back. In its thrownness, the workinglpartial self 
sometimes lives up to the interpretive challenge and its projective potential and 
gears into the world, sometimes it doesn't, and sometimes it just lets the world 
be. As with Dasein's "thrown possibility" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 182), the 
working1 partial aspects of the interactional self, together with its thrownness, 
can be said to ensnare the possible. 
As I will show in the next section, the phenomenological disposition of the 
self proves to be an important area of the phenomenological pallete for further 
interpreting the contours and perspective of the still emerging portrait of the 
experienced in the stream of consciousness (or "stream of experience") and the layers of the thing 
that are open to our awareness are always partial, infinitely multi-layered, and always in flux: in 
Husserl's language, a thing "is given through perspectives, it has its changing forms of 
appearance" (p. 139). For example, things always partially appear to the experiencer: the tree is 
never the entire thingness of the tree for me, the experiencer of the tree at the moment of 
experience, but is always existentially a side or angle or perspective of it. All phenomenological 
appearances, therefore, are "perspectival" and contingent on the perspective of the subject doing the 
perceiving or, better said, contingent on the "experiencer." 
interactional self in IMC. I also believe that a phenomenological approach gives 
the social researcher powerful interpretive textures from whch to begin to 
theorize mediated existence. The phenomenological theory of experience just 
laid out allows Internet researchers to pose the following questions: How do 
online interactants phenomenologically confirm that the others they encounter 
through the pixels, the texts, the online presentations, and the screens of the 
network are who they say they are-that these presentations are those of other 
situated selves too? Further, how do interactants grasp the embodiment and 
situatedness of the other through the textual traces they leave behind on the 
network? In what follows I offer two interloclung ways that this embodiment is 
phenomenologically revealed online-as "extended bodies" and "extended 
spaces." I interpret these Internet-mediated phenomenological extensions of self 
onto the world with assistance from Husserl, Schutz, and Feenberg. 
Extended Bodies: Textual Residues of the Self and the Other Online 
I believe both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of 
perception can particularly help us understand how the interactional self 
phenomenologically "intends" the other as, ultimately, an embodied other in the 
mostly textual environments of the Internet. This is rooted in the 
phenomenological concept of "apperception." The analyses in this section are 
also broadly rooted in the notion, as mention in Chapter 2, that technology is 
hermeneutically interpretable-that technology is like language or, as cultural 
studies has taught us through the pioneering work of Raymond Williams, that 
technology can be interpreted as a text (Bakardjieva, 2000, p. 31).92 As such, this 
section takes on a linguistic spirit in the following analyses of the authors and the 
readers of online texts. 
As I mentioned in the previous section, while sensual perception is 
certainly one way of experiencing the things of the world, it is not the only way, 
Husserl showed. Things are "given" to and "apprehended" by the experiencer 
in various "modes of appearing" (Husserl, 1913 / 1931, p. 137) and in various 
phases of obscurity and clearness (pp. 193-198), as I have already discussed. 
Husserl's concept of intentionality also includes experiences given solely in 
recollection, fantasy, by allusion, in anticipation, etc. Moreover, things and 
others - embodied or otherwise - can be experienced and yet not sensually 
perceived. Husserl(1913/ 1931) called these experiences "apperceptions" (p. 
165). Apperceptions are things given to us as an "appresentation," defined by 
Schutz (1970) as "an actual experience which refers to another experience not 
perceptionally given" (p. 316). In other words, apperceptions are things 
92 In Feenberg's (1995~) discussion of the theory of the "double aspect" of technology (see Chapter 
2), Feenberg links the interplay between the "function or meaning" of technological 
appropriations and the uses of the technology to the possibilities of the tool being literally 
transformed by the "social meaning" and the hermeneutic interpretations users give to the 
technical (in the SCOT tradition). For support, Feenberg also equates technology to language, 
pointing to Baudrillard's study of "systems of objects" as a way to understand the linguistic 
structures technology. "Baudrillard's approach," writes Feenberg (1999, p. 85), "opens 
technology to quasi literary analysis. Indeed, technologies are subject to interpretation in much 
the same way as texts, works of art, and actions" (p. 85). The work of Ricoeur (1979; 1991) and 
Latour (1993) also offer valuable insights for a linguistics of technology. Further to the linguistic 
elements of technology, this time as informed by the work of Latour, Feenberg points that 
"Latour argues that just as authors and readers meet on the printed page, so the builders and 
users of machines are joined in the application. Machines are comparable to texts because they 
too inscribe a 'story,' i.e., a prescribed sequence of events which the user initiates and undergoes" 
(p. 114), emphasis in original). "This analogy," continues Feenerg, "then authorizes a semiotics of 
technology drawing on concepts developed in linguistics" (p. 115, emphasis added). These 
concepts are expressed in Latour's notions of a "shifting out" or "delegating" function of the 
technical to humans and nonhumans via a technology's design and the "syntagmatic" and 
"paradigmatic" elements of "sociotechnical networks" (p. 115). 
apprehended in the "stream of experience" but not "something that appears 
perspectively" before us in an objectively sensorial way, explains Husserl 
(19131 1931, p. 165).93 It is an apprehension that grasps an object in fantasy, 
fancy, or memory. To access these experiences, however, the experiencer pauses 
and reaches back in reflection. Schutz (1970) clarifies tlus by suggesting that 
apperceived things are rooted in "previously acquired knowledge" of the object 
being intended (p. 316). Apperception, as I will show, is a pivotal 
phenomenological theory for understanding embodiment online. 
Apperception can help us see that online traces of worlung selves are 
everywhere online and include written texts; email addresses; graplucs of all 
kinds; actual pictures and images of users' non-computational spaces, things 
they possess, and friends and family (as in the case of facerolls, for example, in 
Chapter 4); textual and pictorial accounts of a user's last trip; websites they have 
93 Technically, in phenomenological theory apperception, while central to recollections, is also 
present in perceptual acts (Husserl, 1913/1931). When, for example, the thing "clock is given to 
us in sensorial perception parts of it are immediately experienced, such as the face of the clock, 
the hands pointing to numbers behind a clear plastic screen, and the second-hand as it moves 
rigidly past each number and notch. We also see the clock encased in a white metal body with 
maybe three or four small metallic stands or feet that keep it propped upright. In this perceptual 
experience of the clock we see it from one perspective, its front, perhaps on our desk. But we also 
"apperceive" the back of it as an aspect of it that falls away from our immediate perspective. 
Based on past experiences of the clock, we "apperceive" the dials and knobs on the backside of 
the clock without having to sensorially grasp its back immediately. In fact, we 
phenomenologically apperceive that the back of the clock also continues with the same 
dimensions, texture, and colour perceived on its front without having to actually perceptually 
"see" its back. Appercieving the clock's backside is a more "passive" grasping of the clock's 
givenness to us as its transcendence fades into various levels of obscurity from any given 
perspective. According to Husserl, we can never know the complete "immanence" of a thing; 
only the thing can know its immanence in its "thingness" (Husserl, 1913/1931, pp. 128-146). We 
can, however, know a things transcendent qualities and through various phenomenological steps 
come to know a thing completely enough to understand its meaning. The "meaning" of the 
clock, therefore, is known by piecing together various experiences of it, each previous experience 
building on present experiences to form a more complete understanding of the clock, how it 
works, and how it can operate within our life-world. This process of coming to know something 
from our accumulated experiences of it Husserl called "synthetic consciousness" (p. 130) or 
"passive genesis" (Husserl, quoted in Vandevelde, 1996, p. ll), what other phenomenologists 
have termed "passive synthesis" (Vandevelde, 1996, pp. 11,16). 
developed and maintain; papers written and published; lists they are mentioned 
on and that are published online (such as faculty lists, blogrolls, or team rosters); 
etc. Even the network infrastructure and the programming codes of the myriad 
software packages and applications that run the network are traces of embodied 
Beings acting and interacting and working and reflecting on the world online. 
Somebody, after all, had to put the network together and program the software 
that runs it and runs on it. As reported by Chee & Vieta (2004), for instance, 
there was evidence of "embodied" social performances embedded within the 
avatars, the EverQuest worlds' environments, and the online texts forged by the 
gamer via their avatars (also see Chapter 6). As both phenomenology and 
poststructural theory inform us, these texts could be thought of as online 
"residues" or "traces" (Poster, 2001, p. 78) of embodied selves. Phenomenology 
specifically informs the Internet researcher that these traces of embodied selves 
are "apperceived" by others (readers) via these residual texts (Feenberg, 2004). 
As I will theoretically and empirically show in the rest of this chapter and in 
Chapter 6, these texts are traces of the action-oriented performances of working 
selves gearing into the world online. 
Appealing to the phenomenology of both Husserl and Sartre, Feenberg 
(2004) associates these residues and traces left behind by Internet users as s i p s  of 
embodied selves. They are, according to Feenberg, traces of the "extended body" 
(p. 104). As such, for Feenberg, online texts show evidence of a "body that uses 
instruments rather than being their object" (p. 104). This is one more 
phenomenologically reductive step from the strategy Merleau-Ponty (1962 / 2003) 
used in his famous illustration of the a blind man's cane as being an extension of 
the blind man's sensorial reach: In Feenberg's further reduction, the cane also 
reveals the cane user - the blind man - as blind." In Heideggerian terms, the cane 
and the way the blind man uses the cane discloses him as a blind user of canes. At 
the same time, the cane also reveals the world to the cane user. This two-sided 
revelation of the blind man's extended body implies appresentational 
consequences for both the blind man and the blind man's audience (the other). 
As Feenberg explains: "[hlis body is extended not only in the active dimension 
[the cane as the perceptual extension of the blind man's arm and as a surrogate 
organ of sight] but also in the passive dimension of [the body's] own objectivity" 
(p. 105, emphasis added). That is, the blind man's body is extended in two ways: 
It is actively extended in Merleau-Ponty's (1962/2003), McLuhan's (19641 1994)' 
and Ihde's (2002) notions of technologically-mediated perceptual extensions of 
94 Merleau-Ponty, as Ihde (2002) explains, writes about the extensions of our bodies in the 
technical objects that extend our bodily reach out onto the world as "going beyond one's bodily 
limits" (p. 6) such as when one uses canes, glasses, hammers, and any type of mediated 
communication. In an earlier book Ihde (1990) calls this type of embodied technological situation 
"embodiment relations" with a technology, or "technics embodied" (p. 72). Even when we lose 
awareness of the technology in our pragmatic and concernful engagements with things ready-to- 
hand (and, indeed, especially when we do so), Idhe explains, we are in an embodied relation with 
that technology: It is, as laid out in Heidegger's phenomenology of equipment and Merleau- 
Ponty's technological relations to the world, technology as subjectively assimilated by our 
corporeal being. In this case, the body and the embodied tool, like other mediational tools of 
worldly encounter, become ready-to-hand, absenting themselves from awareness as other things 
are simultaneously made present by their assistance and, at the same time, their absencing. 
Technologies facilitating this type of relation to the world, according to Ihde, include things such 
as eyeglasses, hearing aids, telephones, a blind-person's cane, etc. In these mediational uses of 
technology, the world becomes known (is revealed) to the experiencing self via the embodied 
extension afforded by the technology. Thus embodied, the technology extends the sensory 
perceptions and reach of the user out into the world as the very technology fades from awareness 
and the thing perceived, via the technology's mediation, enters the core area of awareness. In the 
case of communication technologies such as the phone, email, text messaging, etc., the other at 
the receiving end at the same time interprets our presencing to them as embodied via a 
hermeneutic "reading" of, for example, the voice of the phone or the text of the email as an 
extension of the sender. As experiencers of others' bodily extensions, we also constantly interpret 
the other through a hermeneutic reading of the technologies they use to directly or indirectly 
communicate to us (i.e, "we cannot not communicate"). As such, phenomenologists like 
Feenberg (2004) would say that while technology reveals new worlds to the experiencer, it also 
reveals the user of the technology as someone who uses, bears, and in various ways distinguishes 
him or herself based on both how and that the technology is used. Here, Feenberg extends this 
bodily engagement with the world and hermeneutic readings of the other to online texts. 
bodily things such as limbs (prosthetics, building tools), sight (eyeglasses, 
telescopes), memory (books, lists, databases), etc. It is also passively extended in 
the way the other responds back to the blind man by the revelation of the 
blindness of the blind man through the meaning of the cane as a compensatory 
tool used by the blind. This has implications for both the blind man and others 
that experience him. Feenberg explains: 
Those around him recognize his blindness and are generally 
helpful. The blind man knows this is happening and has a non- 
specific awareness of the helpfulness of those who perceive him as 
blind because of his cane. (p. 105) 
In other words, the cane as the extension of the blind man's active body (arms, 
eyesight), not only reveals the world to the blind man but also distinguishes the 
blind man to both himself and others as a "body that acts through a technical 
mediation" (p. 105). As such, the blind man is passively disclosed "as a body 
that signifies itself through that mediation" (p. 105). Additionally, in the passive 
extension, the blind man is an object to himself as in "I, the blind man who 
attracts the others gaze because of my cane" as well as being an object of the gaze 
of the other. 
This phenomenological dynamic, claims Feenberg, is no different when it 
concerns bodily extensions through online texts. Like the blind man's cane, the 
extended self on the Internet is "signaled" to the other (and the self) through the 
textual mediation. This textual mediation can include the emerging personal 
narratives of blogs, email messages, graphics, the look and feel of one's website, 
the links one points to on one's blog, etc. As Ihde (1983; 1990) has articulately 
pointed out, mediated communication and its texts actively extend the 
perceptual reach of the self onto the world. But they also passively signal, 
Feenberg adds, various aspects of the embodied self that has created these online 
residues. Does the website have sparse white space or is it cluttered with links, 
pictures, and colours? Cluttered? Then perhaps the reader hermeneutically 
interprets the web site owner to be a web neophyte because she doesn't 
understand the basic elements of designing for the web, or maybe that she is a 
complex and busy person. Is the spelling and grammar on a person's email 
riddled with errors? Yes? Then maybe the writer was in a hurry, or perhaps he 
lacks an education, or maybe he's just sloppy and doesn't care. Perhaps we 
encounter a blog written by an articulate blogger that regularly links to, via her 
blogroll and the links in her posts, scholarly bloggers researching Internet 
behaviours. Then maybe she too is an Internet ethnographer or psychologist or 
perhaps a graduate student interested in online behaviour. If we know 
additional information of the person behind the text from our recollected 
reservoir of previous experiences of that person perhaps we can more completely 
compensate - or fill in - the embodiment of the author from the lower- 
bandwidth of the online text. In these scenarios, the compensatory recollections 
signified to the text's reader by the perception of the material text appearing 
before the reader's gaze means that the reader also "apperceives" other aspects 
of the text not denotatively written into the message of the online text. These are 
compensatory steps the reader takes to fill in the "gaps" in the text - the passive 
aspects of the text that are signaled by the cluttered web site, or the sloppy email, 
or the links off of a blog (or the blind man's cane). We know, for example, that a 
man walking down the street with a cane tapping on the ground extended in 
front of the person means, in part, that the person is blind because we have 
previous experiences of blind people using canes to get around. In the case of 
online passive extensions, the other - the reader, the experiencer of the text - 
connotatively "reads" what is both present and missing from the denotative 
elements of the message based on the reader's stocks of knowledge of the author 
behind the message - as referenced by the message - or based on the 
apperceiver's previous experiences of a similar type of email or web site. 
Feenberg (2004) elaborates on this active/passive phenomenological 
dynamic online using the examples of email and online conferencing software: 
On the Internet we experience our self as exposed to the gaze.. . . 
[Thus, while] our physical body is invisible.. .our presence is [also] 
signaled and our objectivity established through signs. In this case 
the signs are intentional and complex and consist in written 
messages. (p. 106) 
For Feenberg, t h s  is more than merely a metaphor (p. 106). Rather, the extended 
body of the online text is evidence of the actual lived experience of persons 
engaging with the world in situated life through the mediation of IMC 
technologies. That is, the text one leaves behind online is evidence to the reader 
of that text that an "other" - an embodied self - exists. We write to others and 
manipulate things online mostly through textual acts. These acts, as such, are 
embodied acts; that we leave residues of these acts in the "texts we weave" 
online (Feenberg, 1989) is evidence of a writer's presence; the texts we leave 
behind can be said to be crumbs, traces of these acts that lead back to an 
embodied other. And, as the hiker retraces his steps back to camp by following 
key markers left on the trail, the online reader retraces the steps left behind by 
the online writer in order to appresentationally form an understanding of the 
other that left the traces: 
[P]henomenologically considered, the point is not the objective 
thinghood of our physical self but what we live in the first person 
as our self in situation. [While] ... mediated human contact is 
always measured against full bodily co-presence, however, the 
consequences of this situation is not simply a feeling of loss but 
evokes compensatory efforts to fill in the gaps, to enrich the 
'monosensory dimension' made available technically. (Feenberg, 
2004, p. 106)95 
These phenomenologically compensatory eflorts are, while perhaps 
accentuated in IMC because of the variability of the message bandwidth afforded 
by Internet communication media, not unique to the Internet. They are 
intrinsically present in any mediated act such as using a phone, or telegraph, or 
even in the more passive acts of watching TV or listening to the radio. And, 
phenomenologically compensatory efforts are also as present when reading 
online texts as when reading offline ones. Indeed, as Chandler (2002) points out, 
Derrida has spent much of his career addressing the connections between 
embodied speech and residual texts and critiquing the traditional Platonic 
privileging of speech over text. To Derrida, the author is simultaneously 
revealed in the text, lost to the text, and the text is interpreted by the reader in a 
way that recreates the text from the original intensions of its author, although the 
author never quite "leaves" the text completely. McLuhan also spent time 
95 Feenberg's notions of passive bodies and compensatory efforts are ultimately rooted in 
Husserl's theories of apperceptions and signs. "[In t]he presentation of a symbol in the form of 
an image or meaning," wrote Husserl(1913/1931, p. 136), "...we intuit something, in the 
consciousness that it copies something else or indicates its meaning; and though we already have 
the one in the field of intuition, we are not directed towards it, but through the medium of a 
secondary apprehension are directed towards the other, that which is copied or indicated. There 
is nothing in all of this in perception, as little as in plain recollection or fancy" (p. 136). 
addressing the place of the self and the author in texts and has similar theories 
(Levinson, 1999, pp. 39-41). Explaining McLuhan's aphorism that the "user is the 
content," especially in electronic mediations, Levinson (1999) writes that in 
"online writing ... users become content in the lines of text they create" (p. 39). We 
both send ourselves through the text and are then phenomenologically 
"apprehended" (received, read, interpreted) by the other both as active and 
passive bodies in the text. When the reader is apprehending the digital text that 
signals the embodied other sent through it, the reader, as Derrida would agree, 
interprets the text and, thus, also its author. The absence of the active 
embodiment of the author is turned into a passive presence - the author becomes 
a trace -by the very interpretation of the text by the reader. As McLuhan 
learned from the literary criticism of his Cambridge professor LA. Richards, "the 
meaning of a text reside[s] not in its author's intentions but its reader's 
legitimate ... interpretations" (Levinson, 1999, p. 39). In phenomenological terms, 
and in agreement with Feenberg's "passive dimension" thesis, the text "gives" 
another to us but in ways that are dependent on the interpretation of the text and 
the stocks of knowledge available to the reader. Ths  givenness of the other to 
the reader is perhaps sometimes more "obscured" or "shaded" than face-to-face 
or other mediated encounters, perhaps at other times it is clearer, depending on 
the technology used, how the message has been written, and what the reader 
knows of the messages' topic and its author. 
Thus, as Feenberg suggests in the case of Internet embodiment, the 
embodied self that creates online texts is, to a large extent, passively 
"apperceived" by the reader, often to a greater degree than in face-to-face 
settings. At times the "written self" discloses certain aspects of the writer 
otherwise obscured by the face-to-face interaction. However, we 
hermeneutically "read" the author's crafted words in a more passive dimension 
than the fleeting and more actively given and emerging ideas of face-to-face 
discourse. As readers we understand, if only intuitively, that the "written self" 
is, at the same time, an "edited" disclosure much more worked over than would 
be the case in the quintessentially unmediated situation of face-to-face 
interactions and its paralinguistic cues. This written self, therefore, requires 
more interpretative compensation by the otherlreader. In online texts, the 
reader knows, at minimum, that the writer had to have taken the time to think 
about the text, compose it, and perhaps edit the text and, equally, that time is 
needed to interpret the message therein. The embodied other is, in these cases, 
reflectively "reconstructed" by the reader as the writer's embodied presence is 
given to the reader in a passive dimension. Face-to-face encounters, however, 
are more instant, more unmediated, a rawer, unedited version of the self where 
interpretation of the other's intentions and of the other's embodiment is 
encountered much more actively. In both encounters - face-to-face and textual - 
there is, however, evidence of embodied selves communicating to other 
intentionalized embodied selves in the communication texts they each weave 
where the compensatory level of the interpretation is contingent on the 
communicational situation at hand and the experiences that each interactant 
brings to the table. 
With this phenomenological foundation of passively embodied presencing 
in communicative acts, the case for embodiment in the digital text can be 
summed up in the following way: The online text created by me, the author - 
like any text I write - shows "traces" of me, of my embodiment. In Meadian 
terms, it is a left-over of my active "I." In Schutzian terms, it is a residue of my 
"worlung self." That is, the digital text is evidence of an embodied self that 
imposes its will and its projects onto the world via the textual actions afforded by 
digital interfaces and packet-switched asynchronicity. Indeed, the digital text is 
not only evidence of me, the writer's, thoughts and ideas but is, as the cane was 
for the bind man, evidence of my full wordly embodiment. Passively, as the cane 
reveals the blind man as blind to both the blind man and the world, the online 
texts I leave behind reveal aspects of my embodiment and aspects of my self but 
as possessed by the gaze of the other and my understanding that the other might 
be possessing my textual residues through this gaze. Further, my online textual 
traces are evidence of the effort and the equipmental totality of the 
communicative act: of the zuhanden and vorhanden I experienced in the act of 
writing and, for example, in the physicality in the pressing of the keys of my 
laptop; of the equipmentality of the writing tools I use that sit on my desk in my 
den surrounded by coffee mugs, books, papers, chairs, shelves, walls, etc.; and of 
all of the projecting, planning, coping, and worlung in the act of publishing my 
thoughts via my blog or in crafting an email and sending it to a potential 
university I would like to attend. From the planning to the minutiae of steps 
taken in the in-order-to and the for-the-sake of-which and the towards-whch of 
projecting textual actions onto the world, the online text is simultaneously an 
extension of my embodiment and evidence of my embodiment. 
These are further testaments that online, in an extension of Schutz's face- 
to-face interactions, we not only perform and act on the world but that we also 
leave traces of our performances open for others to interpret in that world, thus 
co-constructing the world intersubjectively. 
Extended Spaces: Worlds Within Reach and IMC 
One can also use Schutz's notion of "work" to safely say that all IMC texts 
leave traces of interactions between working and partial selves. (This also 
complements Feenbergls analysis of the extended body, as will be made clear 
shortly.) While some types of interactions leave brief or fleeting traces, as in 
more synchronous forms of communication such as chatting or Internet-enabled 
phone calls (voice over IP, or VOIP), other traces remain archived longer, such as 
in asynchronous communication (email, blogs, wikis, conferencing systems, etc.). 
In Schutzian terms, these traces can be said to be residual evidences of how IMC 
extends the life-world's "zones of operations" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 41) 
which, borrowing from Mead, he also called "the manipulatory sphere of the 
communicator" (Schutz, 1970, p. 203). These zones extend the spatial limits of 
"the world within my actual reach" (Schutz, 1962, p. 224) (wluch belongs in the 
"present tense" (p. 224)) into new possibilities for "a world within restorable 
reach (p. 224) (brought back from the past) and into a "world within attainable 
reach (p. 225) (the world not previously within reach but which is attainable 
after imagining it and projecting it).% Thus, by extending the Schutzian world to 
the world online IMC technologies can be said to possibilize new ways of either 
%As Barber (2002) explains, the world within attainable reach is in "a future perfect tense" (sec. 
2). 
restoring things and others previously within reach but subsequently lost, or 
bringing thngs and others otherwise unattainable from the perspective of our 
unmediated "zero system of coordinates" (p. 224) into attainable reach in the 
"here and now." Also pointing back to Feenberg's extended bodies, Schutz 
(1970) seems to be thinlung of the same types of more passively mediated zones 
of operation afforded by IMC technologies when he states that 
[it] is not necessary that the interpreter's world within his reach 
overlap spatially the manipulatory sphere of the communicator 
(telephone, television), nor that the production of the sign occur 
simultaneously with its interpretation (Egyptian papyrus, 
monuments), nor that the same physical object or event used by the 
communicator as carrier of the communication be apprehended by 
the interpreter. (p. 203) 
As is clear from the previous passage, there is room for technical mediation in 
Schutzian socio-phenomenological theory in the notion of the manipulatory 
sphere. 
Combining Schutz's action theories and, in particular, h s  concept of the 
"zones of operation" with virtual ethnography and a critical constructivist 
phenomenology of everyday life, Bakardjieva (2000) and Smith & Bakardjieva 
(2001), for example, capitalize on Schutz's theory of "actual," "restorable," and 
"attainable reach," using the concepts to, in part, convincingly assess the "spatial, 
temporal, and social arrangements" of IMC technology for "particular action 
contexts" in the everyday life-world of Internet users (Bakardjieva, 2000, p. 51). 
Smith & Bakardjieva (2001) found that an understanding of the dimensional 
character of online social behaviours intimately situated within users' complete 
life circumstances are empowering user groups such as immigrant diasporas to 
appropriate IMC technologies for sustaining otherwise compromised cultural, 
social, and familial ties overseas. They also found that these same immigrant 
users also assert their sense of self-worth and belonging withn the extensions of 
the life-world afforded by IMC. The communication scholars ultimately found 
that, in Feenberg's (1999) terms, individuals in these diasporas "creatively 
appropriated" IMC technologies within their everyday life-worlds in order to 
reclaim "their original states and cultures," bringing them to "'restorable' and 
'attainable' reach" (Smith & Bakardjieva, 2001, p. 74).97 By creatively 
appropriating IMC into the contours of their everyday lives otherwise 
marginalized groups discovered new ways to meaningfully configure their IMC 
scenarios to fit the localized needs of their unique life-world situations. Feenberg 
& Bakardjieva (2002) link these reconfigured communication technologies to the 
"dormant affordances" that lie available but untapped within the very techrucal 
code and received designs of the Internet's applications, awaiting "discovery and 
incorporation into new community-building practices" (Feenberg & Bakardjieva, 
2002, sec. 
" It is accepted among critical theories of technology that certain technologies are more open to 
creative assimilation and interpretation by users than others. As both Feenberg (1999, p. 85; also 
see 1991,1995,2002) and Bakardjieva (2000, p. 21) have shown, the Internet, the PC, and the 
communication-facilitating technologies that rely on them are highly interpretable social 
technologies when compared to other, more "closed" technologies such as eye-glasses, washing 
machines, and insulation, for example. This is so because IMC and PCs have been designed with 
an open architecture in mind (Rowland, 1999) and, thus, their programming codes and the 
applications they run on are highly permeable to tinkering and personalization by users (that is, 
aspects of these technologies have not been "closed" in their "technical codes" yet). Feenberg 
(1995a) has shown, for example, how this technical openness encouraged inventive user 
appropriations of the French government-sponsored Minitel in ways unintended by its 
bureaucrat implementors (1995a). 
98 As Feenberg & Bakardjieva (2002) point out: "Empirical studies show that in practice, 
interacting users appropriate the technology as members of particular collectivities with 
particular goals in mind. In that context, they manage to discover and enact new aflordances not 
always perceivable through abstract deduction from the obvious technical features of a system" 
(p. 7, emphasis added). 
Smith & Bakardjieva (2001) term these new, localized uses of IMC "little 
behaviour genres" (p. 80). These behaviour genres could be viewed in Schutzian 
terms as new "zones of operation" afforded by IMC. As the authors report, these 
behaviour genres also include participating in online support groups, political 
organizing, connecting with interest groups, and communicating with 
institutions on users' own terms. While they acknowledged that these online 
activities have been discussed extensively in the Internet studies literature, their 
use of Schutzian action theory to explain these behaviours allow Smith & 
Bakardjieva to innovatively link them to users' "social-biographical situations" 
(p. 80), vividly showing how IMC technologies can empower "boxed in" (p. 80) 
ordinary people to transcend certain limitations of their situations and overcome 
structural and institutional barriers to interpersonal and inter-group 
communication by extending their zones of reach. In so doing, the authors also 
show how IMC can sustain contextualized user needs and users' 
reappropriations and redesigns within their domestic and social settings without 
having to resort to the deterministic claims of pessimistic essentialist theorists 
such as Borgmann, Dreyfus, and Slouka or, I would argue, the equally 
deterministic but overly buoyant claims for social transformation and freedom of 
cybertheorists such as Poster, Turkle, and A. R. Stone. Both camps place too 
much determination on the technical structurations of the network for the calibre 
of communication and its innovative impacts on socio-cultural reality while 
"overriding the cultural ethos handed down from the past" (Feenberg & 
Bakardjieva, 2002, sec. 4), a cultural ethos that is recognized in Smith & 
Bakardjieva's "little behaviour genres," for example. Specifically, Smith & 
Bakardjieva and Feenberg & Bakardjieva show how a critical constructivist 
approach with a hermeneutic and phenomenological sensitivity sees a way 
through the deterministic dilemma faced by both the cybertheorists' position and 
the overly-cautious essentialist school. 
Supported by the empirical evidence in the works of Bakardjieva (2000), 
Smith & Bakardjieva (2001), Feenberg & Bakarjdieva (2002), Mynatt et al. (1998), 
Baym (2000), Wynn & Katz (1997), and others, I believe that Schutz's theory of 
the "zones of operation" within the multi-faceted and overlapping life-worlds of 
social interactants offers strong theoretical correctives for balancing the 
human/ technology and life-world/instrumentality equations, providing deeper 
subject-centred, descriptive, and experiential insights into the meanings 
embedded in the use-contexts of IMC. This will be further elaborated in the next 
chapter where I conduct further analysis using Schutz's sociological 
phenomenology for revisiting online communities and anonymity and fantasy 
play. 
Summarizing Schutz's Theories of Intersubjectivity and the Self 
for IMC 
Using Schutz's own terms then, we can thus claim the following for online 
interactional and communicative performances: Online interactions are, as in 
offline ones, "working acts." Their online textual traces via bits-and-bytes 
displayed on the pixels of interactants' screens show evidence of "bodily 
movements" and embodied presences engaging in mutuaI "projects" between 
action-oriented yet reflective intersubjective selves. In Schutzian terms then, 
online communicative performances are "purposive actions" rooted in 
"preconceived projects" with "intentions to transform" the '~orethought[sl" of 
interactants "into an aim and a project into a purpose" (Schutz, p. 212, emphasis 
added). These purposive actions are carried out within the world of life-worlds, 
which both modifies and is pragmatically modified by intersubjective actions 
and interactions. I believe t h s  "interactional theory" for online human activity 
goes far in both demystifying the more deterministic views of IMC and, in 
Feenberg's Heideggerian-inspired words, "reworlding" the communicational 
activities of IMC by engraining them into the already multi-dimensional reality 
of the lived experiences of an agency-empowered subject firmly rooted in his or 
her interactional (and increasingly technologically-mediated) life-world. 
Moreover, Schutz's socio-phenomenological self of work and action is also 
pivotal for his theory of community and for rethinking the "virtual community" 
debate, as I lay out in the next chapter. 
Again when we bring Schutz back to our social-world canvas, then, 
Schutz's intersubjective theory of the extended self helps us arrive at the fifth 
postulate of the interactional self: 
Postulate 5: The interactional self encounters others through intersubjectively 
overlapping life-worlds and within varying degrees of bodily and spatial 
extensions. 
Chapter 6: 
~chGtz's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the Other: 
Dimensions of Sociability and Online Communities 
"I speak of another person as withn reach of my direct experience 
when he shares with me a community of space and a community of 
time. He shares a community of space with me when he is present 
in my person and I am aware of him as such .... He shares a 
community of time with me when h s  experience is flowing side by 
side with mine, when I can at any moment look over and grasp his 
thoughts as they come into being, in other words, when we are 
growing older together." 
-Alfred Schutz, 1970, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, 
pp. 184-185 
Schutz's theory of the intersubjective world of life-worlds introduced in 
the last chapter also grounds his theory of the self in relation to the other. As 
such, it is at the root of his theory of community. In this chapter, I present this 
Schutzian theory of the other and intersubjectivity with regards to online 
communities by, first, expanding on his dimensions of sociability ("gradations of 
immediacy") introduced in the last chapter and, second, laying out his concept of 
the "in-group." I subsequently show how these concepts can help us begin to 
theorize online community, anonymity, and fantasy from a socio- 
phenomenological perspective. 
Schutz's Dimensions of Sociability 
For Schutz, the intersubjective world of life-worlds is in practice a 
dimension of sociability occurring within a spectrum of social interactions 
spanning from, at one end, anonymous "They orientation[s]" (Mihoelt) (Schutz, 
187 
1970, p. 322) - the world of "contemporaries" where people are not experienced 
directly - to, at the other end, various dimensions of intimacy in "We- 
relationship[s]" (Unzwelt) (p. 323) - the world of face-to-face contacts, or 
"consociates." In a "They orientation" one is aware of the possibility of the other 
but is not in direct contact with the other. It is the typification of people into 
socially and culturally known archetypes and categories. This is the orientation 
we have when we are aware of strangers known to us only by inference but with 
whom we do not immediately interact with (Schutz, 1962, p. 134). Once there is 
any lund of consideration of the possibility of an "other" as a person able to be 
engaged with intersubjectively in mutual interactions the "They orientation" 
transforms into a "Thou orientation" (p. 323). To send the point home, Schutz 
directly quotes Hegel to illustrate this moment of transformation from the They 
to the Thou orientation: "[Hegel] assumes from the outset a reciprocal 
relationship, which he defines as the 'seizure of the Self of one in the Self of the 
Other"' (p. 185)." As with Mead, Schutz too believed that "the existence of the 
Other is the condition for the 'seizure of the Self by itself" (p. 188). 
Once in the Thou orientation, the possibility of intimacy is set. To have a 
"We-relationship," Schutz theorized, moves one up the ladder of sociality within 
the Thou-orientation, opening one up to the full spectrum of social possibilities: 
It is "[tlhe relationship which ensues when two persons, dealing with one 
another in a face-to-face situation, consider each other reciprocally" and are 
"consumed in a period of participation in each other's life, however short" (p. 
" This is also captured by Sartre's (1964) colourful proclamation that "I am possessed by the 
Other .... The Other holds a secret-the secret of who I am" (p. 475). 
323). Importantly, when there is any kind of reciprocity between two people, the 
Thou orientation opens into the realm of We-relationshps. For Schutz, 
reciprocity was the key in this transition to the We-relation. As Schutz's student 
Maurice Natanson (1970) poetically puts it, "our movement from 'I' to 'you' 
brings us next to 'we"' (p. 47, emphasis in original). When an "I" then orients 
itself towards another - an "alter ego"'00 - in face-to-face or some other more 
indirect (mediated) way (letter writing, on the phone, and, nowadays, email, 
chatting, instant messaging, commenting on and interacting via blogging, etc.) 
we engage in the interactional and intersubjective level of the We-relationship. 
Thus, We-relationships can be characterized as Thou orientations, overall, with 
the additional aspect of the possibility of reciprocity between two or more people 
in varying degrees of mutual acknowledgement of one another. In We- 
relationships, deeper degrees of intimacy minimize anonymity amongst 
interactants in gradational levels of disclosure depending on the type of 
interaction engaged in by the parties involved, reminding one of social network 
theory's levels of social multiplexity (see Chapter 5). Withn the Thou 
orientation, the sociality found in We-relations takes on the full dimensionality of 
human co-existence with others, encapsulating the full spectrum from those 
strangers we acknowledge more anonymously to friends and loved ones with 
whom we intimately and constantly live with in increasing levels of intimacy 
and personal disclosure. 
As the mounting sociological and ethnographic evidence is showing, 
la, Schutz (1962) borrows Husserl's term of the "alter ego" in various places and uses it 
interchangeably with terms such as "the other self," "another," "consociate," the other conscious 
being that one is intentionally directed towards, etc. 
interactions online also depict these Schutzian gradations of immediacy. In 
Husserl's terms, and as I explained in Chapter 5, the "other" online is 
apprehended through the self-presentations of the textual residues they leave 
behind. As in offline settings, the "other" online is "intended" in various 
"active" and "passive" phenomenological stages of apprehensions. While I've 
already addressed in the previous chapter how we can come to know another 
embodied self online through their textual residues, how do we 
phenomenologically account for community formations when mediated by the 
computational constraints of IMC? I address this question in this chapter, 
grounding the following discussion of online community in Schutz's 
intersubjective dimensions of sociability and the phenomenological theories 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
Towards Schutz's Theory of Community 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, it is clear that the possibility of the 
other online is, in Heideggerian terms, "revealed" through the hermeneutic and 
appresentational layers of the textual trace. I believe a Schutzian theory of online 
community is also possible from the phenomenological appresentations of the 
other as presented in Chapter 5, together with Schutz's theory of the gradations 
of immediacy just described. I believe Schutz's social phenomenology can show 
how community is "worlded," in Feenberg's terms, (see Chapter 2) and the other 
"given" through the computational affordances of the Internet. For this to map 
to Schutz's interaction theory, however, any notion of online community must 
also be rooted, first and foremost, in the Schutzian worklpartial self illustrated in 
Chapter 5. This is because how the workinglpartial self encounters others and to 
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which degree interactional intentionality occurs in social life depends, for Schutz, 
on the degree of intersubjective overlap, or in what gradation of immediacy each 
acting (working) individuals' life-world is conjoined with the life-world of 
another (see Appendix 1). Borrowing from Simmel, Schutz (1970) writes that 
"the group is formed by a process in which Inany individuals unite parts of their 
personalities" (p. 84, emphasis in original). As Mead also showed in Chapter 4, 
For Schutz (1970) each personality, in turn, collectively joins to form the 
uniqueness of the group as "each individual members' biographies participate" 
(p. 82). Additionally, Schutz's degree of intersubjective overlap between group 
members always depends on how enmeshed their mutual projects and actions 
are. 
An Imagined Community 
As Anderson (1983) Jones (1998), and others point out, the notion of 
"community" is a mu1 ti faceted concept, both objectively knowable and 
phenomenologically experienced. On the one hand, community is made up of 
empirically observable individuals (we can count community members) in 
networked geographic locales of varying sizes (we can locate these members at 
physical locations, we can map the network, etc.), and shared time (community 
"happens" mostly in the existential here and now, although it is sustained over 
time). On the other hand, community is also an "imaginary" social construct; 
community exists in the shared experiences, mutual attitudes, common goals, 
and shared values of its members (Anderson, 1983). By considering both realities 
when defining community, Bakardjieva (2003), Feenberg (1995), and Mynatt et al. 
(1998), for instance, have shown that the "real" versus "virtual" community 
debate is a dead-end when describing actual practices of online communities and 
for designing appropriate online community applications and tools. Indeed, 
Anderson (1983) convincingly argues that all communities, from the "primordial 
village" to larger group formations and on up to the nation state, are all 
"imagined" (pp. 16-18)-they are social constructs created by the shared 
common bonds and agreements between a group of people that may include 
some of, but not necessarily all of, the following: geography, a common history, 
common values, and shared cultural norms. 
As such, a distinction between "real" face-to-face community and "virtual 
community" is superfluous. Anderson's "imagined communities" concept 
deflates both the hailing of cyberpace as the advent of new and unique "cyber" 
locales for new types of virtual communities by the Internet's loudest 
cheerleaders (Rheingold, Barlow, Tapscott, et al.) and the glib critiques of 
essentialists (Dreyfus, Borgmann, Slouka, Postman, et al.), the latter group 
claiming that virtual communities are not possible because the virtual somehow 
compromises the needed "authenticity" of community for its members (i.e., 
social stability, the ability to take risks and mitigate risks, commitment, ethical 
codes, etc.). As Feenberg & Bakardjieva (2002) point out, both camps ironically 
fall into the same conundrum: Both view the technologically narrow bandwidths 
of virtual communities as lowering the commitment and risk needed by 
individual members to engage in community by allowing anonymous identity 
formations and identity play. To the essentialist critics this is proof that online 
communities cannot sustain "real" community because "true" community is only 
possible within the "authentic" risks of face-to-face interactions where authentic 
revelations of selves cannot hide behind the veils of simulations and 
representations afforded by the network of servers, transfer protocols, and 
packets underwritten by the mysteries of its binary code. For cyber-enthusiasts, 
the very reduction of commitment and risk purported by online community's 
detractors opens up new avenues for identity experimentation and new kinds of 
virtually supplanted community formations precisely located within the 
fragmentations, veils, and simulations of the cyberworlds afforded by binary 
code. Rather than add one more voice to this tired, if colourful, debate, I would 
like to show how Schutz's theory of intersubjectivity and his dimensions of 
sociability offers a corrective to the reallvirtual community dichotomy, adding 
phenomenological weight to Anderson's notion of imagined communities. 
Schutz's Theo y of the "In-Group" as a Theo y for Online Community 
For Schutz (1970), all individuals experience two types of communities or, 
as he termed them, "in-groups" (p. 80): "existential groups with which I share a 
common social heritage" (p. 82, emphasis added) and "voluntary groups joined or 
formed by me" (pp. 82-83, emphasis added). We have no choice as to which 
existential groups we belong to. We are born into these or engage within them 
out of necessity. We do, however, have choice over which voluntary groups we 
belong to. Groups formed solely online can be said to be mostly voluntary in 
nature, although IMC can support both types of in-groups as Smith & 
Bakardjieva (2001) show vis-a-vis their "little behaviour genres" and as Baym 
(1998; 2000), Ward (1999), and Correll (1995) illustrate vis-a-vis groups forged 
solely online (I offer examples of these varied online group formations later in 
this chapter). Both existential and voluntary forms of groupings require 
members to adhere to the group's "typifications, relevances, roles, and positions" 
(Schutz, 1970, p. 83). With voluntary groups, these typifications and recipes for 
interaction are not, Schutz writes, "readymade.. .; it has to be built up by the 
members and is therefore always involved in a process of dynamic evolution" (p. 
83) needing to be literally invented by group members based on a "common 
definition of the reciprocal situation" (p. 83). As previously discussed in this 
chapter, in voluntary groups these "reciprocal situations" are intimately tied to 
the level of We-relationship required and are based on the role each member is 
either given, chooses, or earns depending on the membership rules and codes of 
conduct for that particular group (p. 84). Further, Schutz continues, in-group 
participants can have "multiple membership in numerous groups" (p. 84), 
pointing back to h s  notion of the plethora of intersubjectively overlapping life- 
worlds lived in varying gradations of immediacy (see Appendix 1). 
Rooted as Schutz's theory of the in-group is to his overarching theories of 
intersubjectivity, Schutz subsequently defines the in-group as the "subjective 
meanings of group membership" (p. 80). Using Scheler's words, Schutz 
theorized that in-group members maintain an assumption of a "'relatively 
natural conception of the world"' (p. 81), helping to sustain the group long-term. 
Schutz terrned this group assumption "thinking as usual" (p. 81), eventually 
mapping out four main socio-phenomenological requirements needed to hold 
most types of social groups together. Paraphrasing Schutz (1970, pp. 79-81), I 
label these four requirements, or in-group characteristics, as follows: 1) 
consistency; 2) values, beliefs, and myths; 3) rituals and ways of communicating; and 4) 
colzerency. lo' 
Perhaps not coincidentally, it is striking how well these four categories 
map to the five affordances for fostering network communities theorized by 
Mynatt et al. (1998)'02 and to Feenberg & Bakardjieva's (2002) four required 
technical conditions for sustaining virtual comm~nities. '~~ As I describe each of 
Schutz's categories I will also point out the links to both Mynatt et al. and 
Feenberg & Bakardjieva while also briefly suggesting design considerations that 
may better support the phenomenologica1 realities of online communities. As 
such, in-groups are able to sustain themselves in relative stability by "thinking as 
usual" in the following four ways: 
1) Consistency: In-groups believe that "life and especially social life will 
continue to be the same as it has been before" (Schutz, 1962, p. 81) and that 
past experiences will provide the right recipes for action for future 
experiences. In order to accommodate this, Mynatt et al. (1998) suggest an 
element of "periodicity" be designed into online communities showing how 
"activity and time are made meaningful in the community" (p. 130) and the 
"persistence" of the group over time. Along these lines, Feenberg & 
Bakardjieva (2002) recommend online community platforms include 
"tracking1' features, such as newsgroup and BBS threads listing "how far each 
participant has read discussions" and "archiving" features that "maintain 
accessible records of discussions" (sec. 3) such as found on blog archiving 
tools and conferencing systems. 
2) Values, Beliefs, and Myths: In-groups "rely on knowledge handed down" 
lo' While these four characteristics of the "in-group" are Schutz's (1970, pp. 79-81), he does not 
offer overarching category labels for them. These labels for the four categories, therefore, are my 
own attempts at capturing the essence of Schutz's four categories of the in-group. 
'02 Mynatt et al's (1998) five affordances for network communities are: "1) Persistence: durability 
across time of both users and particular uses; 2) Periodicity: rhythms and patterns through which 
activity is structured over time in a meaningful way; 3) Boundaries: spatial divisions, often 
metaphorical, that make possible different social groupings; 4) Engagement: possibility for 
participants to establish diverse forms and modes of communication; 5) Authoring: possibility for 
participants to change the configuration of their space" (paraphrased in Feenberg & Bakardjieva, 
2002, sec. 5). 
'03 Feenberg & Bakardjieva's (2002) four minimum conditions for online community are: "1) 
Bounding: forming closed online groups; 2) Trachng: listing how far each participant has read in 
community discussions; 3) Archiving: maintaining accessible records of community discussions; 
4) Warranting: ensuring stable and (most of the time) genuine participant identities" (sec. 3). 
from predecessors which are meaningful in the actions and projects of the 
group (Schutz, 1962, p. 82). For concretizing these values, beliefs, and myths 
into the very design features of the online community, Mynatt et al. (1998) 
suggest that community software should support social rhythms by 
recognizing the "persistence" of these rhythms, values, and mores over time, 
providing a continuous "context" for the "ecology" of the group (p. 130). 
Feenberg & Bakardjieva's (2002) notion of "warranting" might facilitate this, 
ensuring persistence and stability of the group by linlung online identities to 
offline ones (sec. 3) and by ensuring the consistency of roles and identities 
over time via, for example, user profiles, membershp lists, and invitation 
capabilities as available on social software tools such as Orkut.com and 
Friendser.com. This, Feenberg & Bakardjieva explain, would serve the purpose 
of clearly indicating to each of the group's members whch other members are 
aware of the group's values and which members need support in learning 
them. Appropriate administrative features (members lists, permissions 
allocations, community area accessibility, etc.), learning tools (tutorials), and 
FAQ pages would also guarantee accessibility to learning the online 
community's values and mores in addition to the possibility of sustaining 
them, changing them if needed, and, in extreme circumstances, controlling 
the practices of the group by limiting the access of wayward members. 
3) Rituals and Ways of Communicating: In-groups need to "know something 
about the general type or style of events we may encounter in the life-world 
in order to manage and control them" (Schutz, 1962, p. 82). For Mynatt et al. 
(1998) online community members need to know how to "manipulate their 
space" in the "living" processes of developing the online community (pp. 
131-132) in order to be able to interact properly and yet sustain the group at 
the same time. This can be accomplished by what Mynatt et al. and Feenberg 
& Bakardjieva term "authoring" capabilities, such as the easy-to-use 
publishing tools of blogs, form-based commenting capabilities (Bausch et all 
2002), and the explicitly laid-out writing sections of conferencing system 
applications such as Feenberg's Texhveaver tool (Feenberg, 1989; Mynatt et al., 
1998, p. 131; Feenberg & Bakardjieva, 1998, sec. 3). As such, online 
communities should be designed with flexible, easy-to-use, and member- 
accessible tools for inter- and intra-group communication and site 
administration. Also, and as recognized by Schutz (1962) concerning in- 
group members' distinctive roles (p. 81), each members' roles should be 
properly allocated and these roles should be mutually beneficial and 
supportive of the community's projects, needs, and membershp roster. 
4 )  Coherency: The in-group's "system of knowledge" takes on "the appearance 
of a sufficient coherence, clarity, and consistency to give anybody a 
reasonable chance of understanding and of being understood" (Schutz, 1962, 
p. 81). Feenberg & Bakardjieva's (2002) concept of "bounding" - "forming 
closed online groups" (sec. 3) - guarantees this coherency. For Mynatt et al., 
(1998) exclusionary but not impermeable "boundaries" should be established 
in the online community by integrating proper communicational tools and 
designing, for example, metaphorical "rooms" or "spaces" within the online 
community in order to ensure an "ecology" that both distinguishes the group 
from other groups and yet affords flexibility for mutual "engagement" withn 
the group (Mynatt et al., 1998, p. 131). In Chapter 4, for example, I discussed 
Hine's (2000) Schutzian- and Meadian-influenced theory of "situational 
relevances" to show how topic-based newsgroups incorporate and sustain 
this coherency (and guarantee the long-term survival of the newsgroup) by 
controlling (formally and informally) the topics to be discussed, the styles of 
symbolically addressing each group member, the appropriate writing style, 
and even the connections between online and offline situational spaces that 
afford in-group cohesion and inter-group differentiation (Hine, 2000, pp. 109- 
112). 
What is strikmg about Schutz's still-relevant analysis is how in tune it is 
with the needs of online communities, yet one more suggestion that life online is 
firmly entrenched with life offline. Also, it shows how much there is still to be 
mined from more classic humanist theories of sociability for better 
understanding our increasingly technologically-mediated contemporary social 
settings. 
With this phenomenological framework in place, Feenberg & 
Bakardjieva's (2002) definition of community as the "scene on which a large 
share of human development occurs" (sec. 1) takes on fuller meaning. They also 
convincingly show how their constructivist theory of technologically concretized 
yet phenomenologically-imagined community is experienced in online 
community settings, in strong concord with Schutz's theory of social in-groups. 
If we were to approach their view of community through constructivist and 
phenomenologically hemeneutic lenses (in agreement with their own 
philosophical foundations), Feenberg & Bakardjieva's definition of online 
community can be seen as nicely summarizing the key points in Schutz's theory 
of the in-group: For Feenberg & Bakardjieva, online communities are "the 
formation of relatively stable long term online group associations ... [that] 
. . .involves the participatory engagement in a collective practice aimed at 
constructing collective identities" (sec. 1). Schutz would undoubtedly agree. 
Some Examples of Schutzian Online Communities: Multiplex Communities 
Made U p  of Interactional Selves 
Complementing the work of social network theorists and social 
interaction researchers, recent online ethnographies seem to also be bearing out 
this Schutzian model of multidimensional sociability and community forged by 
the intersubjective mergers of individual life-worlds and the IMC technologies o. 
choice. Challenging cybertheorists' notions of online anonymity and multiple 
and fragmented online identities as well as the essentialists' concerns regarding 
the inauthenticity of online sociability, and supported by Wellman's recent social 
network research (see Chapter 5), online social interactions are showing that self- 
disclosure is insisted upon when online intimacy or strong supportive 
community relations are sought and expected by group participants. 
Conversely, when more weak ties are sufficient for the online social situation at 
hand (i.e., online purchasing, FAQs, one-time chats, a friendly game of chess 
with an unknown online partner, etc.) more anonymous interactions are 
acceptable. In other words, as in offline settings, the level of anonymity in online 
social settings is dependent on the type of interaction that is sought by all parties; 
there isn't necessarily a privileging of anonymous behaviour when interactions 
are mediated through computer screens even if the bandwidth might be "more 
narrow" than in face-to-face interactions. 
Correll(1995), for example, reported that, while "an electronic community 
can be constructed and sustained" through online interactions (p. 15), there was, 
in the broadly supportive lesbian BBS she investigated, a high degree of 
consistency between her informants' online and offline identity performances. 
Baym (1998) came to similar conclusions in reporting on a Usenet group of soap 
opera fans she studied: Baym showed how group interactants "actively 
discourage anonymity, suggesting that the Usenet is not the only influence on 
the creation of.. .identitiesn (p. 55). This finding led her to conclude that "the 
reality seems to be that many, probably most, social users of CMC create online 
selves consistent with their offline identities" (p. 55). Further, and in agreement 
with Mynatt et al, (1998), Feenberg & Bakardjieva (2002), and Hine (2000), these 
identity disclosures, Baym contends, ensured a tighter, more useful, and more 
stable community. In yet another study, Ward's (1999) "cyber-ethnographc 
exploration" (p. 1) of two online feminist communities - a BBS and an email list - 
discovered a very clear level of strategic use of the online communities by 
members. Ward found in the groups she studied strong evidence for what I 
would deem to be Schutzian dimensions of sociability with an indication of 
"weak ties" at play (see Chapter 5)-she concluded that her community 
participants had "a transitory, unconditional relationship with the online 
community" (p.l), participating in the community intermittently when the online 
community's resources seemed most useful to the participants' immediate 
therapeutic and, I would add, existentially discovered needs. While Ward's 
groups engaged in sociality that showed intermittent weak ties at work, 
members nevertheless energetically participated in message exchanges, running 
dialogues, and other forms of online and offline interactions, especially when a 
fellow member needed the immediate support of the group. Indeed, each 
member felt deeply responsible for the emotional well being of each other when 
called upon to support a fellow group member in distress. 
There is another Schutzian subtext to the findings of these online social 
studies that alludes to the gradations of intimacy experienced in online "in- 
groups": Although the Internet social studies I reviewed agree that sociability via 
IMC does not foreclose the formation or sustenance of deeply intimate 
relationships online, it also seems that, as Schutz suggests and as IMC research 
such as Wellman & Gulia's (1999) reveal, the closer to a broad multiplex and 
intimate relationship (a deeper We-relationship) one experiences online the more 
that online social acts tend to push themselves into face-to-face encounters. If the 
intimate We-relationship is left online the evidence is implying that the 
relationship will subside to lower gradations of immediacy long-term or else 
eventually diminish all together (see Correll's (1995) conclusion, for example). 
Wershler-Henry (2003), for instance, suggests that this was the case with 
the networking application Friendster.com: While the online social software-based 
community saw meteoric membership growth and press coverage in early 2003, 
members eventually got frustrated with the software when it seemed that, 
beyond linking up with people of like mind, there was nowhere else to take the 
online relationships forged strictly on the Friendster environment. Unlike dating 
services such as LavaLife.com and FriendFinder.com where the whole point is to 
eventually get off of the online environment and meet a potential partner face-to- 
face for more intimate, deeper We-relation encounters, it seems that, besides 
identifying individuals with similar preferences and interests, there was not a 
clear-cut purpose for Friendster.com users to get together online (Wershler-Henry, 
2003). In Schutzian terms, individuals failed to find mutual projects to build 
long-term interactions around on Friendster.com. Using Schutz's in-group theory, 
Friendster.com seems to be good at affording platform consistency and a place 
where values, beliefs, and myths can be shared via its member profiles pages, but 
the platform does not seem to enable users to explore flexible rituals and ways of 
communicating further in order to solidify new group coherencies and knowledge 
exhanges in order to forge and create mutual projects. That is, once members get 
over the fact that they've connected with others of like-mind there isn't 
necessarily anything specific to do with that knowledge strictly on the 
Friendster.com environment. Comapratively, on EverQuest, for example, 
individuals come together to play and work together in common tasks and goals 
that help them to co-construct and shape their adventures within EverQuest in a 
collaborative manner. There is reciprocity involved based on shared goals, 
taking on the successes and failures of one's group. Recall Ito's examples of 
strategic and multiplex uses of IMC discussed in Chapter 5; there were reciprocal 
purposes in the interconnections Ito forged on his blogs and IRC in the 
interactions involved in hiring someone: Ito needed to hire and potential 
employees needed work. The IMC tools used allowed Ito and his potential hires 
to explore each other's interests and compatibilities mutually and effectively. 
But in Ito's scenario, long-term consistency from the IMC tools, in the Schutzian 
sense, was not needed because the whole point was to exchange information 
about values, beliefs, and job competencies in the short-term, not to sustain a 
community that is consistent over time. The coherency aspect of Ito's intended 
job-based in-group practices will happen offline once the Ito's hring takes place. 
As I suggested in Chapter 5, for initial meeting and contacting, Ito's media 
multiplexity strategy was a good fit for the task at hand: to h r e  someone. But 
once a synchronous face-to-face interview is reckoned to be the next step by both 
interactants, the IRC and blog technologies used are no longer needed for the 
employee/ employer hiring relationship as the deeper We-relationshp needs are 
deemed to be better served offline. Friendster.com enthusiasts, on the other hand, 
didn't know what else to do with the strictly online connections that brought 
individuals of like-mind together from every corner of the world. Perhaps h s  is 
the case with Friendster.com because the affordances of the technology aren't in 
synch with the actual long-term intersubjective demands of meeting people of 
like-mind or for deeper forms of We-relationships. Consequently, 
Friendster.com1s future is very much in doubt as of this writing (Boyd, 2004).IM 
In further Schutzian terms (although admittedly needing further 
exploration), it seems to me that certain high-investment typifications of intimacy 
- that is, certain types of socially multiplex relations - are not sustainable solely 
online for long periods of time, perhaps needing offline contact and face-to-face 
connection to be fully integrated into each interactant's reference schema. The 
common practices of online dating, as with Wershler-Henry's observations 
concerning Friendster.com, are a good illustration of how these gradations of 
intimacy play out on the network, providing more evidence of how the 
I" As my senior supervisor for this thesis, Prof. Richard Smith, pointed out to me, some Friendster 
users, in the absence of things to do with Friendster, have started playing with their identities and 
"falung" their credentials on the system (Mieszkowski, 2003; Terdiman, 2004). Subsequently, 
they have been labeled "Fakesters" (Terdiman, 2004). In an interesting counterstrike, the 
Friendster marketing team has attempted to appropriate this phenomenon and has recently 
started selling fake profiles of characters linked to the movie Anchorman (Terdiman, 2004). Can 
this behaviour be chalked up to an ironic pastiche by both Friendster users and marketers, where 
the interactional stakes can perhaps be argued to be fairly low? Would users be compelled to be 
"Fakesters" in Joi Ito's scenario in Chapter 5 where the goal is to find a job? 
mediational role of online tools are tactically used by interactants: When two 
people meet for the purposes of ultimate romantic connections on services such 
as LavaLife.com, ePersonals.com, and FriendFinder.com, for example, they share 
pictures of themselves, personal information, physical descriptions, likes and 
desires, and, of course, eventually email addresses, IRC handles, or phone 
numbers. After a time of online courtship or connection, and if both parties feel 
compatible, they will usually eventually meet face-to-face to explore the 
possibilities of deeper or more physical intimacy. Throughout, the textual and 
digital representations of the users remain directly linked to their situated and 
embodied realities, although key aspects of their embodied selves are gradually 
disclosed as trust is created between the interactants. (Recalling the discussion in 
Chapter 5, extended bodies are both actively and passively present in these 
scenarios mediated by the text.) As interactants desire more intimacy, more 
disclosure of each other is sought; each seeks to know more about the other and 
their mutual compatibilities as the We-relationship expands. 
Phenomenologically, the potential daters subsequently move from the more 
passive readings of each other through the textual affordances of the interface to 
more active disclosures as the online channels of communication are expanded 
or opened up to the other as dictated by the level of reciprocity needed for the 
next stage of interaction sought. For example, LavaLife has customization 
functionality in its personal profiles pages that allows the user to control the level 
of access that other LavaLife users have to those pages. Each user is able to keep 
the general LafaLife population and even specific LavaLijers out of these more 
intimate and less anonymous pages while allowing the user the choice of inviting 
favoured LafaLifers in to their more intimate pages, if desired. Access to other 
IMC tools that facilitate the eventual encounter is then accessed within these 
more intimate member pages. Whether or not interactants eventually meet is 
then up to the mutual agreement of the users based on what they were able to 
glean of the other from the IMC tools at hand. Judging by the growing success of 
these dating services and the general acceptance of them as dating options, it is 
hard to see how the full expression of the human connections that may be 
facilitated by these services are either fragmentary and decentered or inauthentic 
and laclung in commitment, as the essentialists claim. Indeed, meeting online 
first is proving to be safer and more preferable than meeting at bars or even more 
restrictive offline environments where individuals might be known to each other 
primarily within one or two specific life-roles that discourage divulging more 
intimate aspects of each other's life-worlds needed for deeper We-relations (i.e., 
thnk  of social settings such as school, work, church, etc.). 
As the social studies reviewed in this section and as the cursory look at the 
online personals phenomenon begins to show, if a relationshp starts online and 
becomes increasingly intimate online it seems that IMC will ultimately become 
too present-at-hand for the relationship to successfully mature and the 
relationship will tend to lead to a face-to-face encounter or eventually fade out. 
On the other hand, for those already experiencing close and proximate social ties 
in the world of flesh-and-blood IMC tends to be instrumentally used to support 
the situated relationship instead of being the only medium of interaction in what, 
as I introduced in Chapter 5, the social network theorists call "media- 
mu1 tiplexity " practices. 
A Definition of Online Communities 
By synthesizing Schutz's theory of community with his theory of the 
intersubjectively influenced working and partial self; the constructivist 
community research of Feenberg & Bakardjieva and Mynatt et al.; and the 
empirical evidence of multiplex online communities I looked at in Chapter 5 and 
this chapter, I make the proposition that community, online or off, can be defined 
as the intersubjectively motivated contribution of individuals co~nlnitted to participating 
in mutual reciprocity to accomplish or partake i n  a common project. Moreover, we can 
say that co~nlnunity is about the affective and mutually respectful means of 
communicative interaction between a group of individuals that are not necessarily 
brought together by a commonality of ends (although they could be) but, more 
importantly, by  a comnzonality of projective nzeans, sharing in the processes and values 
that are intersubjectively constituted and agreed upon. 
As such, we come to our sixth postulate of the interactional self which 
links it socially, culturally, politically, and ethically to a community of others, 
online or off: 
Postulate 6: The interactional self practices community-building and 
community-sustaining acts that are the intersubjectively motivated 
contributions of individuals committed to participating in communicational 
reciprocity to accomplish or partake in common projects together. 
Rethinking Anonymity and Fantasy in IMC 
Schutz's theories not only add dimensionality to the interactional self and, 
via his sociological phenomenology of the gradations of immediacy, between 
interactants but also can be said to add dimensions to the individual's personal 
orientations towards particular types of social acts. With these subjectively 
situated dimensions, the levels of self-disclosure and the appropriateness of the 
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particular IMC technology to use can also be gauged and the dynamics of online 
anonymity revisited. 
Schutz subdivided each interactant's experience of a "world" of 
"indetermined number of worlds" (1970, p. 323) into many "provinces of reality" 
(1973, p. 22) (which he also termed "provinces of meaning" (1970, p. 252)), each 
province in turn coloured by dimensions of experience he called the "accent of 
reality" (1973, p. 22).'05 According to Schutz, ". . .there should be several, indeed 
probably infinitely many, different orders of reality that at any given time have a 
special style of being that is characteristic of them alone" (p. 22). (As I have 
already discussed in Chapter 5, the life-world, for Schutz, happened to be an 
experiencing subject's "paramount reality.") The accent of reality can be said to 
colour and inform each "finite province of meaning" which is "meaning- 
compatible experience" that is embodied in a "style of lived experience," or 
circumstantial and meaningful preferences, actions, motivations, projections, etc. 
(p. 23). To Schutz, within an experiencing individual's "accent of reality" there 
can be infinite styles in "multitudes of provinces of meaning," each with their 
own meaning compatible experience working to make meaningful both the 
existential and the appresentational encounters being attended to at any given 
moment. Importantly, Schutz stressed that the accent of reality shading each 
'05The "accent of reality" shades each "province of meaning" making up each individual's 
experience of the many phenomenological worlds he or she inhabits at any given time. The 
accent of reality was, for Schutz, his version of what William James called "subuniverses" (Schutz 
& Luckrnann, 1973, p. 22). For Schutz, following James: "Reality means simply relation to our 
emotional and active life; whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real" (1970, p. 252). In 
this theory of "multiple realities" we see congruence with Heidegger's notion of "worlds": 
Provinces of reality can (and do) include "the life-world, the world of play, the world of dreams" 
(p. 323) as well as things like the "world of arts, of religion, of politics," etc. (1962, p. 329). That is, 
realities can be shared with others via the intersubjectivity of our life-worlds or can be uniquely 
experienced by an individual within other "worlds" directly reachable only by the experiencer. 
province of meaning is not shaped by the "ontological structures of their Objects" 
but rather through the very act of experiencing these objects (p. 23).lm Further, 
Schutz envisioned the experiencer as possessing the capability of moving back 
and forth between each province seamlessly and without much conscious effort 
(p. 23). "For in the course of a day, indeed of an hour," Schutz explained, "we 
can, through the modification of the tension of consciousness traverse a whole 
series of such provinces" (p. 24). 
Moreover - and of particular interest in rethinkmg cybertheoryls and the 
popular press's fascination with online role-playing - these multitudinous 
provinces of meaning can also be made up of fantasy (p. 28). While in fantasy, 
however, our ability to influence the "social reality" of the external world is 
suspended; according to Schutz, fantasy worlds "bracket determinate strata of 
the everyday life-world" (p. 28) thus preventing meaningful intersubjective 
action: 
We speak of 'fantasy worlds,' since it is a question not of a single 
but rather of several finite provinces of meaning .... When my 
attention becomes absorbed in one of the several fantasy worlds, I 
no longer need to master the external world.. .. But also, as long as 
I live in fantasy worlds, I cannot 'produce,' in the sense of an act 
which gears into the external world and alters it. As long as I tarry 
in the world of fantasy, I cannot accomplish anything, save just to 
engage in fantasy. (pp. 28-29) 
lrn This falls in line with both Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenology of experiencing the 
objects of the world and coming to know the world by manipulating its objects and entangling 
oneself with the things of the world (see Chapter's 3 and 5). 
Implications for Online Fantasy and Anonymity 
Online fantasy and role-playing practiced on MMPORGS'~~SUC~ as 
EverQuest, therefore, looked at with a Schutzian eye, could be viewed in two 
ways. On the one hand, online fantasy and role-playing could be thought of as 
an instrumental and temporary decision by the interactant to suspend the 
"external world" and engage purely in fantasy and play. In this case, while 
fantasy would still be part of the EverQuest gamer's multifaceted plethora of 
realities, it would be a "province of meaning" of the gamer's "accent of reality" 
dominated by intra-subjective, and thus "non-producing" (non world-altering) 
fancy. In this scenario, EverQuest is not part of the player's intersubjectively 
adumbrated life-world. On the other hand, using Chee & Vietals (2004) 
EverQuest case study as an illustration, the role-playing activities of players 
could, for example, be viewed as not occurring in a pure "fantasy" world but, 
rather, as happening within another "working" dimension of the life-world of 
players where "real" others and "real" human needs are explored and engaged 
with-in other words, EverQuest sociability becomes another outlet to explore 
the human "will-to-communicate" within each player's life-world. Indeed, 
based on the evidence Chee & Vieta observed through ethnographic observation, 
the authors failed to find any sharp contradistinctions between garners' will-to- 
communicate and the practices of community on EverQuest when compared 
with interactions in gamer's offline lives. This reading would contest both the 
postmodern insistence and the essentialist critique that sees online communities 
bring with them fractured yet freeing altered identities and multiple personae in 
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the former's case, or dehumanized and decontextualized monsters in the latter's. 
In fact, if Chee & Vieta's observations are assumed to be the case, both Schutz 
and Husserl inform us that, as on LavaLife, the EverQuest-influenced garners' 
life-worlds come into contact with each other's, in varying degrees of overlap, 
via the phenomenologically passive and active readings of the synchronous and 
asynchronous activities and the textual residues created by their avatars. 
My reading of Schutz's phenomenology of intersubjective interaction in 
light of to the sociality that occurs on EverQuest, for example, underscores for 
me the importance for social researchers, game designers, and policy makers to 
first seriously ask themselves whether and how the computational worlds of 
EverQuest are radically different and dichotomously positioned from the non- 
computational worlds of flesh and blood before conceptualizing the gamer 
(social researchers), designing the games (programmers), and legislating 
restrictive policies in regards to gamming activities (policy makers). If social 
behaviours and socio-phenomenological experiences are that different on 
EverQuest-type multi player role playing games when compared to other types 
of community formations, how so? It seems that, phenomenologically, either 
calling immersive multiplayer games such as EverQuest "just a game" or, 
contrarily, claiming that they have the power to destructively influence the 
"real" lives of users are both ill-informed and simplistic views of the full 
spectrum of social formations that can possibly take place via the mediation of 
these games. If the online universe of EverQuest is fundamentally detached 
phenomenologically-spealung from our situated world of flesh-and-blood, these 
ruptures must be clearly articulated. Chee & Vieta (2004) show that, 
phenomenologically, there is no strong case to be made that such a sharp 
dichotomous separation exists: The life-world of players and the ways 
community experiences are described by them are just too complex and too 
integrated into everyday life to make strong assumptions regarding the uni- 
linear influences of MMPORGs on the lives of users. 
I believe that using the phenomenology of Schutz to rethink online 
sociability mediated through EverQuest radicalizes the ostensibly concrete 
differences between offline and online human interactions. Indeed, in true 
phenomenological fashion, the separation of the "subject" engaging with the 
online "objects" of EverQuest is effaced and replaced by the conscious processes 
of intentional beings engaging with each other within the intersubjectively 
overlapping accents of reality of their life-worlds as experienced through 
EverQuest. Further, this social phenomenology bears witness to the extentions 
of users' "manipulatory spheres" (zones of operation), actively and passively, as 
worlung selves within their phenomenologically intentional projects and 
practices as mediated via EverQuest. In addition, Chee & Vieta found that, again 
phenomenologically, legitimate meanings and community formations are indeed 
forged within these EverQuestian relationships via the communicative processes 
of actors engaging with other actors and the digitally tangible stuff that makes 
up the EverQuest world. 
Moreover, the much-discussed anonymous and fantasy-based online 
interactions that occur in MMPORGs like EverQuest could be explained via 
Schutz's (1973) concept of the "zones of anonymity" of the life-world (pp. 79-80) 
which, like the "dimensions of sociability" addressed earlier on in this chapter, 
span the full gamut of We-relation types. Examples of other types of anonymous 
online relations where full disclosure is not needed for the desired task would 
include the following: an email to an online FAQ expert; an online purchase on 
Amazon.com; an anonymous online chess partner engaged with for a few hours; 
engaging in an ongoing debate on a correspondence class's online conferencing 
system; etc. In these interactions, there is no need, as in similar situations offline, 
to disclose too deeply the nature of one's situated self-identity. We can afford to 
disclose only key parts of our personalities and backgrounds according to the 
demands of the communicative act at hand and still function well within these 
less multiplex social settings. Inversely, and again as in offline sociability, online 
interactants desiring deeper "gradations of immediacy" (deeper We-relations) - 
or, in other Schutzian terms, some sort of deeper "mastery of their external 
world" - might demand fuller disclosure from each other online or off. Does one 
need to know the name of any of the opposing players on the soccer pitch in 
order to play a game of soccer? No. At the same time, does one stop being a 
"soccer player" and perhaps also a father, sister, farmer, teacher, etc., when on 
the pitch if one does not disclose these other life-roles - accents of reality of our 
life-worlds - to the opposing players? No, again. Alternatively, one should have 
a good idea of the social biography, the likes, and dislikes of a spouse or a best 
friend in order to maintain a mutually beneficial and deeper We-relationship. 
Chee & Vieta (2004) found that in EverQuest social mediations, for example, 
gamer experiences span all of these possible gradations of anonymity. 
So, perhaps some EverQuest relationships fall into the area of weaker We- 
relations. Or maybe, as in the world of flesh-and-blood, there are also myriad 
types and dimensions of relationships to be had on EverQuest. Or, perhaps for 
some garners, EverQuest is, after all, just a temporary suspension of the working 
world and actually a world of "pure fantasy," where full disclosure of the self is 
optional and the relationship is merely narrowly specialist or only about 
engaging in temporary play. The full dimensions, occurrences, the exact degree 
to which the IMC tool influences these experiences, and the location of these 
online experiences within the greater life-world of users need to be explored 
further both phenomenologically and ethnographically to get a better sense of 
the full dynamics of mediated intersubjectivity and play in such Internet- 
mediated scenarios. 
Summarizing Schutz's Theory of the Other and Community for 
IMC 
In summary, the overarching perspective for IMC that Schutz's theory of 
the other helps us understand is that the social world online is a part of the 
"accent of reality" of our greater life-world, not a part of a different world or, on 
the whole, a sharply differentiated reality of fantasy. Where interaction is more 
narrowly based and specialist - that is, where only weaker We-relations are 
necessary - the need for fuller disclosure diminishes, Schutz teaches us, and the 
interacting (working) self remains more anonymous and in a weaker relation 
with the other as more specifically focused (though no-less meaningful) uni- 
dimensional interactions are engaged in. Related to this, online fantasy and play 
looked at from a Schutzian perspective is, while perhaps temporary and fanciful, 
still very much a part of our myriad provinces of meaning. Indeed, Schutz 
shows us that even these situations of fantasy and play may be active and "real" 
parts of our meaningful life-world, evidencing the "will-to-communicate" 
through the textual residues left behind by embodied users and garners. 
Schutz's sociological phenomenology, then, helps us understand the 
dimensions, the instrumentality, and the depth of IMC from the perspectives of 
individual interactants' experiences of social scenarios in the context of broader 
group interaction, greatly informing the emerging concept of the interactional 
self, online sociability, and community theories. Schutz can also help the 
researcher and the IMC designer better conceptualize whether the IMC scenario 
in question is narrowly based in focused affinity activities or more broadly 
multiplex in supportive and deeper social ties-that is, in Schutzian terms, the 
degrees of the "We-relations" that various IMC scenarios afford. An 
understanding of these phenomenological user conceptualizations can ensure 
better-designed and more flexible IMC platforms and tools. Further, by also 
taking into account the malleability of IMC technologies for user interpretations 
and appropriations, Schutz can further inform the technologist what aspects of 
the community software should be left for users to ultimately control and 
develop based on actual life-world use-contexts. In addition, Schutz's gradations 
of immediacy and anonymity can help the social researcher rearticulate online 
(and offline) anonymity and role-play, helping to better understand the social 
formations that are mediated through the social articulations of the Internet. 
A Schutzian reanalysis of online anonymity, then, leads us to our seventh 
and last postulate illustrating the interactional self: 
Postulate 7: The lnteractional self uses strategic self-disclosure and 
anonymity as part of the normal course of encountering its life-world, online 
or ofline. 
Conclusion: 
A Conceptual Portrait of the Interactional Self for 
Re-theorizing Internet-Mediated Communication 
"As subordinate actors, [ordinary people] strive to appropriate the 
technologies with which they are involved and adapt them to the 
meanings that illuminate their lives." 
-Andrew Feenberg, 1999, Questioning Technology, p. x 
Summarizing the Theory of the Interactional Self for IMC 
Rooting this thesis in the human philosophies of experience of Husserl, 
Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz, I have ultimately tried to illustrate how the 
emerging concept called the interactional self can give the social and human 
science researcher of the Internet, Internet software designers, and users a 
powerful interpretive theoretical tool from which to better understand Internet- 
mediated communication (IMC) and its place in the life-world of users. In 
particular, the interactional self helps one to understand the dyadic way users 
appropriate the Internet's technical (environing) affordances in light of users' 
socio-cultural (environmental) realities. Rather than the over-determined 
theories of cyberspace or the essentialist critiques of the (in)authenticity of 
computer-mediated communication, a theory of the interactional self for IMC 
reveals an "underdetermined" and interpretative perspective on the place of 
IMC in the everyday lives of users. In particular, by also anchoring the 
interactional self to Feenberg's (1999) hermeneutically-sensitive "double aspect 
theory" of human-technology relations, this self helps us see a crucial dynamic at 
play between the technical structures of IMC and users' pragmatic 
appropriations of those structures as determined by their own use-contexts. That 
is, simultaneously, users (as "subjects") instrumentally approach the Internet by 
"positioning [themselves] strategically" with respect to IMC and its technical and 
mediational objects thus bringing the Internet's "inherent [technical] properties 
into account" (p. 204) via the very practices of "creatively appropriating" (p. 121) 
the Internet through various pragmatic, everyday "tactical initiatives" (p. 207) 
entrenched in users' deep engagements with meaningful lived experiences, social 
needs, and communities (p. 206). 
At the heart of my thesis, then, is my belief that a reassessment of the will- 
to-virtuality - as also suggested by Hayles (1999) (see Chapter 1) and others such 
as Jones (1995; 1998) and Rowland (1999) - should also extend to the ways we 
think about the place of Internet technologies in our everyday lives. I believe 
locating the Internet and the sociability that occurs through it w i h n  the 
mundaneity of everyday living is important for demystifying IMC so as to not be 
seduced by the promises of "new economies" and fundamentally "new 
paradigms" of human thought and life caused, uni-linearly and in a normative 
and progressively historical trajectory, by the impacts of digital technology. By 
lookmg at contours of IMC sociability in light of the everydayness of most IMC 
interactions and use-contexts, I believe we can make better techrucal decisions as 
users, make better policies as lawmakers, and design better user-centred tools as 
developers. 
I also think that situating the Internet in its everydayness is of the utmost 
importance for the same reasons Hayles (1999) states concerning the fate of the 
self as subject at the juncture of the posthuman: As we find ourselves at the 
juncture-point of our digitally-infused late-modernity where our choice of 
technologically paved paths could decide the fate of our very humanness 
(Hayles, 1999), so do we find ourselves at a decision juncture that will decide the 
fate of our agency when it comes to how we are to use, design, implement, and 
legislate the IMC technologies in our lives. As I have suggested throughout this 
thesis, I believe it is particularly essential that, at this point in time more than a 
dozen years into the popularization of what we have come to know as the 
Internet, we start to seriously re-consider the place of IMC in our everyday lives 
in order to better design and implement IMC technologies to meet 
users-our-needs better. 
In the 1990s we placed our faith in the "new economy" of virtualized 
information only to have the dot-com road-to-riches and the good life implode in 
on us. We also envisioned in the same decade different self-expressions and 
social relations occurring on our new cyberpsaces and posited these new 
virtually real online spaces as either freeing and exciting cyber-frontiers or 
dangerous and dank cyber-alleys and found both versions of VR wanting. For 
understanding the place of the Internet in our personal, social, cultural, and 
political realities we will be better served by, 1 believe, a demystified and 
pragmatic approach to the place of the virtual and the online in light of user 
practices. Our experiences of the introduction of the telegraph, the telephone, 
the television, and the personal computer, for example, should have taught us 
many valuable lessons by now: Initial prophesies of their promises or perils 
eventually gave way to more sober realities once the new technologies spread 
into the socio-cultural and socio-political milieu (Carey, 1989; Czitrom, 1982; 
McLuhan, 1962; Rowland, 1999). I believe the theory of the interactional self 
offers a more measured account of the impact of IMC in our everyday lives. 
Additionally, and as I implicitly argue throughout t h s  thesis, the more 
measured, more user-sensitive approach I propose could take us far towards 
understanding the importance of keeping the Internet and the subsequent 
communicational technologies it supports open and free in order to best meet 
users' personal, social, and political needs and appropriations. 
In this spirit, the interactional self helps us see that the Internet is not pure 
technique. But neither is the Internet completely pliable to the whims of its 
users. Users and their social formations both shape and are shaped by the 
Internet-are in some ways constrained and implicated by the technical limits of 
the mediational tools of the network at the same time that users corral these very 
tools to meet their own personal and social ends. It is my contention that the 
interactional self provides a lens for showing us these dynamics at play by giving 
us a theoretical perspective from which to begin to critically view this human- 
technology interplay. The interactional self shows us that the Internet is not 
merely bits-and-bytes that fundamentally and deterministically decentre the 
selves that meet thereon and therein into fragmentary bits of binary code which 
can then be whimsically and wilfully reconstructed into altered user existences. 
But the interactional self also discloses an Internet that is not devoid of the 
possibilities for new types of user-driven social formations and productively 
supportive community realizations. That is, the Internet, the user, and the 
sociality that is mediated through it - the "interactions through the screen" - all 
bear witness to socially-determined use-contexts that simultaneously mitigate 
the influential affordances and the malleable but nevertheless obstinately present 
boundaries of the Internet's instrumentality. It turns out then that the 
phenomenological and pragmatically informed interactional self offers a way to 
illustrate technologically-mediated communication via the Internet, painting a 
portrait of a technically positioned yet multi-dimensional, socially situated, and 
embodied self experiencing the world through an Internet that mediates the 
intersubjectively linked life-worlds of its users through the retinas of its screens 
and the arteries of its network. 
The Seven Postulates of the Interactional Self for IMC 
After introducing early on in the thesis the well-known postmodern- 
influenced cybertheories of cyberspace and the fragmented online self as posited 
by authors such as Turkle, A. R. Stone, and Poster, as well as the more 
pessimistic views of technological essentialits, I began to paint an alternative 
conceptual picture of an interactional self situated on a social world canvas. I 
began this painting by explaining how the interactional self's technologically- 
mediated existence can be explained via Feenberg's Heideggerian notion of the 
"world-disclosing" nature of technology. I then used the ontological theories of 
Heideggerls Dasein and the "Being-in-the-world" that resides therein as my 
foundational brushes to begin to sketch the first images of this self. The outline 
of the interactional self that began to emerge with Heidegger shows that online, 
as in offline settings, we encounter the world fully embodied and deeply 
engaged in daily acts that we use to interpretively understand our place in our 
world. These ontological brush strokes included such notions as the contextual 
218 
equipmentality and the readiness-to- and presence-at-hand of the objects of the 
world, online and off. From Heidegger's outline sketch of the human being 
(Dasein) at the heart of the interactional self, I then dipped my conceptual 
brushes into the colours and textures offered by the sociological theories of Mead 
and Schutz, exploring some alternatives to the postmodern and essentialist 
explanations of online sociability from a few of their key theories. I used Mead's 
theory of the "generalized other" and a brief case study of blogging practices to 
highlight the interactional self as a self that does not concretely distinguish 
between offline and online social settings but instead uses IMC technologies 
instrumentally and holistically in performative practices that maintain group 
cohesion in effaced onlineloffline settings. I then dipped my Heideggerian 
brushes of Dasein into Schutz's rich theory of the sociological phenomenology of 
the life-world to show how the interactional self and online sociability are 
fashioned via the intersection of "intersubjective" and multi-dimensional social 
biographies positioned within overlapping life-worlds. With a little more help 
from Husserl's phenomenological palette, the interactional self took on further 
phenomenological textures, allowing me to theorize how Internet users: 1) 
"intentionalize" (direct themselves to) the other that is signified via the traces left 
behind in digital texts; 2) "creatively appropriate" the Internet in order to extend 
the world within their "attainable reach;" and 3) form engaging and stable online 
communities that intermix offline and online social settings and practices. I 
finally relied on Schutz to provide an alternative interpretation for online role- 
playing and fantasy, adding yet more socially situated shading to the 
technologically-mediated life-world of IMC. As a result, seven postulates 
emerged in the portrait of the interactional self: 
The interactional self's sedimented and socio-biographical offline 
affinities, on the whole, dictate its online activities. 
The interactional self is the "point-zero" of all human experience and 
lives within a socio-biographically-rooted life-world where meaning is 
interpretively mediated within both the life-world's technological 
contours and the experientially-based and socio-culturally informed 
use-contexts of those technological contours. 
The interactional self is in a constant state of interpretation of itself and 
its world, practically using the things of the world, online and offline, 
as conduits for communicating with others and for self-understanding. 
The interactional self emerges within a social context by projecting 
itself onto others and being projected upon through social and 
symbolic interactions. 
The interactional self encounters others through intersubjectively 
overlapping life-worlds and within varying degrees of bodily and 
spatial extensions. 
The interactional self practices community-building and community- 
sustaining acts that are the intersubjectively motivated contributions of 
individuals committed to participating in communicational reciprocity 
to accomplish or partake in common projects together. 
The interactional self uses instrumental anonymity and strategic self- 
disclosure as part of the normal course of encountering its life-world, 
online or offline. 
These seven emerging postulates of the lived experiences of the interactional self 
can subsequently be conflated into four interlocking hypotheses for the self 
online: 
1) The interactional self encounters social acts, online and off, as part of 
its greater life-world, practicing performative and group-enforcing 
self-management through.. . 
2) varying and interlinked dimensions of sociability and.. . 
3) pragmatic yet meaningful uses of the communicational tools at hand 
in.. . 
4) contextually relevant degrees of self-disclosure. 
Remnant Research Questions, Future Research 
It appears, then, that the growing corpus of social research focusing on 
IMC, looked at from the perspective of a Heideggerian-, Meadian-, Schutzian-, 
and Husserlian-informed interactional self, is revealing a clearer picture of online 
embodiment, social situation, self-disclosure, role-playing, and sociability. The 
speculative tone of some of the phenomenological observations in tlus thesis 
should be assumed to indicate that more ethnographic, dialogic (long, 
descriptive interviews), and survey-based research is needed in order to not only 
describe the place of IMC technologies for human interaction but also to further 
unravel the specific meanings underscoring users' lived experiences of these IMC 
practices. In this spirit, some of the questions brought to light by this thesis's 
portrait of the interactional self needing further sociological and 
phenomenological exploration include, but are certainly not limited to, the 
following: 
How exactly are online and offline identities experienced and played 
with, if at all, by IMC interactants considering that, as Chee & Vieta 
(2004) found with online gamers or as Smith and Bakardjieva (1999) 
found with user-appropriated Internet use patterns, the rules of the 
communities formed online seem to be co-constructed around the 
affordances of the IMC tools? 
Inversely, how are these affordances being creatively appropriated to 
fit the social needs of users based on the phenomenological limits - the 
selectivity - of the online mediational tools at hand? 
Are the most popular tools for online sociability the ones that give 
users the most flexibility for self-disclosure or anonymity or do 
interactants choose IMC tools more instrumentally within a greater 
rubric of available technologies in light of the tool's availability, the 
level of self-disclosure required by the social setting, and the 
communicational tasks at hand? 
Can we say that, as the empirical evidence is showing, where new 
online identities are toyed with, the average online interactant tends 
not to dwell in these alternative identities permanently? That is, just as 
soccer players must eventually stop playing soccer and become 
farmers and uncles and teachers again, do online identity 
experimenters also return to more situated identities online? If so, 
when and how do IMC tools mediate these transitions? 
How do the above four questions offer insights into the point-of-view 
of users located within subordinate positions in the technical and 
institutional power hierarchies they reside in? What is the perspective 
of technical users of IMC on that hierarchy? And, do IMC settings 
(especially user-initiated IMC platforms and the interactions they 
afford, such as blogs) offer privileged insights into these power 
differentials that will then allow users to resistively and purposefully 
recreate the technological contours of their mediated communicational 
settings? 
Combining these remnant questions, we are left with the following two 
overarching research questions and one sub-question each that should inspire 
the Internet social researcher: 
How do the lived experiences of users in IMC settings compare when 
we look at the encounters with self, other, and community on a wide 
range of IMC tools? Are these new types of social formations or new 
ways of expressing long-held communicational and social practices? 
Can we begin to look at specific IMC tools as "technologies of self," 
"technologies of community," and "technologies of worldly 
encounter," in general? That is, do certain tools afford self-expression, 
or community formations, or resistive expressions, or democratic 
appropriations, or the manipulation of things online in more 
responsive and reflexive ways than others? If so, what are these 
affordances and how do they facilitate some human interactions and 
engagements while hindering other user experiences? 
Parting Images 
And so, the image of the interactional self that emerges out of the social 
interactional and phenomenological theories and portrait presented here is in 
many ways different from the fragmented, decentered, and hyper-individualized 
self of recent popularity. Instead of notions of the imploded self that lives in a 
media-saturated world of hyperreal simulacra with no "referential being or 
substance [as] 'an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference"' 
(Waskul & Douglass, 1997, quoting Baudrillard, 1981, p. l l ) ,  I have argued that 
the more traditional human philosophies of experience continue to convincingly 
position the self, online and off, as a socio-reflexive and auto-interpreting being 
of co-constituted, co-constructed, and socio-historically formed realities and 
phenomenologically-known possibilities, developed and redeveloped 
throughout its lifespan via a contingent engagement with the world. This 
interactional self is not a schizophrenic self of "multiple personalities" but a selfof 
multiple potentialities, shaped by the myriad social interconnections with others in 
a multitude of social ties, fulfilling varying degrees of social needs, whle 
constantly updating, reformatting, and reassessing the provinces of meaning 
defining its existence. While influenced by and constantly interpreting and 
negotiating a world that increasingly straddles the realms of computational and 
non-computational realities, the interactional self's essence, if you will, is not 
simulated, artificially created, or even changed wilfully but, at its core, is actually 
entrenched deeply in and is contingent on a social world. Further, its existential 
essence, though preontologically rootless, is in a constant search for stability, 
order, and home. In a never-ending search for self-definition and centeredness, 
the interactional self is a self always in flux in concomitant and contingent 
intersubjective life-worlds that, at the same time, shapes society's reality while 
interactionally moulding its own. Thus, as interactional selves, individuals live 
in an eternal present whle always aspiring to futures (projections/protensions) 
based on the reflectively accessible meanings of a past (reflectionslretentions). 
In other words, as interactional selves living within our presently-rooted stream 
of experience, that we aspire and that we remember moves us forward into the 
future while being always firmly planted in the experiences of our vivid and 
intersubjective present. In our interactions through the screen, we seem to be, on 
the whole, similarly guided. 
Appendix 1: 
A Diagram of Interactional Selves 
Figure 1: The interactional self and a world of life-worlds 
Everyday life is lived directly in the life-world, is interpreted by our accumulated stocks of knowledge, and is experienced 
through the life-world's mitigation. While it might appear from a cursory reading of Schutz that there is only one life- 
world, this is not the case; each individual has his or her own life-world with its own spatial and temporal horizons of 
experience. However, each life-world also overlaps with others' life-worlds to form the realm of social life in a world of 
life-worlds, so to speak. Ritzer (2000) interprets Schutz to mean here that "others belong to our life-world and we belong to 
the life-worlds of others" (p. 4191, each individual life-world, in turn, is anchored culturally and historically to each 
experiencing subjects' socio-biographies which, when melded together, give unique personalities to the various groups 
individuals form (Schutz, 1970, p. 84). Collectively, these infinitely interlinked life-worlds make up our common cultural 
world that is connected to a past of "predecessors" and shapes the present within the realm of our "contemporaries" and 
"consoaates," which will, in turn, shape the world of our "successors" (Schutz & Luckrnam, 1973, pp. 61-92). Moreover, 
each life-world overlaps with other life-worlds within "gradations of immediacy" or "degrees of sociability" (see 
Chaptefs 5 and 6). 
Gradations of immediacy: Lie-worlds 
overlap in "gradations of immediacy" or 
"degrees of sociability." Here, Suzie's and 
Jack's life-worlds overlap more deeply than 
do Jack's and Dingo's or Suzie's and Dingo's. 
The world of life-worlds: This means that Suzie and Jack perhaps have 
Dingo, Jack, and Suzie each a deeper, more multiplex relationship than 
have their own life-world but say Jack and Dingo do. That is, Suzie and 
also inhabit a world of Jack share a more intimate relationship and 
overlapping Life-worlds. perhaps have more areas of common affinity than each has with Dingo. Some areas of 
their affinities all intersect, however, forming 
the wtential for a communitv. 
Overlapping lifeworlds and community: Where Dingo's, Jack's, and Suzie's life-worlds 
overlao at the same time is where communik (or the formation of an "in-mou~") has the 
potenda~ to occur. This area of mutual integection between all three is wiere > o m o n  
projerts emerge. 
Appendix 2: 
Internet Use Patterns 
Table 1: What people do online 
UCLA Internet Report: Surveying the Digital Future(2000-2001) (UCLA, 2003) 
Email and instant messaging 
I I 
81.6% 
Web surfing or browsing 
Buying online 
87.9% 
Finding entertainment info 
81.7% 
57.2% 
Reading news 
Table 2: New users vs. very exeperienced users: What do they do online 
UCLA Internet Report: Surveying the Digital Future (2000-2001) (UCLA, 2003) 
76.3% 
48.9% 
56.6% 
Playing games 
Activities on the InteRlet 
47.9% 
54.3% 47.6% 
36.6% n /a  
Table 3: Daily Internet activities 
Pew Internet and American Life Project (Howard et al., 2003) 
All Users 
Fun 29.0% 
Information utility 33.0% 
Major life activities 21 .O% 
Monetary transactions 9.0% 
Appendix 3: 
A Few Examples of Blogs 
Figure 2: An anatomy of a blog 
Blog screenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Joichi Ito (2004). 
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link to a - 
separate 
page where 
comments by 
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another post 
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- Faceroll 
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/ comments/ 
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to present this 
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\ Search 
function. 
Readers can 
perform 
keyword 
searches on this 1 blog. 
Figure 3: An example of a blogroll 
Blog screenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Jon Husband (2004). 
A blogroll 
designed 
into the - 
main body 
of a blog. 
Figure 4: Two more examples of blogs 
Heart @ Work 
Thursday, July 2 2 . 2 0 ~  
Coodgrlef, iYsbamrwhobmdcndIhavcwrlmnnuyaword. IpwrriYsrummcrand 
the livin' is easy.... ktwl ly,  thaYs not entirely true. Ive done some guest preaching, called 
on folks In nurdng homes, worked with caPrVophk ~ncrscncy canr In my private 
counselin# practice, and trled to keep the house somewhat plcked up. rve also been really 
docmy m i k  me messarlly more buff or more enlightened. I just have to do i t  became I 
Intuitively know that building this life hablt Is importart. Practice reminds me to step back 
from a lot of life drams Into which I might ordinarily plunge. The bodily sVength I am 
Mldlng is a metaphor that I return to Umughout the day. Thc awamwss that we are 
t q h t  tn Mng to each posWe ad exercise rtppks out past thes? early morning how. 
How I see and hex ad taste and feel $0 much more than ever before. Pehzm that Is whv 
I've been less Inctined to mltc. I feel quietly Mtssful, orte tiny note in a h k  
symphony, contmt to be tncluded in the mythm and vibration of the larger whole. 
Blog screenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Lois Annich (2004). 
July 27, 2004 W 3 9  AM 
- n - keep the old one up and link to it 
e b e c n u r i n g ~ , a p y m m ~ w i k i b c c a ~ ~ I ~ h t I ' d b e a b l e t o h a c k i t  
n K c  I w x  laming W(hon. It t u r ~  out that I h a w T  had any time to hack MoinMDin and 
frarkly, it lmlu too difficult for me. The $gcialText ( l h  an inrsrtor and an tha board) 
wikisof twan~bcmncqui te~b(ewi thnmmolfwtue.u , I~dccldcdtoIwl~  
my main wiki fmm Mdn Moin to SociatTat. The qiwh I haw is wh&w I I d  
migrate page fran my old wiki and w k t k  I hould mntinuc N n i r n ~  the dd wiki. If I 
am going to migrate the pw, another qeska i s  how to m ~ u c  the pages. .. ~nyorr 
haw any tharqhts? 
Ik been wait iy  for this to happn. Software needs pmfmiaanti to arpport it. This is the 
secret viral strategy of opn nxrm software. Om people start using it - thefre hmked. 
Iknw&t theopn,uauppor tcdWik ib ihsd .muld~HAVEto&wi l lh to  
Mystery solved - "How did Photoblox take off in Japan" 
For almmrt twa m o n ~  mw - Wek ken wadcring bar mw 4.000 Moggm in M n  
find out abart teh l&o PhotDMm Blog obJcct. 
Well - we just f o w l  out. 
H a &  what Lyndon Wmi mld nu: 
In M m i l  Un-rod with KUllbtw, ourpfwtdAox fan fmm bpon, I haw dxawred: 
I thc NoJsar Pmjut h m tin main b l g  paw of &pann$ largest iSP. 
T k  d(og6ox Project mention h at: hltp:llmm.cocdog-nilty.cmlli&tlinkM.hbn 
Halfway down tk page of featurd cool sluff is tk rnby on thr Biogbox ProJectcct 
complete with unm &at. Further down thot same list, yw can qmt S~JL&& (crvatrn of 
~ I e T ~ ,  which pawen Wiftfs Caalogi and Gwgle News. Laszlo BIogboxer are in 
conww. 
.................. 
I T k  blog h poject 
R k h  b t e r f a c e ~ t u r e ,  sticking to thc side bar oj U$B%V%rn%OU(J, thc tml wh 1 Y U W 3 k ~ a L b a ~ a & ~ ~ ~ a ~ t k d i d ~ r h m e t c C o f t h c p i c  
. . . . . . . . . . . .  ... 
40 friends 
Alexasmuchasicl~ 
52 friends 
rn 
56 friends 
Blog saeenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Marc Canter (2004). 
Figure 5: An example of how running commentaries inspired by a blog post 
might appear on an actual blog page 
Blog screenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Stephen VanDyke (2004). 
(See next page). 
How News Travels on the internet- 
(r--&--) 
, ,,, .,.,. -. -...... e Media 
(e.a. Reuters.com,  corn, MSNBC.com, '1 AP) 
post 
Comments 
/ regarding post (Continues on next page). 
3 Mandav's Random Rarnrlamahmdambllnas 
4 Stephen VanOykx 1 Hew Ncm T r A r  on me Inlernet 
Slephen VanDyke . H m  Nevs T18velS on the Internet -VIE borq  bornq 
5 I d lhke to k n r v  mwe a h 1  &Q rnersar Seems lhke amlhwq 'multiaarrced" can 
b e c m  nawr W l e  lor the lake (but nm not2 caamlc M y  moa~ l~cm~ca  
thal k a m e  big new bul lhey wore nol wsmetlc amplants Also Ihe W e  
thng wth that CIA .qm exposed was In a m u d  about way to drspell haw Ihe 
US gets the~r ~n~elbgence t h y  are mi ~ R R  sourced 
6 $1 T an mtfnla~nmg Chart IILMlsver whale tt D In* thal lhore 6asM twm5 am 
ralely rrttnbuled you seem lo be Im@ylq thal thal Is a bad tMng Wl Irn a le  
Suppcae I pass acong a lhnk lo  a nw, vea pap lo my r e n w  Dernuse I Ihln): 
11 I I q  IX C ~ W  w Whetewer W a t  s lhb lmpnant vnlormatlm It s the 
It*: 111d1 Wtw awes a re1 s ass hOX I found 11' 01 what w r m e  mteauence 
6 11 to anyom t k t  I l o u d  11 frmb B a q B a q  m a  twnd 11 tmm M a m e w  uha 
lwna n t m  SldsfXIOI ltlO t w M  st t w n  Atwnynlovs Couatd niro qul 11 In 
g011~cal~n Of w e  Mm tI+e met wasle ma1 Imf day dredgmq tne nec 
lne h r ~  IIM tn tne cham ,s IW m e  IWI s the x t u u  credrfn act 
tne chao ufi cn is  exaruy &I I ~d m mma. but I also & hat aitnout,ons 
01 llas r!iamr ran  irlso be wq limy may ,!nk lo tha ma& t q e  lnrtesa d 10 
Wcm 11 was actwfly lovnd SOmelliw6 It's lrnpwslMe to Oa 11 any other way d 
c w n e  
I ve boon cornplnq a t a  lrom Ihe ammnl d trafllc Rooeraled tm thn and Ill 
deflnllely be &np a Wlar*up 
8 St* your qrapn delmtely rnaka d earta to see the f l w  04 mnlonnem 
Imm source to l ogs  lo m a n  DUlfPLs and so on But whRl I lowtd mlwerlmg 
a m 1  It* Btoa EpOdrmt Analyzer 8nd !Ee relaled resewch at HP Lebs was tM1 
ther hed conbe un mlh a wav lo mfer where ~ n f m a t t m  came Imm even M w  
lraca the f l w  01 12ea1 M n  there arc no e~plCIt lmks back to lne sorvce I 
Sounds lke ycuf r s u ~ ~ ~ z m ~ o n  l s c h w  am HP Labs r mlerence tecmogy 
I) , uae IVM layerr ai Imnhage e ma* eg d I see an anhcle on the CNN set0 I M I  rs 
actuallv an AP s t w  I lust make Ihe k k  lCNN!AP)mth the I~nk dlmle6 lathe 
Impatant to onue trsffic lo the smcdl Mw lor three rsaralr le Ilrsl bmnq 
SMIDIP courtew IM $ e m  to elfecl a 'demccratwm 01 the mlo' lWh~ch can 
10 Sclf-rshrenUaI Llnklnp 
l r m  borng b o q  vta Mqhnes There s an tmereslmq article by Stephen 
VonWke crlled 'How Nw Travels on Ihe Intanel which has the graphlr be lw 
whch he created to demonstrate he sees the IMW o' ~nlormatnn on the ne! 
CIKk 
11 
Stephen VanDyhe Hon Nem Tiavels on the tntem (If yw re wonberlng where 
DPH mghl fall m th~s - the slle s been gLctmg an aver@e d 4WO m e  a @st 
t c a a d v t w )  
12 Screw the artlclf look st t M  mIxi n thp sub1 In thp upper r l p  comer a d  read 
lk accompaolng lexl i N I l  la Feat' 
13 Whad y w  put th~nqs hke LweJoumst am Ckarytand m Ihe 'lesser bl~gaphsre'7 
14 HI Ele It m a J d  depend m the Mop'lournd of course I k m  lhal LJ mC DL tath 
- a  n W r  n* r entr, rr 7 4  v c l ~ r  nt - r ~  -a Cn Xy";(p- bi.*: ~l18.q e. $ 4  
Figure 6: An example of a collaborative online essay by multiple authors. 
Collaborative essay screenshot used by permission of its creator and manager, Joichi Ito (2004). 
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O D I O P U I O Q  
I Emergent Democracy 
Mostly by loichi It0 
Version 1.40 October 1, 2003 
Note: another mnlon 01 thb document b In process, to be Included In a the ExtremeDemocracy book Jon Lebkowsky and Mltch Ratcltffe 
a n  edltlng. I t  p u  ham changes, additions, or comments In mlnd, please contact Jon Lebkowsky at  jonl at  polycot.com. 
Proponents of the Internet have long sought a more Intelligent lnternet whlch can help correct the Imbalances and lnequalltles of the world. Today, 
the lnternet Is a noisy environment wvrlth a great deal of power consohdat~on instead of the level, balanced democratic Internet many envision. 
In 1993 Howard Rhelngold wrote[l], 
We temporarily have access to a tool that could brlng conviviality and understanding into our llves and mlght help revltallze the public 
sphere. The same tool, improperly controlled and wlelded, could become an instrument of tyranny. The virion of a citlren-deslgned, citizen- 
controlled worldwlde communlcatlons network is a version of technological utopoanlsm that could be called the vision of 'the electronic 
agora.' I n  the original democracy, Athens, the agora was the marketplace, and more--it was where clUzens met to talk, gossip, argue, slze 
each other up, find the weak spots in polltical Ideas by debating about them. But another kind of vlslon could apply to the use of the Net In 
the wrong ways, a shadow vislon of a less utoplan klnd of place-the Panoptlcon. 
Rhelngold has been called naive.[2] While the lnternet has become a global agora, or meeung place, effectlve global conversation and debate Is 
just beglnnlng. We are on the verge of an awakenlng of the Internet, an awakenlng that may either facllltate the emergence of a new democratic 
p~l l t lcal  model (Rheingold's revitalization of the public sphere), or more fully enable the corporations and governments of the world to control, 
monitor and influence their populations, leaving the individual at the mercy of and under constant scrutiny by those in power (an electronic, global 
Panopticon). 
[I'm havlrg trouble followirg the last sentence In this paragraph, glven that It's nve lines long. Can this be broken up, deparenthes~zed, or 
othemlse revlsed to flow better? - -  rs] 
We must influence the development and use of these tools and technologies to support democracy, or they wall be turned against us by 
corporations, totalltarlan reglmes and terrorists. To do so, we must begin to understand the process and ImplicaUons of this Emergent Democracy. 
Thls new polltlcal model must support the basic characterlstlcs of democracy and reverse the erosion of democratic principles that has occurred 
under the burden of concentrating power within corporations and governments. New technologies may enable the emergence of a functional, more 
direct democraUc system which is able to manage complex Issues and will support, change or replace indlrect, exlstlng representative 
democracies. 
[Last sentence nlled with commas, tripped over 'replace indirect'as a phrase until I realrzed the comma grouping pattern. .- rs] 
The dictionary defines democracy as 'government by the people in whlch the supreme power is vested In the people and exercised dlrectly by 
them or by thelr elected agents under a free electoral system.' With the Gettysburg address, Abraham Uncoln gave us a more eloquent deflnltlon, 
government -of the people, by the people, and for the people.' 
A functional democracy Is governed by the majority while protectlng the rights of ail mlnoritles. To achieve this balance, a democracy relles on a 
competltlon of ideas, which, In turn, requlres freedom of speech and the ability to criucize those in power without fear of retribution. In an 
effective reeresenta'lve dc-ocracv eawer must also be distributed to several points of authority to enable checks and balances and reconcile 
(Continued on next page.) 
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Appendix 4: 
Why Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz? 
It is perhaps appropriate to say a few words about why I used and 
combined the phlosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz in this 
thesis. A question that might come up for the reader is whether it is appropriate 
to combine the theories of these phlosophers for theorizing everyday sociability 
that is increasingly mediated by networked technologies such as IMC. While 
differences between the four philosophers exist, I believe there are aspects of 
their philosophies that can be melded together. Indeed, each time I read these 
four philosophers, and as I begin to explore in this thesis, I am more convinced 
that there is a powerful fit between various areas of their thought, especially 
when looking at the self as situated in our increasingly complex and 
technologically-mediated social world. While I attempt in this appendix to touch 
on the key theoretical links I have found to date between these four theorists and 
their relevance to IMC, the following review will have to be limited to a few brief 
words. There is no doubt in my mind that a comparative analysis of their work 
could span several volumes and a lifetime of scholarship. Over the next few 
years, I hope to explore in more detail some of the connections between these 
philosophers and their relevance for understanding Internet practices specifically 
and our place in technological existence more generally. 
Importantly, I'd like to clarify off the top that in interlinlung Husserl, 
Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz for developing my theory of the interactional self 
within the context of IMC, I am not seeking to efface their variances. Rather than 
effacement, this paper follows fitzer's (2000b) Kuhn-inspired suggestions for 
"paradigm linlung, leaping, bridging, and integrating" (p. 496) in sociological 
research. In one of these paradigm linkages, fitzer connects action theories, 
symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and existentialism 
under the umbrella of "the social-definition paradigm" of sociology and social 
theory (p. 498). fitzer claims social theorists and sociologists that fall into this 
paradigm are interested in "the way actors define their social situations and the 
effect of these definitions on ensuing action and interaction" (p. 498). While only 
Mead and Schutz can be seen as working primarily within the field of sociology, 
Husserl and Heidegger can be seen as offering the first ontological and 
phenomenological footsteps that undergird, if indirectly, the social theories of 
Mead and Schutz. Moreover, I believe all four philosophers of human 
experience at the heart of this thesis can be said to fruitfully ground such a social 
definition paradigm. In the spirit of Ritzer's paradigm for sociology, then, t h s  
thesis uses the theoretical connections and intellectual congruencies between 
Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz for the interactional self and attempts to 
show how these connections afford excellent footing for identifying and 
understanding the social uses of the Internet in everyday life. In the following 
paragraphs of this appendix, I will first touch on some of the differences between 
these four philosophers of human experience and will then elaborate on the a 
fewe of the strong concordances between them. 
Distinctions 
While the early Heidegger (1962/2001, et passim) worked within the 
phenomenological standpoint he acquired from Husserl as his student and 
intellectual successor, Heidegger disagreed with his teacher on the primacy of 
consciousness for coming to know the world. To Husserl(1913/ 1931, et passim) 
the world is constituted and experienced through a complex continuum between 
a directed and "intentional" consciousness of the things of the world and the 
always partial "givenness" of those things to consciousness as filtered through 
the various ways we experience worldly things (see Chapters 1 and 5). 
Heidegger instead obstinately looked at the ontological level of existence, or Being 
(Sein), rather than consciousness throughout his published works, especially 
when discussing the existential worldly "being" aware of its "Being" (existence) 
that dwells in Dasein (Steiner, 1992) and how Dasein "concernfullyff copes with 
the things of the world (see Chapter 3). '" For Husserl, existence and 
consciousness were inseparable. For Heidegger, existence and encounter came 
before consciousness. And, while Husserl and Heidegger worked within the 
philosophical realms of the phenomenological attitude and used its framework 
to articulate how an experiencing human being and the world are intimately 
intertwined, Mead (1934, et passim) and Schutz (1970, et pas~im)'~ theorized 
primarily at the sociological level when they both looked at interpersonal action, 
interactional existence, and communication as the foundations for our pragmatic 
and social concerns (Joas, 1985; Ritzer, 2000a). Moreover, although not as rigid as 
Watson's stimuli-response behaviourism, Mead relied on behaviourist principles 
of action, albeit dialectically intertwined with consciousness and society (Joas, 
1985): For Mead, the human organism reacted to environmental stimuli but also 
learned from these encounters; to Mead, engagements with things and others 
were inherently entrenched in social settings and contexts."O Heidegger and 
Schutz, on the other hand, grounded human actions in the Husserlian-inspired 
concepts of intentionality and meaning rooted in human experience (Taminiaux, 
'" Rather than Husserl's contention that the world is made known solely through the 
intentionality of consciousness - that consciousness is always directed towards an imagined, 
material, procedural, or conceptual object - Heidegger instead proposed a practical 
intentionality, or engagement, with the world and that consciousness is already always in the 
world in the form of Dasein (Taminiaux, 1994). Thus, Heidegger moves beyond Husserl's focus 
on the descriptive meanings of experience made known in consciousness and replaces 
consciousness with the self-interpreting being that dwells in Dasein (loosely, his word for the 
meaning-making human), a being that is aware of itself as a Being, that is formed by the act of 
encountering the world, is constituted by the world, and is in a constant interpretive engagement 
with the world. 
'@ Schutz also worked within the phenomenological attitude but was expressly concerned with 
the sociological issues of intersubjectivity and action. Heidegger and Husserl were more 
generally focused on articulating a phenomenological standpoint and a methodology for 
philosophical reflections concerning how the world is made known from the perspective of an 
experiencing human being and, in Heidegger's case, how we can think about existence ("Being") 
(Wagner, 1983; Taminiaux, 1994). 
"O Using an amended social behaviourism (Joas, 1985; Ritzer, 2000a), Mead "attempted to 
formulate a non-reductionist orientation to psychology that nevertheless drew on the natural 
sciences and was concerned with a theory of action" goas, 1985, p. 5). 
1994; Wagner, 1983): Heidegger in the concept of the intentionality of all human 
encounters with the world's beings (Taminiaux, 1984; Dreyfus, 1991) and Schutz 
in the notion that all intersubjective action is still, at its core, rooted in the 
intentionality of consciousness (Wagner, 1983). Thus, to Heidegger, all 
encounters are directed at something encountered and, to Schutz, like Husserl, 
all consciousness is conscious of something. Mead, did not have a theory similar 
to intentionality and was opposed to studying mental processes 
"introspectively" (although he was contesting the psychology of Watson here, 
not phenomenological methods per se) (fitzer & Goodman, 2004). Instead, 
Mead thought that the social act was the primary human vantage point from 
which to assess the human mind and interaction (fitzer & Goodman, 2004, p. 
384). 
Congruencies 
With this brief look at some of the theorists' main distinctions from each 
other two major questions still remain: Why use these four phlosophers for 
thinking about how we encounter the world as mediated by the Internet and 
what concordances do these four philosophers have? 
First, all four are foundational for each of their respective areas withn the 
phlosophies of experience and, I believe, should not be ignored by 
contemporary communication researchers. Second, all four address our place as 
human beings within the subject/ object dichotomy, and that a sense of self is 
necessarily forged by, coexists with, and is contingent upon the world, thus also 
problematizing the dichotomy. But primarily, for all four philosophers, 
awareness of others and things were deeply contingent on one's socio- 
biographical experiences forged within the world of things, others, and projects. 
All four philosophers, for example, believe the following: 1) that we exist among 
a world of manipulable things; 2) that through a manipulation of these things we 
project unto the world, come to know the world, change the world, and are 
changed by the world; 3) that the world is open to our manipulation and 
interpretation but that the world also resists and pushes back; 4) that we live in a 
world with others; and 5) that others validate our own existence and our sense of 
self by reciprocating our communicative advances (Dreyfus, 1991; Joas, 1985; 
fitzer, 2000a, 2004; Taminiaux, 1994; Wagner, 1983). In what follows I articulate 
some of these connections that I further elaborate on throughout this thesis. 
Foundationally, on both sides of the Atlantic at the beginning of the 2oth 
century, separate but related movements towards the philosophies of human 
experience began to take form in the humanities via phenomenology and 
Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) in Europe and pragmatism in the US. One 
of the common aspects of these movements was an attempt to resist the primacy 
of "psychologism," "positivism," and "scientism" that prevailed in sociology and 
the social sciences, and that was encroaching in on philosophy at the end of the 
1 9 ~ ~  century (Bowie, 2003). Instead the late-19~~ and early-20th centuries saw the 
emergence of a movement towards a philosophy of experience on both sides of 
the Atlantic that sought to look at "a possible grounding of the human or social 
sciences by revealing how the objects of these sciences are constituted in the 
communicative life-praxis of human beings" (Joas, 1985, p. 41). Indeed, this was, 
in their own separate circumstances but with links via the work of Simmel, 
Weber, James, Mead, Dilthey, and Schutz, amongst others, one of the major 
projects of both pragmatism and phenomenology (Joas, 1995; Mattelart & 
Mattelart, 1998; Moran & Mooney, 2002; Ritzer, 2004). All four philosphers fall 
within this movement. 
All four are also seminal thinkers for the notion that human beings come 
to understand the world through directly experiencing it. In addition, there is 
evidence of a cross-pollination occurring between the continentals and the 
pragmatists throughout the 2oth century concerning this, especially via the 
philosophy of Bergson and Husserl (Joas, 1985). Husserl, for instance was the 
first to fully articulate the phenomenological method for understanding the deep 
structures of experience and consciousness and greatly inspired the early 
thinking of Heidegger and Heidegger's own interpretation of phenomenology 
(Taminiaux, 1994). Husserl's work was also central for Schutz's sociological 
phenomenology and especially in the latter's conceptualizations of the life-world 
and intersubjectivity, which he then took to America after his exile from Austria 
in the late '30s (Wagner, 1983; Ritzer, 2000a). It is also undeniable that Mead was 
also influenced in part by German Lebensphilosoplzie and the "factical" view of life 
that also influenced Heidegger and early 2oth century German thought via the 
work of Dilthey (Joas, 1985, pp. 41-43). "' Dilthey's thinking concerning the 
"facticity" of the sciences and of practical life had affinities with American 
pragmatism and Mead even studied under Dilthey for a time (Joas, 1985, p, 41). 
Heidegger is the philosopher who reintroduced the exploration of "Being" and 
was, arguably, one of the most important philosophers of the 2oth century, taking 
continental phlosophy to the deep realms of the subjective and factically 
entrenched individual acting in a world. Mead bridged the mental world with 
the social and was one of the founders of American pragmatism and the founder 
of symbolic interactionism, inspiring Blumer, Goffman, aspects of Schutz's work, 
and others (Blasi, 1998). And Schutz brought Husserlian phenomenology to the 
social realm as well as doing much to introduce Husserl to North America. In 
addition, Schutz quoted Mead, James, Dewey and other pragmatist's often and 
can be thought of as an important bridge between continental phenomenology 
and American pragmatism (Ritzer, 2000a). 
Tellingly, all four also quote Bergson at times in their writings suggesting 
a strong link between all four theorists' concepts of "time," a concept also 
particularly key to Husserl's phenomenology. To all four, there are notions of a 
sense of self that is intricately tied to one's time-based biographical experiences 
which sees the memory (Bergson) or "retention" (Husserl) of past experiences 
informing present decisions and actions as well as "projecting  ergso son) or 
"protaining" (Husserl) future plans and actions. For example, Heidegger's 
"Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1962/2001, p. 153; Steiner, 1992), Mead's self 
and "reflective consciousness" (Mead, 1934, p. 22; Ritzer, 2000a), and Schutz's 
"stocks of knowledge" and realms of intersubjective interaction (Schutz & 
Luckman, 1973, p. 111; Ritzer, 2000a) all relied on Bergsonian notions of time's 
11' For Wilhelm Dilthey "facticity" or "factical life" was lived experience in a pragmatically 
practical and inherently social world with the biography of individuals being influential in 
malung up that social world. 
non-mechanistic, biographically entrenched "flows" (see Joas, 1985; Ritzer, 2000a; 
Steiner, 1992) (see Chapter 5 for an elaboration of Bergson's and Husserl's 
notions of time and space for the interactional self). 
Another related complement between the four philosophers of experience 
includes very compatible notions of the selfwith others; indeed, all four had 
concepts of "the self" and "others" and how others impact the self. All four 
philosophers, for example, agree that the self emerges, in varying degrees, as a 
dialectic between a social world and an inner being. This notion can be seen in 
the following related concepts: Husserl's (1970) "alteration of [intersubjective] 
validity through reciprocal correction" (p. 163) by "living together" (p. 108) (see 
Chapter 2); Heidegger's Dasein, "Being-in-the-world" and "Being-with-others" 
(Mitsein) (see Chapter 3); Mead's "I" and "me" (see Chapter 4); Schutz's concepts 
of "intersubjectivity" (see Chapter 5); the "working" and "partial" self (see 
Chapter 5); and urnwelt ("we-relations") and rnihuelt ("they-relations") (see 
Chapter 6); as well as in their agreement that the "real" is tightly intertwined 
with the world of self with others, and that the world is contingent on the 
individual as the "point zero" of experience. 
For these and other reasons that are elaborated on throughout t h s  thesis - 
not least of which are the kernels of theories of mediation in all of their writings 
that I particularly touch on in the thesis - I am increasingly convinced that 
Husserl, Heidegger, Mead, and Schutz can be reckoned with together when 
considering aspects of the human experience of the self in the social world and, 
thus, when contemplating how the Internet and networked society in general 
interplay with, affect, and afford sociability. 
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